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[I]n the twentieth century we have become increasingly
sensitive to the fact that even in the sciences that depend
crucially upon measurement (whether these include all
sciences or only a majority of them), measurement alone is
not enough. To serve the purposes of science, the measure-
ment must be susceptible to comparison. And comparability
of measurements requires some common understanding of
their accuracy, some way of measuring and expressing the
uncertainty in their values and the inferential statements
derived from them.
STEPHEN M. STIGLER'
I. INTRODUCTION
Through the use of statistical and econometric techniques,
social scientists can offer powerful new insights into the causes and
effects of changes in the law. Despite a long tradition of empirical
research by both economists and political scientists into diverse
political institutions, investigations of the common law using meth-
ods more sophisticated than simply counting cases or votes is a
relatively recent development.2 Given the natural laboratory provid-
ed by the heterogenous development of the common law in the
multitude of jurisdictions in the United States, the lack of such
research is surprising. Extending this scholarly tradition to common
law subjects promises great rewards. Changes in the common law
have significant effects on virtually every aspect of modem life.
Just in the last fifty years, for example, there have been far-reach-
ing developments in employment law, landlord-tenant law, and tort
1. STEPHEN M. STIGLER, THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS 1 (1986).
2. There have been some relatively sophisticated counting exercises, particularly in the
area of legal history. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme
Courts, 76 MICH. L. REv. 961 (1978) (utilizing sophisticated statistical and data analysis
techniques to support his thesis). An exception to this lack is the political science litera-
ture on diffusion of judicial innovations. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence Baum,
Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of Diffusion Theory to
Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 975 (1981). Among the few articles examin-
ing the speed of legal changes empirically using the states as a laboratory are JAMEs A.
DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, LABOR MARKEr RESPONSES TO EMPLOYER LIABILrrY
(Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice Paper R-3989-ICJ, 1992); Bradley C. Canon
& Dean Jaros, The Impact of Changes in Judicial Doctrine: The Abrogation of Charitable
Immunity, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 969 (1979); and Christopher Curran, The Spread of the
Comparative Negligence Rule in the United States, 12 INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 317
(1992).
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law. Evaluations of the effects of these changes would provide
valuable information to legislatures and courts considering such
changes. Even greater benefits are possible for the development of
the economic analysis of law, where empirical work on the com-
mon law has lagged far behind theoretical work.
The difficulty of accurately dating changes in the common law
partly explains the absence of research into their causes and conse-
quences. Unlike statutes, common law changes are often unan-
nounced or hidden beneath layers of obscure language. Although
courts sometimes do make an explicit innovation,3 in many in-
stances courts characterize the change simply as the application of
existing precedent to slightly different factual circumstances.4 The
many sources of the common law introduce further complications.
Not only may a decision come from different levels of a state's
courts, but federal courts may decide questions of state law prior to
the state courts in some circumstances.5 Finally, the development
of the common law is an iterative process. Courts may change
their interpretation of existing precedent or explicitly overrule it.
What appears to be one rule may turn out years later to be an
entirely different rule.6
3. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Ariz. 1985)
("We therefore adopt the public policy exception [to the employment-at-will rule] . . .
4. In M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 1980), for example, the Arkansas
Supreme Court found no wrongful discharge claim on the facts before it but nevertheless
indicated that different facts might lead it to recognize a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will rule. I count Counce as adopting a public policy exception because I
view it as creating a strong presumption that such an exception would be created. (I have
found no cases where a court made a statement like the one in Counce and later rejected
a claim on the grounds that the exception did not exist.) See infra Appendix B for addi-
tional discussion of Counce. The choice of which opinion should be viewed as the inno-
vation will depend, in part, on the effect which is being studied. If the study is con-
cered with when a particular jurisdiction has become committed to a particular legal
doctrine, then a decision adopting the new rule with certainty may be the appropriate
choice. On the other hand, if the issue is when the old rule was no longer certain to
apply, then a different opinion, perhaps suggesting in dicta that the court was considering
changes, might be appropriate. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d
725 (Ala. 1987) (adopting the implied contract exception to employment-at-will and por-
traying the decision as merely an application of existing law rather than as a change in
the law). See the dissenting opinion of Justice Maddox for an explanation of how the
decision really constituted a change from previous Alabama employment law cases. Id. at
740-52 (Maddox, J., dissenting).
5. See infra part II.B.2 (discussing this issue). Again, the question of what is being
measured may help resolve the issue of which opinion to count.
6. Two important examples of such changes are the implied covenants of good faith
and fair dealing in employment contracts in New Hampshire and California. The New
Hampshire Supreme Court radically rewrote what had been one of the broadest opinions
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Social science research on common law issues has suffered
from three difficulties:
* inconsistent treatment of opinions;
* incomplete analysis of changes in the law; and
* hidden choices which affect results.
In this Article, I attempt to delineate and resolve various method-
ological problems that can critically affect research conclusions in
this area.
In Part II, I develop eighteen general principles to guide re-
searchers in solving the problem of dating changes. Although there
are no simple answers which resolve every problem, researchers'
application of these principles will ensure that their decisions about
dating changes are appropriate to the problem studied and, just as
important, are open to scholarly review.
In Part m, I present my own analysis of the impact of the
modem law of wrongful discharge' and reanalyze two recent em-
pirical papers by economists which analyzed the impact of the
modem common law development of wrongful discharge claims in
the United States.' This Part not only provides a clear example of
the application of the general principles but demonstrates how
different choices can affect the results of empirical research.
on the subject, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974), while claiming
it had not. See Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (N.H. 1980); see also
Bergeron v. Travelers Ins. Co., 480 A.2d 42 (N.H. 1984); infra note 81. Similarly, the
California Supreme Court substantially changed the law with regard to the damages avail-
able for breach of the covenant from the remedy which the intermediate appellate court
h d provided in Cleary v. American Airlines Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980). See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting Cleary
and holding that only contract damages can be sought for a breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing).
The iterative nature of the common law process led Landes and Posner to reject the
idea of measuring change from a particular decision. William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979). George Priest
has also recently argued against dating change by traditional common law legal methods,
suggesting use of settlement ratios as a more accurate measure of change. George L.
Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J. OF L., ECON. & ORG. 193, 222 (1987).
7. The development of common law remedies for wrongful discharge provides an
ideal set of circumstances for the development of these principles. Not only are there
three independent datings of the changes, but the rapidity and widespread nature of the
changes mean that the case law illustrates almost every problem researchers are likely to
encounter.
8. See DERTouzos & KAROLY, supra note 2; Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Un-
just-Dismissal Legislation in the United States, 44 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV. 644 (1991).
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The results are both reassuring and a cause for concern. They
are reassuring because they suggest that conclusions are not "too"
sensitive to debatable methodological choices. Point estimates
change, often substantially, but wholesale reversals of conclusions
do not occur. The concern stems from the sensitivity of empirical
results to the dating method used. Unless researchers use systematic
judgments informed by legal reasoning in addition to empirical
skill, they are in danger of making critical errors. Although caution
is advisable in generalizing from the limited number of empirical
examples which space permits here, the results of the case studies
are encouraging. They suggest that such studies are reliable if done
properly. More importantly, the principles developed here provide
researchers with a clear framework for approaching these important
choices.
I. METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
Empirical research into the common law has three require-
ments: (1) the definition of common law events; (2) the choice of
a method of dating common law events; and (3) the choice of a
structure of analysis. To discuss these issues at a general level
requires a considerable degree of abstraction. I will attempt to
resolve the tension between generality and specificity by discussing
issues generically, with appropriate examples from the employment-
at-will area. Some conventions are useful: (1) "Rule X" refers to
the rule whose adoption or impact is being studied;9 (2) "Rule X"
refers to the adoption of a rule inconsistent with Rule X;' (3)
"Rule Y" refers to the adoption of a rule not inconsistent with
Rule X; " and (4) "Rule Q" refers to one of the other rules of the
legal system which have an impact on the court's consideration of
a particular case. 2
9. In the at-will case, Rule X might be the initial adoption of the at-will rule or the
adoption of a particular modem exception to the at-will rule.
10. The New Hampshire experience with Monge and Dorr, see supra note 6, furnishes
a good example of this. Dorr's rule (Rule X) was inconsistent with Monge (Rule X) al-
though not all cases are decided differently under them. See supra note 6 and infra note
81. Rule X could also represent a rejection of an exception entirely where Rule X is
adoption of the exception.
11. Where Rule X represents a public policy exception, Rule Y might be an implied
contract exception.
12. Rule Q might be, for example, the rule that a party must preserve its objection to
language in the court's instructions to a jury by noting it at the time. See, e.g., FED. R.
CIv. P. 51 (detailing the procedure that must be followed when counsel objects to jury
1004 [Vol. 45:999
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A. Definition of Common Law Events
Defining common law events is much more difficult than
defining legislative events. I first examine a systematic attempt by
federal courts applying habeas corpus law to define what is a "new
rule.""3 It is useful to consider the difficulties the courts have en-
countered in defining what constitutes a new rule and applying that
definition. I then discuss the factors which need to be considered
in empirical work.
1. The Jurisprudence of "New Rules"
The Supreme Court has on a number of occasions interpreted
the federal Constitution to require states to take (or refrain from
taking) certain actions in obtaining criminal convictions. Any rule
clearly applies to state court criminal proceedings which begin after
the rule is announced. When the state conviction has become final
before the rule is announced, however, the applicability of the
precedent has been less clear. 4 In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme
Court held that if the rule is a "new" rule it is not available as a
source of law for collateral attacks on convictions fimalized before
the rule is announced, while if the rule is not "new" it is available
for use in collateral proceedings concerning convictions final before
the rule is announced. The application of this distinction has
proven difficult, however. The fractured nature of the Supreme
instructions). A plaintiff in a wrongful discharge case who contends on appeal that the
trial court incorrectly described the legal parameters of a wrongful discharge claim to the
jury could be barred from pursuing this objection if he did not adequately note his objec-
tion at the time the instructions were given. An appellate court might therefore not reach
the question of whether a new exception to the at-will rule applied, since the issue was
not properly before it.
13. Courts also consider the newness of rules in determining whether they apply retro-
actively. See, e.g., Bergeron v. Travelers Ins. Co., 480 A.2d 42 (N.H. 1984) (applying
Dorr result retroactively). The retroactivity cases are neither more enlightening nor notice-
ably more doctrinally coherent with regard to defining newness than the habeas cases and
so they are not discussed here.
14. In other words, any rule announced at time t clearly applies to state court criminal
proceedings which begin at time t, > t. when the state conviction has become final at
t, < t, the applicability of the precedent announced at time t has been less clear.
15. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300-11 (1989). This section is not an attempt to
state with completeness the Teague doctrine. (Two significant omissions are the exceptions
to Teague and the pre-Teague law on retroactivity in habeas cases). This section is an
attempt to draw from this area of the law guidance for social science research. For one
of the many doctrinal discussions of Teague, see Joseph L. Hoffmann, Retroactivity and
the Great Writ: How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv.
183.
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Court's opinions and the Court's shifting voting patterns 6 reveal
the difficulty of determining a rule's newness.
In Teague and its progeny, the members of the Supreme Court
have articulated three somewhat different tests for newness. All
three depend on the specificity of the statement of the rule-the
more specific the statement, the more likely the rule is to be clas-
sified as "new." The starting point of the "newness" jurisprudence
is the description by the four-justice Teague plurality: 7
[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground
or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal
Government.... To put it differently, a case announces a
new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent exist-
ing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.'
In the first Supreme Court case applying the Teague plurality
test, Penry v. Lynaugh, 9 a majority labelled one rule (the moral
culpability rule)' as new,2 but another rule (the mitigation
rule)'2 as not new.' Dissenting on the latter, Justice Scalia ar-
gued that a "new rule, must include not only a new rule that re-
places an old one, but a new rule that replaces palpable uncertainty
as to what the rule might be."2 4
Teague and Penry, as a majority of the sharply divided en
banc Fifth Circuit observed, "do not immediately yield a clearly
articulable definition of a 'new rule."'" "[D]ictated by precedent"
is simply not a useful way to categorize cases for either habeas
review or social science. Given enough generality, precedent may
appear to dictate most rules; given sufficient particularity, the same
16. See infra Appendix A for a table of Supreme Court voting patterns on Teague and
its progeny.
17. Joining the plurality decision were Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist.
18. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original).
19. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
20. According to the moral culpability rule, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execu-
tion of mentally retarded persons because they "do not possess the level of moral culpa-
bility to justify imposing the death sentence." Id. at 328-29.
21. Id. at 329.
22. The mitigation rule requires that juries must, upon request, be given jury instruc-
tions that make it possible for them to give effect to mitigating evidence in determining
whether the death penalty should be imposed. Id. at 318-19.
23. Id. at 315.
24. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 352 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1288 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), affd sub nom.
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
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rules are innovations. As the Fifth Circuit majority argued, the
Teague analysis is inextricably bound up with the question of the
substance of the rule in question itself.'
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court returned to the question
the following term. Beginning with the obvious, the majority in
Butler v. McKellar27 noted that, aside from the simple case of an
explicit overruling of a past holding, "where the new decision is
reached by an extension of the reasoning of previous cases, the
inquiry will be more difficult."' The petitioner, Butler, argued
that Arizona v. Roberson29 (the holding of which he sought to
have applied to his case) had not articulated a new rule but was
merely the application of an earlier opinion (Edwards v. Arizo-
na)3" to slightly different facts." In support of his claim, Butler
noted that the majority opinion in Roberson had (1) stated that the
case was directly controlled by Edwards and (2) rejected a request
by the state for an "exception" to the rule announced in Ed-
26. Id. at 1281. The en banc dissenters argued that the Teague plurality and Peny
majority recognized that
the process of constitutional interpretation routinely requires courts to articulate
extant law and apply established principles of law to different facts and in
different contexts. Rules that are the product of this gradual process of refining
and developing doctrine are not "new." To define "new" rules more broadly
would depart significantly from the traditional understanding of constitutional
jurisprudence as an evolving body of principles rather than jarring series of
revolutionary pronouncements.
Id. at 1297 (King, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The Teague plurality had cited the
holding of Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986), that the Eighth Amendment
forbids execution of insane prisoners as an example of a "new rule" without explanation.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). Attempting to explain this example, the dis-
senters in Sawyer argued that the example was of a "new" rule
because of its sweeping and categorical nature, even though such a rule may
be premised on a finding that contemporary values, manifested through legisla-
tive enactments, already condemn such punishment. The fact that a rule is
inherently ground-breaking insofar as it announces a new, categorical rule of
substantive eighth amendment law thus appears to outweigh the fact that the
rule derives from these indicia of community consensus.
Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1302 (citations omitted).
27. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
28. Id. at 412-13.
29. 486 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1988) (holding that the Fifth Amendment bars repeated
interrogation even for separate investigations after the right to counsel has been invoked).
30. 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981) (holding that the police must refrain from further ques-
tioning of suspects in continuous custody once the suspect has invoked his right to coun-
sel).
31. Butler, 494 U.S. at 414.
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wards.3 2 As a result, petitioner concluded that Roberson was with-
in the "'logical compass"' of Edwards." The majority rejected
this argument, and the notion that a court's statement that it is not
announcing a new rule is conclusive, finding instead:
[Tihe fact that a court says that its decision is within the
"logical compass" of an earlier decision, or indeed that it is
"controlled" by a prior decision, is not conclusive for pur-
poses of deciding whether the current decision is a "new
rule" under Teague. Courts frequently view their decisions
as being "controlled" or "governed" by prior opinions even
when aware of reasonable contrary conclusions reached by
other courts .... That the outcome in Roberson was sus-
ceptible to debate among reasonable minds is evidenced
further by the differing positions taken by the judges of the
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits
noted previously.[3 ] It would not have been an illogical
or even a grudging application of Edwards to decide that it
did not extend to the facts of Roberson.35
On the same day Butler was decided, the Supreme Court also
applied Teague's analysis in Saffle v. Parks.6 Saffle produced a
"functional" view of Teague under which the courts' task became
"to determine whether a state court considering [the petitioner's]
claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt com-
pelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [petitioner]
seeks was required by the Constitution."37 This formulation has
proven to be the most useful of the Court's tests and appears to be
the key to the future application of the doctrine.3"
The Supreme Court expanded on Saffle in Sawyer v. Smith.39
In Sawyer, a prisoner sought to apply the holding of Caldwell v.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 415 (quoting transcript of oral argument).
34. The Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987), and the lower court in Butler v. Aiken,
846 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1988) (subsequent history omitted), had reached opposite conclu-
sions on the issue in the case before the court.
35. Butler, 494 U.S. at 415. One remarkable aspect of this analysis is that the "court"
whose characterization is being rejected is the Supreme Court itself.
36. 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
37. Id. at 488.
38. See Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 897 (1993) (citing the Saffle formulation).
39. 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
1008 [Vol. 45:999
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Mississippi'° to his case. Caldwell created the "responsibility rule"
which prohibited the imposition of a death sentence "by a
sentencer that has been led to the false belief that the responsibility
for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's capital
sentence rests elsewhere."
41
In Sawyer's state criminal trial the prosecution had emphasized
to the jury that there would be extensive review of their deci-
sion.42 The prosecutor used this review to argue that the jury
should not hesitate to sentence Sawyer to death. 3 To apply the
Teague test, the Court reached for the purpose of the distinction:
"[t]he principle announced in Teague serves to ensure that gradual
developments in the law over which reasonable jurists may dis-
agree are not used later to upset the finality of state convictions
valid when entered."' The goal, therefore, is to separate cases in
which the law has evolved past the point at which "reasonable"
judges would no longer agree from those cases which simply apply
existing principles in a consistent fashion to slightly different facts.
The Sawyer majority found the responsibility rule was a new
rule and looked to several factors to make that determination.45
First, the Court found that framing the responsibility rule as a
general principle "of reliability in capital sentencing [would make]
the test meaningless if applied at this level of generality."'  Sec-
ond, the Court noted that no prior case had applied the responsibil-
ity rule to prosecutorial argument rather than to a statutory
scheme.47 Third, the case which announced the rule contained a
dissent which argued that there was a "lack of authority" for the
approach taken.' Fourth, the majority argued that there were indi-
cations that the rule was in fact the opposite of the responsibility
rule announced before the Court issued the decision.49 Finally, the
majority rejected the argument that the issuance of state court
opinions adopting similar rules was sufficient to establish the rule,
since those opinions applied state law rather than federal constitu-
40. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
41. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 233.
42. Id. at 231.
43. Id. at 230-32.
44. Id. at 234.
45. Id.
46. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 236 (1990).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 237 (explaining that such an argument was permissible.)
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tional law."
In the Court's next attempt to apply the Teague standard,
Wright v. West,5 consensus on the meaning of "newness" contin-
ued to elude the Court. Justices Thomas and Scalia and the Chief
Justice interpreted Teague as addressing the question of whether
the state courts have "interpreted old precedents reasonably, not
only [whether] they have done so 'properly."' 52 Justices O'Connor,
Blackmun and Stevens argued:
To determine what counts as a new rule, Teague requires
courts to ask whether the rule a habeas petitioner seeks can
be meaningfully distinguished from that established by
binding precedent at the time his state court conviction
became final. Even though we have characterized the new
rule inquiry as whether "reasonable jurists" could disagree
as to whether a result is dictated by precedent, the standard
for determining when a case establishes a new rule is "ob-
jective," and the mere existence of conflicting authority
does not necessarily mean a rule is new. If a proffered
factual distinction between the case under consideration and
pre-existing precedent does not change the force with
which the precedent's underlying principle applies, the
distinction is not meaningful, and any deviation from prece-
dent is not reasonable.53
Justice Souter offered a third test:
The crux of the analysis when Teague is invoked, then, is
identification of the rule on which the claim for habeas
relief depends. To survive Teague, it must be "old" enough
to have predated the finality of the prisoner's conviction,
and specific enough to dictate the rule on which the con-
viction may be held to be unlawful. A rule old enough for
Teague may of course be too general, and while identifying
the required age of the rule of relief is a simple matter of
comparing dates, passing on its requisite specificity calls
50. Id. at 239. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented, arguing
the rule was not a new rule. Their primary argument was that this rule was simply the
application of an existing principle to a different set of circumstances. Id. at 246-47 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
51. 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
52. Id. at 2490 n.8.
53. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).
1010 [Vol. 45:999
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for analytical care.54
Most recently, the Court applied Teague in Gilmore v.
Taylor."s The petitioner sought review of his conviction on the
ground that the jury instructions were improper because their form
allowed a jury to convict him of murder "without even considering
whether he was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter conviction
instead." 6 The Teague issue was the only issue in Gilmore be-
cause the State had conceded that the instructions were unconstitu-
tional under the Falconer v. Lane7 standard.58 The Court ap-
proached the issue this way: "We begin our analysis with the actu-
al flaw found by the Falconer court in the challenged jury instruc-
tions."' 9 The Court then proceeded by narrowly stating the precise
nature of the Falconer error (the structure .of the jury instructions)
and compared that error to the precedent upon which the Seventh
Circuit had relied in Falconer, Cupp v. Naughten.' Finding that
Cupp was "an unlikely progenitor" of the Falconer rule, the Court
determined that Falconer had established a new rule.
61
The Supreme Court has now provided empirical researchers and
habeas petitioners with three not necessarily consistent implementa-
tions of the test to determine a rule's newness: (1) the Thomas
test: would it have been unreasonable to reach a result before the
rule was announced; (2) the O'Connor test: an "objective" test as
to the reasonableness of any distinction between an existing rule
and new factual circumstances; and (3) the Souter test: a rule must
be based on a "specific" prior rule not to be a new rule. What is
clear from Teague and its progeny is that the application of the
test for newness depends critically on the specificity of the state-
ment of the rule. Where, as in Gilmore, the rule in question can be
stated narrowly, it is new. Where, as in the case of the mitigation
rule in Penry, the rule is stated more broadly, it is not new.
Although this discussion suggests that the Supreme Court has
been unsuccessful in defining "new rule" even in a single area of
54. Id. at 2501 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
55. 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993).
56. Id. at 2116.
57. Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129, 1130 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that jury instruc-
tions which set forth the elements of murder before the elements of voluntary manslaugh-
ter violate due process).
58. Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2116.
59. Id.
60. 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
61. Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2117.
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constitutional analysis so that other courts or researchers can con-
sistently apply the definition,62 we can draw some useful lessons
from these opinions. First, the criterion that defines a "new rule"
cannot consist of the announcing courts' own assessment of "new-
ness," either in contemporaneous opinions or ex post. Independent
analysis must determine "newness." Second, the test of newness is,
as the Fifth Circuit noted, inextricably bound up with the definition
of the rule. Defining a new rule requires a comparison with an
"old" rule. In some cases, particularly in constitutional law, there
are wholly "new" requirements based on, at least arguably, pre-
existing principles. In other cases, however, the question is much
more difficult. Third, the multiplicity of opinions in this area offers
a wide menu of indicators that a researcher can use to identify
"new" rules. The choice of indicators must, however, be justified a
priori on theoretical principles in each case, and cases where a
different choice might have produced different results must be
identified. Finally, the definition of a principle for identifying "new
rules" is a difficult endeavor.
2. Analysis
As is clear from the above discussion, before we can decide
how to evaluate a case we must first define the event with which
we are concerned. To do so, we need to look first at the raw ma-
terial the courts produce for our analysis: written opinions deciding
particular cases.63 Within an opinion, a court typically presents a
selective summary of the facts of the case, a statement of legal
rule(s), and application(s) of the rule(s) to the facts presented,
leading to an order requiring the parties or a lower court to take
some action' or a refusal to order such an action.65 The primary
function of these opinions in the legal system is to resolve a par-
62. For a thorough evaluation of the application of Teague in the lower courts, see
generally Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts
After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REv. 371 (1991).
63. Trial courts sometimes produce written opinions, but they also generate products
such as jury verdicts, injunctions, temporary restraining orders, and other types of orders
denying or granting various requests of the parties. Some of these are supported by opin-
ions, but many are not.
64. For example, the lower court may be ordered to dismiss the action, retry the ac-
tion, take further proceedings "not inconsistent with this opinion," or some other action.
In some cases, of course, the court can resolve the entire case without further proceedings
and so simply directs the lower court to enter judgment.
65. For example, the court may affirm the lower courts decision.
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ticular dispute between the parties. A secondary function is to
create a body of precedent to which other courts, lawyers, and the
public can refer to prevent future disputes or to resolve disputes
without resort to the courts.' The court's actions in furthering its
primary function often frustrates this secondary function.
For example, there is a well-known principle which restricts a
court to deciding the actual controversy before it and refraining
from generalization to other potential fact patterns.67 This principle
is often honored in the breach, but it still prevents courts in many
instances from simply stating: "The rule from now on is to be
Rule X, although because the party seeking to establish Rule X has
failed to properly preserve its objections to the action of the trial
court below, Rule Q governs this case and that party loses." In-
stead, a court is more likely to say: "Although under other circum-
stances we might be inclined to apply Rule X, the party seeking
Rule X loses in this case because its failure to follow Rule Q
prevents us from reaching the issue of whether Rule X applies. 68
The result is that the presentation to a court of the question of
whether Rule X applies can produce a significant range of legal
outcomes, which are listed in Table 1. The statements of each of
these can, of course, be made with differing degrees of certainty
and by varying numbers of members of the court. The court may
equivocate in making its suggestion,69 bury the discussion in a
66. For an extensive discussion and empirical examination of the dual role of prece-
dent, see Landes & Posner, supra note 6.
67. See U.S. CONsT. art. I1, § 2; see also, e.g. Stewart v. M.M. & P. Pension Plan,
608 F.2d 776, 785 (9th Cir. 1979).
68. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Andrews, 211 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.
1954) (clearly signalling the Tenth Circuit's view that the contract was terminable at-will
but noting that "it is a firmly established rule that ordinary errors in instructions are not
open to review on appeal unless the matter was brought to the attention of the trial court
by exception to the instructions or in some other appropriate manner"); Hodges v. Gibson
Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) (noting that the failure of defendant to properly
object to the instruction on a public policy exception precludes appellate consideration of
whether the exception existed).
69. Compare Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984)
("We join the growing majority of jurisdictions and recognize a cause of action in tort
for wrongful discharge if the discharge of the employee contravenes a clear mandate of
public policy.") with M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Ark. 1980). In
Counce, the court's discussion went as follows:
Ms. Conce first argues that there was a breach of the employment relationship
in violation of public policy. This is but another way of saying that M.B.M.
breached the contract of employment. She relies to some extent upon cases
holding that discharge of an employee for filing a worker's compensation claim,
for refusing to 'go out' with her foreman, for going on jury duty, or for refus-
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footnote, or simply be cryptic regarding the applicability of Rule
X.7  Similarly, all members of a multimember court may agree,
for example, that Rule Q applies and governs the disposition of the
case, but a minority may quarrel with the majority's discussion (or
lack thereof) of the issue concerning Rule X."1
al to commit perjury, is a breach of contract. She contends that, upon the
authority of such cases, she has stated a cause of action in contract. We might
well agree with Ms. Counce if there was any indication that she was dis-
charged for exercising a statutory right, or for performing a duty required of
her by law, or that the reason for the discharge was in violation of some other
well established public policy. That simply is not the case here.
70. See, e.g., High v. Sperry Corp., 581 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (S.D. Iowa 1984) ("The
terms of the employment relationship between plaintiff and defendant are not before the
court. Perhaps plaintiff can prove an employment relationship and other facts giving rise
under Iowa common law to a cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.").
71. See, e.g., Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 851-52 (Kan. 1987) (Herd, J.,
concurring) (arguing for an expansion of the cause of action); Johnson v. Kreiser's Inc.,
433 N.W.2d 225, 228 (S.D. 1988) (Sabers, J., specially concurring) (arguing for an exten-
sion of the holding); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178, 183-84 (W.
Va. 1980) (Neeley, J., dissenting) (objecting to the creation of the exception).
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Table 1 Legal Outcomes of Court Decisions
Case Legal Outcome
I Rule X appliesa
II Rule X does not applyb
M Rule X might apply to this type of case but does not
on these facts'
IV Rule X might apply to this type of case, but Rule Q
prevents consideration of that questiond
V The issue of the applicability of Rule X has been raised
by the parties, but Rule Q prevents consideration of that
questione
VI Rule Q appliesr
VII Rule X appliesg
a Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
'Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987).
'M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 1980).
d High v. Sperry, 581 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
' Tombello v. Dunn, 342 N.W.2d 23 (S.D. 1984).
tBottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit Co., 635 P.2d 992 (N.M. App. 1981).
9 Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980) (reinterpreting Monge).
(Most cases discussed in detail in Appendix B.)
Even when the subject of the research is court adoption of a
rule,' as in the Dertouzos and Karoly study of modem exceptions
to the at-will rule,73 the definition of the event is not straightfor-
ward. Between Case I and Case H lies a wide range of language
indicating different amounts of judicial sympathy for a legal inno-
vation. Even Case I may be stated in language which severely lim-
its the general application of the rule.74
72. Empirical research related to the common law is not limited to the question of
whether a particular rule has been adopted. The replacement of certainty concerning legal
rules with uncertainty may be the event of interest: in the at-will case, my analysis in
Part IMI relied on this formulation. If so, then Case I and Case ll may be of equal inter-
est to the researcher.
73. See DERTOuZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 5-7.
74. In an interesting series of cases in the late 1970s, the Alabama Supreme Court
considered claims by employees of the American Cast Iron Pipe Company ("ACIPCO')
against the company. Duff v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 362 So. 2d 886 (Ala. 1976);
Smith v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 370 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 1979); Bierley v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 374 So. 2d 1341 (Ala. 1979); Green v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
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The underlying theory of how the legal event is thought to
influence the parties whose behavior is of primary interest will
heavily influence the definition of the legal event. If we are con-
cerned with the behavior of businesses, for example, then the cre-
ation of significant legal uncertainty concerning the future rule in
similar cases will be likely to produce behavioral changes even
without the occurrence of Case I. If we are concerned about the
influence of an innovation in tort law on individuals' behavior, a
quite different analysis would be necessary. If we are concerned
with the behavior of other judges, as in the Dertouzos and Karoly
analysis of the adoption of exceptions, the existence of Case I may
be critical. This discussion points to the first principle for empirical
analysis of common law events:
PRINCIPLE 1: The researcher must justify a priori on theo-
retical grounds the definition of the common law event to
be measured before she can perform the actual measure-
ment.
More formally, one might adopt either of two alternative views
of common law decisions. First, one might view the change in the
law as an unobserved event, which is observed only when certain
other events occur." Alternatively, one might consider the change
446 So. 2d 16 (Ala. 1984); Farlow v. Adams, 474 So. 2d 53, 56-57 (Ala. 1985). In
Smith and Duff, the court found that there was a contractual right not to be discharged
except for violation of a plant rule, and hence the at-will rule was inapplicable. Farlow,
474 So. 2d at 56-57. Rather than so ruling on broad implied contract grounds, however,
the "unique corporate structure" of the employer provided a narrow basis for relief. Id. at
56. ACIPCO was governed by a trust established by the will of its founder, which pro-
vided, among other things, that the trustees who managed the company "acknowledge our
belief in Jesus Christ, and the practical application of His teachings to industrial problems
and progress." Id. at 56 n.2.
75. This, of course, is the familiar unobserved variable problem in econometrics and is
specified as:
y*=y+e
One would specify any analysis under this assumption as:
Y* = f (X'B) + p.
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in the law to be directly observed.76 The difference is more than a
matter of terminology. In the first case, the search will seek evi-
dence of a shift in the underlying law in cases. In the second case,
the search will seek the discovery of an opinion finalizing the shift
and more conclusive language in the opinion is likely to be neces-
sary.' If the analysis is concerned with the behavior of other par-
ties, the theoretical analysis should specify (1) the path through
which common law court decisions are thought to influence the
actors of interest; and (2) the type of legal events which are
thought to produce this influence. If the analysis is concerned with
the behavior of the court system itself, the theoretical analysis
should explain how court opinions have defined the event: is mere
recognition of a rule's existence enough or is a clear endorsement
of the rule necessary?
Beyond this discussion, as required by modem legal analysis,
lies a meta-discussion concerning the content of Rule X and how
we differentiate Rule X from Rule X. This is not simply a theoret-
ical matter but one with far-reaching practical consequences. Courts
do not simply announce Rule X-their language is both richer and
more equivocal. As we saw above with respect to the Teague
cases, the Supreme Court has been unable to resolve satisfactorily
this issue in its habeas jurisprudence.
Even when they do take steps toward a new rule, courts may
not fully specify all aspects of the rule until much later. They may
allow a new cause of action to proceed to trial, but leave the mea-
sure of damages for another day. They may decide that a remedy
exists in principle, but may be unwilling to determine its parame-
ters until the record has been developed further.' Depending on
the characteristic of the rle which matters, this gradual delineation
76. The specification would then be:
Y= f(XB) +[t
77. In Iowa, for example, the Iowa Supreme Court suggested the possibility of a pub-
lic policy exception to the at-will rule in Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270
N.W.2d 454, 456 (Iowa 1978), and again in Northrup v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 372
N.W.2d 193, 196 (Iowa 1985), before conclusively adopting the exception in Springer v.
Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988). See also infra notes 143-45 and
accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn. 1980)
(adopting public policy exception but declining to decide whether "violation of a state
statute is invariably a prerequisite to the conclusion that a challenged discharge violates
public policy").
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of the law may alter our judgment about when the rule was creat-
ed.79
Even if the language is unequivocal and definitive, problems
still arise when making comparisons between cases. Leaving aside
the issue of whether there is a text that contains shared meaning at
all,8" since an empirical analysis presumes the existence of such a
text, we must decide how to compare the language used by the
courts of one state in different opinions81 to the language used by
courts of different states. This leads to the second principle:
PRINCIPLE 2: Researchers must define precisely the legal
79. For example, the potential for punitive damages might be the characteristic of
interest, rather than the existence of a particular claim allowing only compensatory damag-
es. Consequently, we might agree that the rule was created when the court conclusively
decided on the issue of punitive damages.
80. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551 (1982).
81. The reinterpretation by the New Hampshire Supreme Court of its opinion in Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974). illustrates this problem. In 1980 the
New Hampshire Supreme Court backed away from a broad reading of Monge, reinterpret-
ing it as a public policy exception. Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H.
1980). The New Hampshire court has held that Dorr "clarified and construed" Monge and
"did not create a new rule of law or significantly depart from Monge." Bergeron v. Trav-
elers Ins. Co., 480 A.2d 42 (N.H. 1984).
Other courts have rejected the New Hampshire Supreme Court's interpretation of
Monge. See Cummins v. EG&G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D. R.I. 1988) (cita-
tions omitted) (interpreting Dorr as "arguably altering the nature of the action created
from one in contract . . . to one in tort"); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710
P.2d 1025, 1031-32 n.3 (Ariz. 1985) (noting Dorr's retreat in a footnote but citing Monge
as an example of the farthest reach of an exception to the at-will rule); Magnan v. Ana-
conda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 781, 785 n.16 (Conn. 1984) (noting that "New Hampshire,
where the rule was first announced, has since retreated and presently requires that the
discharge violate public policy"); Morriss v. Coleman Co., Inc., 738 P.2d 841, 849-50
(Kan. 1987) (citing Monge, without mentioning Dorr, as creating an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing); Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d 1086, 1089
(Miss. 1987) (noting that New Hampshire had adopted the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in Monge but that in Dorr the court "discarded it in favor of a more
limited rule"); Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487, 493 (Mont 1984);
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983) (reading Monge
broadly, without mentioning or citing Don, for the proposition that employers have a
duty to discharge only in good faith).
The narrow reading in Dorr is also contrary to the pre-Dorr scholarly commentary
on Monge. See, e.g., Comm. on Labor and Employment Law, Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of N.Y., At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 THE REC. OF
THE Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE CrrY oF N.Y. 170, 183 (1981) (interpreting Monge as
requiring good faith in discharging employees); Cornelius J. Peck, Some Kind of Hearing
for Person Discharged from Private Employment, 16 SAN DIFO L. REv. 313, 321
(1979).
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rule which affects the analysis.
Compliance with this principle will allow readers to judge whether
the analysis rests on a definitional quirk. It is not, for example,
sufficient to state simply that Rule X is under study. Rather it is
necessary to illustrate the parameters of the rule with examples and
careful analysis.
Readers are not the only beneficiaries of compliance with this
principle. Researchers too will benefit from careful explication of
the legal boundaries of the rule they analyze. It is difficult to
imagine a successful process other than an iterative one: definition
of the rule, followed by legal research, redefinition, additional legal
research, and so forth. Some rules are easy to distinguish: State A
adopts Rule X and State B adopts Rule X; X and X are antitheti-
cal as well as inconsistent. Often, however, drawing the distinction
between Rule X and Rule X is not so straightforward.82 There are
several potentially distinguishing characteristics: the type of remedy
involved,83 the legal doctrine underlying the claim,84 or the
source of the rule'5 could all be used. Some justification for the
choice needs to be offered, and perhaps alternative specifications
attempted.86 This leads to a third principle:
PRINCIPLE 3: Researchers should define the legal rule with
reference to the underlying theoretical analysis of the effect
of the legal change on the court's behavior.
As the discussion above demonstrates, there cannot be a gener-
82. Dertouzos and Karoly define a narrow public policy cause of action, a broad pub-
lic policy/good faith cause of action, and an implied contract cause of action. They also
use a tort/contract distinction in some specifications. See DaRTouzos & KAROLY, supra
note 2, at 10. Krueger and I rely on a different tripartite divison. See Krueger, supra note
8, at 648-50; infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text. Other catergorizations are no
doubt possible as well.
83. See DERTOuZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 8-9 (distinguishing between contract
and tort remedies).
84. See Krueger, supra note 8, at 648-50.
85. A court which has consistently adopted other majority rules identified in the Re-
statement of Torts, for example, is presumably more likely to adopt a majority rule than a
minority rule in a torts case where the court has not yet spoken than a court which has
more often adopted minority rules in the past.
86. Dertouzos and Karoly, for example, justified the remedy-based approach since tort
damages generally exceed contract damages. Se, e.g., DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note
2, at 8-9. Alternatively, I relied on the doctrinal basis because (i) it has sufficient overlap
with the tort/contract remedy to capture much of that distinction and (ii) it more effective-
ly captures, in my opinion, the distinction between disclaimable and nondisclaimable
claims.
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al answer to the question of what constitutes a common law event
for research purposes; the answer for any particular project will
depend on the nature of the project. The principles listed provide
some guidance to the researcher. The first principle is a caution
that appears in other contexts later in this paper: the definition of
common law events depends heavily on the context of the question
being asked. When researchers examine the question of the influ-
ence of common law events, they must be able to specify the
channel through which the common law event influences the popu-
lation being studied. Similarly, scholars must pay attention to the
legal details of the opinions in question to determine the range of
possible answers. Independently of questions of whether a particu-
lar opinion meets the researcher's criteria for inclusion, the re-
searcher must determine the range of outcomes given in Table 1
which will satisfy her needs." There is simply no substitute for
independent legal research to define the common law event. Sec-
ondary sources, in particular specialized reporters such as those
published by the Bureau of National Affairs, are suitable only as
starting points; they cannot reliably define the event. The second
principle is that the researcher must be clear about the level of
generality at which she is prepared to define the rule. As the dis-
putes in Teague and its progeny demonstrate, any event can be-
come a nonevent and vice versa. The third principle is the obverse
of the first. Legal analysis alone is insufficient; scholars must also
use the social science motivating the analysis to define the event.
The Teague cases demonstrate that legal analysis alone is incapable
of defining all but the most obvious common law events.
B. Case Selection
I turn now to the specifics of dating the changes in the com-
mon law. Cases produce opinions at different times in their prog-
ress and the procedural and substantive differences between those
occasions are responsible for many of the problems with dating
changes in the common law. Courts also act at different rates
among jurisdictions and among different types of cases. These dif-
ferences are important to consider in evaluating changes since the
relative speeds will affect the rates of adoption of changes." To
87. The modem erosion of employment-at-will is a fine example of this issue. One can
define the event as the adoption of a public policy cause of action, a tort cause of ac-
tion, or a broad or narrow tort cause of action.
88. There are no nationwide statistics on the processing times of state trial courts.
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identify the problem, consider the path a dispute follows through
the court system. 9 Using wrongful discharge law as an example,
the development of a common law exception in a particular state'
(State Z) takes place, in general,9 as follows: Employer A fires
Employee B. B visits Lawyer L and persuades L to accept his
case. L accepts the case, files suit against A, and the case of B vs.
A enters the legal system. One party prevails at the trial level,
either on the merits or for procedural reasons.' This process can
take from a few months to several years. In most states the trial
court opinions, if any,93 in B vs. A are unpublished documents.94
There have been several studies which have examined selected state courts. In 1987, for
example, the median time for completion of proceedings in contested civil cases in 39
trial courts was 481 days, with individual courts' medians ranging between 180 and 1019
days. JOHN A. GOERDT, REEXAMINING THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN 39 URBAN TRIAL
COURTS tbl. 3.1, at 38 (1991). The median length of time varied with the type of case
(424 days for contract cases versus 469 days for tort cases) and cases which involved
jury trials took significantly longer (median time 748 days). Id. tbls. 3.2 & 3.9. No time
series data is available on court processing times, but comparison with an earlier study of
some of the same courts suggests that the time required increased from 1976 to 1987 in
some courts and decreased in others. See THOMAS CHURCH, JR. ET AL., JUSTICE DE-
LAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS tbl. 3.3, at 27 (1978);
GOERDT, supra, tbl. 3.10, at 57. There are no statistics available for earlier periods for
state courts.
The broad range of times indicates a problem for empirical research into when the
law changed. If cases are delayed at the trial level, the opportunity for an appellate court
to create a new rule is also delayed. Although there is no convenient way to control for
this effect, researchers need to be aware of it when interpreting their results. Its impor-
tance will vary with the question being studied. With tort law changes in comparative
negligence, for example, delays will be less important than in employment-at-will since
tort cases appear independent of the rule while wrongful discharge cases were rare before
the law began to change.
89. This section relates information which legally trained readers are likely to find
elementary. Because I hope non-legally trained social scientists will also find this Article
useful, I have opted for completeness rather than assume that all readers are aware of all
the steps in creating an opinion.
90. The discussion here assumes that the law of State Z will apply. There are often
choice of law questions and a court in State Z will apply State Z's choice of law rules
to determine which state's substantive law should apply.
91. In some instances (studies of the rate of change of the law, for example) re-
searchers should control for the relative speeds of different states' legal systems. A small
state with no intermediate appellate court (Rhode Island) will not only have fewer oppor-
tunities to change the law, since fewer cases will be brought, but will resolve those cases
at a different rate than a large state with an intermediate appellate court (California). Data
on the speed of state court systems is sparse. Where possible, therefore, the notes include
time estimates for various proceedings.
92. The employer may prevail by citing the at-will rule in support of the contention
that regardless of the truth of B's factual claims, B has no legal claim.
93. Some trial courts decide motions with simple orders stating: "Defendants' motion
to dismiss is granted." Others issue formal opinions supporting their actions. A jury ver-
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In many states, the appeal of B vs. A begins in an intermediate
appellate court," where, after a typical delay of a year or more,9
dict simply takes the form of a judgment entered by the court.
94. Some states, such as New York, sometimes publish trial court decisions. See, e.g.,
Chin v. AT&T, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), af d, 70 A.D.2d 791, appeal
dismissed, 396 N.E.2d 206 (N.Y. 1979) (an important at-will case). Delaware adopted the
at-will rule in a trial court opinion, Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co., 43 A.2d 609 (Del.
1899), and the Delaware Supreme Court did not address the issue until 1982. The first
Delaware Supreme Court opinion to address the at-will rule is Heideck v. Kent Gen.
Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095, 1096-97 (Del. 1982). Heideck cites only earlier superior court
opinions but clearly indicates the rule had been adopted earlier.
95. Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Neva-
da, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming
currently do not have intermediate appellate courts. See infra note 126.
96. Delays have sharply increased in recent years. Although historical data are sparse,
there is one 6arly study of federal court delay. In 1928-30, 908 terminated law cases on
selected federal district court dockets were examined and the time to termination calculat-
ed:
Time Number %
< 1 month 267 29.4
1-2 months 106 11.7
2-3 months 103 11.9
3-6 months 113 12.4
6 months - 1 year 111 12.2
1-2 years 102 11.2
2-3 years 68 7.5
3-5 years 25 2.8
> 5 years 7 0.8
(Numbers exclude one case which did not have any entry on its docket sheet.) AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, Table 79 at 189
(1934). More recently, there were 248,717 civil cases (excluding land condemnation
cases) pending in U.S. district courts as of September 30, 1984. Of these, 155,081
(62.4%) were pending for less than one year, 55,204 (22.2%) were pending for one to
two years, 21,703 (8.7%) were pending for two to three years, and 16,727 (6.7%) were
pending for three years or more. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS AND REPORTS Div., FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS DURING THE 12-
MONTH PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1984, tbl. C6.A, at A-20 (1984). These national
figures obscure important differences among courts-the three years and over figure varied
from 19% in District of Massachusetts to 0.7% in the Eastern District of Tennessee. Id.
Decisions on motions are also subject to delays. As of September 30, 1984, there were
1628 cases and motions held under advisement over 60 days, 978 more than 60 days and
less than six months, 411 between six months and one year, and 239 over one year. Id.
tbl. II, at 17.
For the 12 months ending June 30, 1989, the following table presents the median
times to disposition for the 64,869 diversity cases (of 194,759 total civil cases) terminated
during the time period.
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Time to Disposition (Months)
Type of Diversity 10% Median 10% Numbe %
Case i
less more
than than
All cases 2 9 31 64,869 100
Closed without court 2 8 30 19,441 30
action
Closed before pretrial 1 6 25 27,928 43
Closed during or 6 15 36 13,086 20
after period I I I _ I
Closed after or dur- 7 18 40 4,414 7
ing trial II_
Source: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TWELVE MONTH PERI-
OD ENDING JUNE 30, 1989, Appendix 1, Table C5A.
There is also some sketchy historical data on time to decision in state cases in the late
19th century.
State Avg. State Avg. State Avg.
Case Case Case
Length Length Length
(mos.) (mos.) (mos.)
Alabama 18-24 Louisiana 10-12 North Carolina 18-24
Connecticut 12-36 Maine 18 Ohio 36-48
D.C. 72 Maryland 12-18 Pennsylvania 24-36
Delaware 30 Massachusetts 6-24 South Carolina 12-36
Florida 12-36 Michigan 15-30 Tennessee 48
Georgia 48 Minnesota 12 Texas 24
Illinois 36 Missouri 36 West Virginia 30
Indiana 24 Nebraska 24-60 Wisconsin 18
Iowa 24 New York 60
Kentucky 36 New Hampshire 18
Source: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO
CONSIDER AND REPORT WHETHER THE PRESENT DELAY AND UNCERTAINTY IN JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION CAN BE LESSENED, AND IF SO, BY WHAT MEANS, IN REPORT OF THE
EIGHTH ANNUAL MEEING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1885) at 368-449.
Although there is no comprehensive data on delays, there are some studies which indicate
state courts continue to experience substantial variations in case processing times:
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a panel' of that court issues an opinion, often widely available
although not necessarily formally published in a case reporter. If B
(or A) is dissatisfied with the results and has the resources to pay
L (or his defense counterpart) additional costs and fees, the case
may proceed to additional appellate review-either an en banc
sitting of the intermediate appellate court or the State Z Supreme
Court. After further delay,98 the court may decide to grant review
or not. If the court grants review, additional delay ensues before it
issues an opinion." Again the court may or may not formally
publish the opinion,"° although an opinion adopting an exception
to the at-will rule is sufficiently important to warrant publication in
most cases.' Opinion in hand, A and B most likely depart for
the lower courts for, in the oft-used judicial phrase, "further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. '""°a As the court has
issued an opinion, we can allow A and B to litigate in peace and
examine the consequences of the decision.
A and B might have taken a slightly different route to court. If
Court All Civil Cases
Median length 90th %tile % over 1 year % over 2 years
(days) (days)
All courts 417 1038 51.0 21.7
Fastest 177 526 2.3 5.0
Slowest 818 1708 71.0 54.0
Source: GOERDT, supra note 88, at 39, Table 3.2.
97. Panels consist of less than the full membership of the court.
98. No statistics are available on the extent of this delay.
99. No statistics are available on the extent of this delay.
100. The number of opinions issued by state supreme courts varies widely across states.
In 1989, for example, the number ranged from 65 in Delaware to 751 in Alabama. NA-
TIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1989 94-98 (1991). This difference partially reflects differences in counting methods.
Id. at 4.
101. The publication history of the opinions in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp.,
714 P.2d 412 (Ariz. CL App. 1984), aff d in part, rev'd in part, remanded, and vacated,
710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985), illustrates this point: the appellate court opinion, which had
denied a public policy claim, was issued on June 21, 1984, but not published until after
the Arizona Supreme Court opinion, which allowed the claim, was issued on June 17,
1985.
102. If A prevailed before determination on the merits, the case may return for trial,
although in unusual cases the Supreme Court might be able to render a judgment based
upon agreed facts. If B prevailed, the case may return for additional proceedings on dam-
ages, attorneys' fees, and the like, or for a new trial for other reasons.
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diversity jurisdiction" existed or if the wrongful discharge claim
was attached to other claims under federal law,"° B vs. A might
begin in federal district court. 5 Despite its location in a federal
court, the wrongful discharge claim would still be interpreted under
State Z's law and the federal court would have two options in
deciding the case. First, the court could make an "Erie guess" as
to the law of State Z.1°" In doing so, the federal court would per-
form much the same analysis as a state trial or intermediate appel-
late court and examine the decisions of state courts in State Z."°
Although the role of the federal court would be to anticipate the
developments in State Z's law, not to innovate independently,
federal judges are not to be merely "ventriloquists' dummies.' °
Instead the federal court is to function
as a proxy for the entire state court system, and therefore
must apply the law that it conscientiously believes would
have been applied in the state court system, which includes
the state appellate tribunals. In other words, the federal
court must determine issues of state law as it believes the
highest court of the state would determine them, not neces-
103. 28 U.S. § 1332 (1988); see also infra, part II.B.2.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1990). Obvious examples for a wrongful discharge case
would be Title VII, Americans With Disabilities Act, or Age Discrimination In Employ-
ment Act claims alleging discrimination in discharge with a pendent state claim for dis-
charge violating public policy. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Wesley Medical Ctr., 585 F. Supp.
1260 (D. Kan. 1984) (combining federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim
with pendent state claim).
105. Alternatively, B vs. A could begin in state court and be removed to federal court
under the removal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1990). Removal use has varied over time.
A study of selected federal district courts between 1928 and 1930 found that 10% of all
actions on the law docket had been removed from state courts (990 of 9852 cases). BUSI-
NEss, supra note 96, tbl. 103, at 211. Of these removed cases, 4.6% were remanded back
to the state courts. Id. thl. 105, at 215. Remands did not all occur immediately: 50.8%
were remanded after one year;, only 19.1% were remanded in less than six months; and
27.8% were remanded over two years after removal. Id. thl. 106, at 217. Removal use
varied greatly across districts: from 48.9% in the Western District of North Carolina to
1.1% in the Eastern District of Louisiana. In more recent times removals have grown
from 10,177 (6% of total filings) in 1980 to 25,924 (11.8% of total filings) in 1990.
1990 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANNU-
AL REPORT th]. S-4, at 79 (1990).
106. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), is the case which established the
modem guidelines for federal courts applying state law.
107. The court would, of course, also consider opinions from other federal courts decid-
ing similar issues and applying State X's law.
108. Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942) (under the then-
prevailing interpretation of Erie, federal judges were "to play the rule [sic] of
ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state").
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sarily (although usually this will be the case) as they have
been decided by other state courts in the past. 1°9
The second alternative, available in most but not all states, would
be for the federal court to certify a question of law to the State Z
Supreme Court."' The State Z Supreme Court could then choose
to accept the certification, and after additional delay, answer the
question with an opinion. The opinion might be published, and
might require additional analysis applying the law to the facts by
the federal court."'
After deciding the case, the federal district court could issue an
opinion, which the Federal Supplement or a specialized employ-
ment law reporter might publish."2 The dissatisfied party might
109. 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507, at
89 (1982). A wrongful discharge opinion exemplifying this analysis is a 1981 case exam-
ining both Georgia and Texas law. See Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651
F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit was faced with a claim by an employee that
he had been discharged for refusing to commit perjury (similar to the first public policy
exception case, Peterman v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen &
Helpers of America, Local 396, 344 P. 2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)). Id. at 1052.
After finding "no reported case in either jurisdiction which stands on fours with this one,"
the court turned to predicting the holdings of the Georgia and Texas Supreme Courts. Id.
at 1055. The court predicted that neither would adopt the exception, stating:
The courts of Georgia and Texas have consistently held to the at-will doctrine.
We are unable to perceive the slightest indication of a shift toward recognition
of any exception to the at-will rule. Indeed, the intermediate appellate courts of
each state have expressly refused to recognize exceptions to the at-will rule
when faced with challenges that are analogous, although not identical, to that
urged by [plaintiff].
Id. at 1056.
110. Certification is a relatively recent innovation. Although the Uniform Law Commis-
sioners proposed a Uniform Act in 1967, only a few states adopted the act and Wright
and Miller conclude that "certification did not play an important role in the federal courts
until 1974." 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 109, § 4248, at 162-63. Most states provide
for certification to the state supreme court from the U.S. Supreme Court and court of
appeals and many also allow district courts to certify questions. Id. § 4248, at 167-68.
Delaware allows certification only from the federal district courts. Id. at 168 n.31. Burk v.
K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989), is an example of adoption of an exception to
the at-will rule in a certified question context.
111. Some states allow certification only where the answer is determinative of the case.
See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 109, § 4248, at 170-71. Wyoming, for example,
allows certification only where "there is nothing left for the federal court to do but apply
the state's answer to the question and enter judgment consistent with the answer. This is
a severe restriction since often a great deal remains to be done in the federal proceeding
after the state court's answer is received." Id. at 169.
112. Even an opinion adopting an exception might not be published. There are no com-
prehensive statistics on federal district court publication rates. One analysis of employment
discrimination cases in one federal district found 80% of the 4310 cases filed between
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then appeal"' to the appropriate federal circuit court of ap-
peals," 4 which would also have the. option in some states of cer-
tifying the question if the district court had not done so."5 From
there, the case could go to the full circuit court sitting en banc,
and, in very unlikely circumstances, to the U.S. Supreme Court."
6
July 1, 1972 and March 31, 1987 did not result in a published district court opinion.
Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue InI, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison
of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
1133, 1137 (1990). The percentage of cases with published opinions in this area has in-
creased over time, however. See id. fig. 1, at 1141. Publication rates also vary consider-
ably across districts. Id. at 1144. For example, Volume 812 of the Federal Supplement,
published in 1993, contains 238 opinions by district courts. Of these, 63 (the largest num-
ber) are from district courts in the Second Circuit and ten (the smallest number) are from
the Fifth Circuit. Among Second Circuit district courts, over a third of the opinions come
from the Southern District of New York while only two opinions are from the Northern
District of New York.
Again these statistics suggest an area for concern for researchers, but not a solution.
The decision to file in (or remove to) federal court, where possible, rather than state court
is likely to be influenced significantly by the time to decision in each of the courts.
Plaintiffs may prefer federal court where it is significantly faster, for example. (The deci-
sion will also depend on many other factors as well.) This selection effect may cause
changes in adoption rates if only state court opinions are counted. See infra part ll.B.2.
113. A study of selected federal district courts found that 322 of 9852 civil cases pend-
ing in 1928-30 were appealed (3.4%) and that 82 of 1816 diversity cases (4.5%) were
appealed. BUSINESs, supra note 96, at 93. Only 14 of these cases were appealed to the
Supreme Court, only one of which was a diversity action. Id. tbl. 97, at 205. Although
no comparable survey exists for modern times, a rough equivalent can be obtained by
comparing district and circuit courts within the same year. In the twelve month period
ending June 30, 1989, for example, there were 34,995 total cases begun in the courts of
appeals and 233,293 cases begun in the district courts. Of these, 4287 appellate cases and
67,211 district court cases were diversity cases. Roughly equivalent percentages would
therefore be fifteen and six percent, respectively. 1989 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATwE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs ANNUAL REPORT, app. I, tbl. B-7, at 17 & tbl.
C-2, at 22 (1989).
114. Appeals in the federal system tend to be resolved relatively quickly. On September
30, 1984, for example, there were 713 cases under submission to federal courts of appeals
for more than three months, 424 had been under submission for three to six months, 157
for six to nine months, 70 for nine to twelve months, and 62 for more than one year.
BuSINESs, supra note 96, thl. 4, at 6. In the same period, 31,018 cases were terminated
and 32,342 filed. Id. thl. 2, at 3. Cases with unpublished opinions are resolved much
faster than those which produce a published opinion. See William L. Reynolds & William
M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Ap-
peals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, tbl. 6, at 594 (1981) [hereinafter,
Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation].
115. The question of certification may cloud resolution of the legal issue of primary
interest. In Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d at 1051, 1057-58 (5th cir.
1981) (Brown, J., dissenting), for example, one judge dissented from the Erie guess on
the ground that the court should have certified the issue to the state court.
116. In the 1991 Term, for example, five percent of appeals and petitions for review
were granted on the appellate docket and one-half percent of appeals and petitions for
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Courts may resolve appeals on either procedural or substantive
grounds.'17
Identifying when the law changes is not a simple task. Courts
are not only not under an enforceable obligation to reveal when
they have made an innovation, but the common law reasoning
process encourages active concealment of innovation as the deci-
sion is portrayed as simply the culmination of a long series of
decisions."8 I have identified eleven general areas in which re-
review on the miscellaneous docket were granted. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term--The
Statistics, 106 HARv. L. REv. 19, 382 (1992). The earlier years' calculation of the percent
of appeals and petitions for review which were granted were inflated through erroneous
calculations. See id. at note d. The U.S. Supreme Court would accept the case only if a
significant federal question were present since the U.S. Supreme Court would be an infe-
rior court to the State Z Supreme Court with respect to State Z's law .
117. Appeals, like district court actions, may be disposed of on either the merits or on
procedural grounds. In the twelve months ending December 31, 1991, the federal circuit
courts of appeal disposed of 13,004 private civil cases (excluding prisoner petitions and
cases involving the federal government) and a total of 41,905 cases. These were disposed
of as follows:
Consolidation Procedural On Merits
All cases 3,845 14,989 23,071 (55.1%)
(9.1%) (35.8%)
Private civil cases 1,426 5,193 6,385
(11%) (39.9%) (49.1%)
Source: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
WORKLOAD STATsTICs, December 31, 1991, Table B-I, at 20 (1992) [hereinafter "1991
AO REPORT".]
Of the terminations on the merits, these took the following form:
Affirmed/ Dismissed Reversed Remanded Other
Enforced
All cases 18,280 1,302 2,668 530 291
(79.2%) (5.6%) (11.6%) (2.3%) (1.3%)
Private civil 4,975 269 987 116 38
cases (77.9%) (4.2%) (15.5%) (1.8%) (0.6%)
Source: 1991 AO REPORT, supra, Table B-5, at 23.
118. In the case of employment-at-will, most courts, perhaps recognizing the futility of
concealing such a dramatic change, have been relatively open about admitting innovation.
See, e.g., Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) (adopting
public policy exception and stating that "[b]ecause courts are a proper forum for modifica-
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searchers must make decisions: (1) opinions of intermediate courts
of appeal and trial courts; (2) federal courts applying state law; (3)
dicta; 9 (4) unpublished opinions; (5) statutory interpretation cas-
es; (6) sources of cases; (7) definition of the period; (8) flip-flops;
(9) dismissals and summary judgments; (10) denials; and (11) ex
post verification. I now turn to the factors to consider in making
these decisions.
1. Intermediate Appellate Courts and Trial Courts
States can have several levels of courts: trial, intermediate
appellate, and f'mal.'2° The state supreme court has the final word
on a state's law, so that a new rule can be considered finally
adopted only when the state supreme court has spoken.' States
may operate for years, however, with only intermediate appellate
opinions on a subject." Until then, one intermediate appellate
tion of the judicially created at-will doctrine, it is appropriate that we correct inequities
resulting from harsh application of the doctrine by recognizing its inapplicability in a
narrow class of cases."). Such directness is not, however, universal. See, e.g., Petermann
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Lo-
cal 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (creating the first public policy exception
without citing authority or acknowledging it was changing a statutory rule). Similarly,
when it radically changed its interpretation of New Hampshire's implied covenant excep-
tion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court insisted that it had not changed the law. See
Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (N.H. 1980). See also supra notes 6
and 81.
119. Opinions which recognize the existence of a cause of action but find it inapplica-
ble to the facts of the case at hand.
120. For details on court structure, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE
COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1989, pt. 4, at 167 (1991) (including
flow charts of court structure for each state). Some states have more than one final court,
dividing jurisdiction by subject matter Texas, for example, has both a civil (the Texas
Supreme Court) and criminal court of last resort (the Court of Criminal Appeals). Some
states have specialized courts of limited jurisdiction which potentially adds a fourth layer
from which appeals can go to the general jurisdiction trial courts. Continuing with the
Texas example, besides the 384 district courts (10 of which handle only criminal matters),
in 1989 Texas had 254 constitutional county courts, 17 probate courts, 157 county courts,
928 justice of the peace courts, and 838 municipal courts. Id. at 216. Appeals from some
of these courts are to the district courts. For example, county courts have appellate juris-
diction in criminal cases where the original jurisdiction lies with the justice courts and
other inferior courts. 2 "I x. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 26.046 (West 1988).
121. The Monge-Dorr problem remains, however. See supra notes 6 and 81.
122. In California, for example, the California Supreme Court did not address the public
policy exception until Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980), over
20 years after Petermann, the first intermediate court opinion to adopt the exception.
Similarly, in Ohio, Feazel offers the following account of a particular point of law:
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court may ignore or disagree with the opinion of another." Trial
court opinions have even less precedential value. 24 Whether to
count lower court opinions makes a great deal of difference dating
the adoptions of exceptions to the at-will rule, as Table 2
shows."z
If one is concerned with the final adoption of a rule, one ap-
proach may be simply to wait until the state supreme court has
spoken. There are a number of difficulties with this approach. First,
not all states have intermediate courts of appeal, while some have
more than one.'26 This obviously affects both the incentive struc-
In 1904 a common pleas judge had before him the question of whether or not
the owner of real estate could be enjoined from erecting an apartment house
upon his lot when the deed by which he acquired the same contained a restric-
tion to the effect that the lot should be used for "residence purposes only."
The court decided that the erection of an apartment house would be a violation
of the restriction and allowed the injunction in a well written opinion which is
reported in the case of Burton vs. Stapley, 17 Ohio Decisions 1. This was the
first reported decision in Ohio upon this subject, and the case was carried to
the circuit court where the decision below was affirmed without report, and
from the circuit to the Supreme Court where it was again affirmed without
report. 74 Ohio State 461. It thus happened that though both the Circuit Court
and Supreme Court had passed upon this important question for a number of
years the only reported opinion was that of the trial judge.
E. A. Feazel, Ohio Case Law, 4 L. LIBR. J. 9, 13 (1911).
123. In Michigan, for example, one intermediate appellate court panel issued a decision
on November 8, 1977, rejecting an implied contract theory, while another issued an opin-
ion on November 9, 1977, accepting the theory. Illinois had a similar experience. See
Appendix B for more detailed descriptions of these cases.
124. Sometimes trial court opinions are important. Delaware, for example, adopted the
at-will rule through a trial court opinion. See supra note 94. In more recent times, some
exceptions have been adopted by federal district courts before any state appellate court.
See infra part II.B.2. See Appendix B for a more detailed discussion of specific lower
court opinions.
125. Table 2, infra, contains the dates of the opinions adopting exceptions to the at-will
rule which meet the following criteria: all are lower state court opinions cited by Krueger,
Dertouzos and Karoly, or myself in support of the adoption of an exception, except those
which come after a state supreme court opinion which I identified as adopting an excep-
tion. For the purposes of this table, I accepted the characterization of the opinions cited
by Krueger or Dertouzos and Karoly as they gave them. Some additional research was
done to identify cases adopting the rule after intermediate court opinions cited by one or
more of the three papers when no other paper cited a later state supreme court opinion.
126. In 1989, for example, 13 jurisdictions had no intermediate appellate court: Dela-
ware, the District of Columbia, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. NATION-
AL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 120, at 70. Seven states-Alabama, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas-had multiple appellate courts
at least at one level, which allows for conflicting precedents at that level. Id. at 72. The
remaining jurisdictions had one intermediate appellate court and one court of last resort.
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ture of the courts and the speed with which the court of last resort
will speak to an issue. The structure of the intermediate court also
makes a difference. Texas, for example, has fourteen courts of
appeal, with eighty judges sitting in panels. 27 Utah, on the other
hand, has only one court of appeal with seven judges sitting in
panels." The potential for conflicting rulings among Utah inter-
mediate appellate panels is obviously much lower than the potential
for conflict among Texas appellate courts and panels, even after
taking into account the differences in caseload which result from
differences in population.29
Id. at 62-69.
127. Id. at 216.
128. Id. at 217.
129. The filing rates per 100,000 population are not that different: 56,939 trial court
cases in Texas in 1989 versus 41,180 in Utah in 1989. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, supra note 120, at 106-07. The outputs, however, are quite different: the
Utah Court of Appeals reported only 326 signed opinions in 1987, while the Texas
Courts of Appeals produced 5,324 (46.67 opinions per Utah judge vs. 66.55 per Texas
judge). See id. at 96, 98.
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Table 2 Intermediate and State Supreme Court Datings
State Exception [Method Lower Court Court of Last
I I IResort
Arizona IC M 6/14/83 4/25/84
California PP M,R 9/30/59 6/2/80
California IC M,K 2/6/76 12/29/88
California IC R 3/31/72 12/29/88
California GF M,R,K 10/29/80 12/29/88
Colorado PP R 7/1/88 1/13/92
Colorado IC R,K 6/14/84 1/20/87
Connecticut PP M 10/1/85 1/27/87
Connecticut GF M 6/10/80 7/3/84
Connecticut GF R 1/16/85 None
Illinois IC M 12/20/74 1/30/87
Illinois IC K 7/26/86 1/30/87
Kansas PP M,R,K 6/19/81 3/25/88
Kansas IC M,R,K 8/2/84 6/12/87
Minnesota PP M,R,K 11/18/86 6/26/87
Missouri PP M,R 11/5/85 None
Missouri PP K 12/26/79 None
Missouri IC M,R 1/18/83 None
New Mexico PP M,R 7/5/83 9/21/84
New York PP R 7/17/78 Rejected-
3/29/83
N. Carolina PP M,R,K 5/7/85 7/26/89
Ohio PP M,R 2/11/85 3/14190
Ohio IC M,R 3/21/82 8/9/85
Ohio IC K 3/30/84 8/9/85
Oklahoma IC M,K 12/28/76 6/9/87
Tennessee IC M 11/5/81 None
Texas PP M,R 6/7/84 4/3/85
Texas IC M 4/11/85 None
Wisconsin PP M,K 1/28/80 7/1/83
Method: K: Krueger, M: Morriss; R: Dertouzos & Karoly (RAND)
Key: IC: Implied Contract; GF: Good Faith; PP: Public Policy
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There is scattered research on the effects of creation of an
intermediate appellate court on a state's legal system. 13 Research-
ers have hypothesized two primary effects: (1) a reduction in the
workload of the court of last resort, and (2) increased policymaking
by the court of last resort.13' These effects will result in several
important differences in the appearance of legal innovations. First,
to the extent that intermediate courts concentrate on routine deci-
sions, cases which could result in a policy innovation will take
longer to reach courts of last resort, potentially delaying the inno-
vation. Second, the intermediate court may increase the chance of
the court of last resort adopting an innovation by allowing the final
court more time to consider the cases it does decide.
PRINCIPLE 4: Researchers should base their choice of
whether to include intermediate or trial court decisions on
the theoretical model. They should include lower court
opinions when modeling changes in the law but exclude
those opinions when modeling the behavior of courts of
last resort.
2. Federal Courts
Even when only state common law is concerned, federal courts
play an important role since a federal court may consider a state's
common law on a subject before the state's own courts have spo-
ken.' Table 3 shows the dates of the federal 'opinions in the
130. The most comprehensive surveys of this research are NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS: IMPROVING CASE PROCESSING (1990),
and John A. Stookey, Creating an Intermediate Court of Appeals: Work Load and
Policymaking Consequences, in THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 153 (Philip L.
Dubois ed., 1982).
131. See Stookey, supra note 130, at 153. Stookey argues that the crucial step is the
granting of discretionary review authority to the court of last resort. See id. at 165-66.
Since that review is impossible without the creation of an intermediate court, the distinc-
tion does not seem to be critical.
132. For example, I found six federal court diversity opinions which I considered to be
the first to adopt a particular exception to the at-will rule. These are: Laws v. Aetna Fin.
Co., 667 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (Mississippi public policy exception); Newman
v. Legal Serv. Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535 (D.D.C. 1986) (District of Columbia public policy
exception); Winther v. DEC Int'l Inc., 625 F. Supp. 100 (D. Colo. 1985) (Colorado pub-
lic policy exception); Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805 (D. Colo.
1983) (Colorado implied contract exception); Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 574
F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Va. 1983) (Virginia implied contract exception); McKinney v. National
Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980) (Massachusetts public policy excep-
tion). For an in-depth discussion of the role of federal courts in Pennsylvania, see Mark
R. Kramer, Comment, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employ-
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wrongful discharge area relied on by the three papers discussed
here as well as the subsequent state court rulings and shows that
counting federal opinions makes a significant difference.'
Table 3 Federal vs. State Court Opinions
State Exception Method Erie State
1Guess Court
Alabama Implied Contract Krueger 8/14/84 7/10/87
Colorado Public Policy Morriss 9/18/85 7/1/88
Colorado Implied Contract Morriss 10/18/83 6/14/84
D.C. Public Policy Morriss 1/26/86 9/17/91
Iowa Good Faith Krueger 3/16/84 None
Massachusetts Public Policy Morriss 5/28/80 2/18/82
Mississippi Public Policy Morriss 7/17/87 8/19/93
Virginia Implied Contract Morriss 9/9/83 None
How should one treat opinions by these courts? One approach
is a categorical exclusion. 3 4 Some circumstances may justify this
approach. For example, if one is modeling the behavior of judges,
state court judges will obviously have different incentives to adopt
a change than federal judges because state court judges often are
elected or appointed for relatively short terms while federal judges
are appointed for life. 35 If the concern is the effect of the law on
the behavior of others, a categorical exclusion is difficult to sup-
ment At Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227 (1984). In addition, New
Mexico first formally recognized the at-will rule through a federal court opinion. See
Odell v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 201 F.2d 123, 128 (10th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 947 (1953). See also Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical & Eco-
nomic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679, app. A
(1994) [hereinafter Morriss, Exploding Myths] (providing the citations relied on for dating
the establishment of employment-at-will).
133. Table 3, infra, includes all federal opinions cited by any of the three papers except
opinions which are dated after a state court opinion which I identified as adopting the
exception. For the purposes of this table, I accepted the characterization of the opinions
cited by Krueger or Dertouzos and Karoly as they gave them.
134. That is, for example, the strategy Dertouzos and Karoly chose. See DERTOUZOS &
KAROLY, supra note 2, at 10 n.3.
135. This is especially true of territorial judges who were appointed for limited terms
but whose incentives were very different from those of state court judges after statehood.
See Morriss, Exploding Myths, supra note 132, at 720-22. In these cases, the existence of
a federal court decision might be handled more properly as an independent variable or the
adoption by either court treated as competing risks.
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port. Federal judges' role under the Erie doctrine is to anticipate
the development of the law in the state.'36 Their judgment is a
strong indicator that the law has in fact changed, although their
record is not perfect. 7 Thus, where the model is of a change in
the law, there is little justification for a categorical ban.
In general, a case-by-case analysis of the federal court opinions
seems to be the best approach. Factors to consider should include
the familiarity of the court rendering the opinion with the law of
the state in question, 3 1 the importance of the doctrine to the re-
sult, 39 and the strength of the court's opinion."4
PRINCIPLE 5: Researchers should count federal court diver-
sity opinions when the model concerns the behavior of the
136. See supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Samples v. Hall of Mississippi, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1413 (D. Miss. 1987).
The federal court initially made an Erie guess that Mississippi would allow an implied
contract claim based on supervisory guidelines governing terminations and allegations of
promises to employees. Id. at 1417. Shortly before this opinion was issued, the Mississip-
pi Supreme Court rejected the doctrine in Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d
1086 (Miss. 1987). When the federal court became aware of that opinion, it .modified its
holding to find that the implied contract theory was not available. Samples, 673 F. Supp.
at 1418-19.
138. For example, more weight should be given to a federal court sitting in Texas
interpreting Texas law than a federal court in Illinois interpreting Texas law. See infra
notes 257-58. The classic reference on this point is Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345
(1976). See also Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit
Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MiNN. L. REv. 899 (1989)
(summarizing and analyzing circuit court deference to district court rulings on state law).
139. For example, the conclusion of the court in High v. Sperry Corp., 581 F. Supp.
1246 (S.D. Iowa 1984), that there was sufficient evidence to survive a motion to dismiss
is worthy of less attention than a direct Erie guess that a cause of action exists in a state
as in McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass 1980). Weaker
still is Hass v. Picker Int'l Inc., 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2367 (D. Mass. 1986). The BNA
Individual Employment Rights Manual summarizes the three-paragraph opinion as allowing
a claim based on "statements in an employee handbook and representations by the
employer's agent that [the employee] would be employed for a term in excess of one
year." BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INDIvIDuAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS MANUAL
505:434 (1991). That opinion merely rejected a summary judgment motion, saying "al-
though plaintiff's evidence appears to be gossamer thin it cannot be ruled with certainty
that there is no question of material fact lurking in this case." Hass, 122 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 2368. Given the procedural posture, this is less than "gossamer thin" authority
for the existence of such a cause of action in Massachusetts. See also discussion infra
part H.B.3.
140. Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805 (D. Colo. 1983), embodies
both a strong and weak finding in one opinion. With respect to the implied contract
exception, Brooks made a careful argument as to why Colorado would recognize the
exception. Id. at 808-10. With respect to the public policy exception, however, Brooks
misstated previous precedent. Id. at 809. See also Appendix B.
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public or change in the law but not when modeling state
courts' behavior.
3. Dicta
Cases III, IV, and V in Table 1 present an additional problem
area. In these types of opinions, courts hint that they are sympa-
thetic to claims that the law really is Rule X, but some other rule
prevents them from reaching that issue. Their comments about Rule
X are therefore dicta and not binding on future courts deciding the
issue. The strength of dicta varies enormously. The weakest version
might simply mention that a party has made a claim that Rule X
applies but never go beyond the simple mention of the claim.
141
At the other extreme, a court could undertake an extensive analysis
of a rule but ultimately decide not to reach the issue on the mer-
its. 42 How should one handle these cases? The answer will again
depend upon the model under consideration.
The common law exceptions to the at-will rule provide an
141. See, e.g., Hass, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2368. "Given the fact that a complaint is
to be read favorably to the party resisting a motion for summary judgment, I rule that al-
though plaintiffs evidence appears to be gossamer thin it cannot be noted with certainty
that there is no question of material fact lurking in this case." This passage is the entire
substantive discussion of this issue in this opinion.
142. See, e.g., M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 1980). In between these
two extremes is Chin v. AT&T, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (subsequent
history omitted). In the trial court opinion in Chin, the court discussed a public policy
claim, which it termed a claim under "the doctrine of abusive discharge":
Although it does not appear that this doctrine has been recognized in this state,
it is appropriate, on a motion of this nature, to examine the elements of the
cause of action to determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts upon
which relief might be granted at trial. Since plaintiff is proceeding on a cause
of action not presently recognized in this state, he bears a heavy burden of
demonstrating that this new cause of action should be adopted ...
At the threshold, the doctrine of abusive discharge places upon the
plaintiff the burden of persuading this court that (1) there is a public policy of
this state that (2) was violated by the defendant. Plaintiff herein has not suffi-
ciently demonstrated that public policy, derived from or bottomed on New York
constitutional, statutory or decisional law, exists that would restrict the right of
a private employer to discharge an employee at will due to the employee's
political beliefs, activities and associations.
This is not to say that such public policy does not exist; it merely
is to say that plaintiff herein has not sustained his burden of persuasion. While
this court is not averse to recognizing new causes of action or defenses where
clearly warranted, such recognition should only be given upon a substantial
showing which has not been made here.
Id. at 740-41 (citation omitted).
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excellent example of this issue. Particularly in the 1970s and early
1980s, courts often indicated sympathy for a particular exception in
dicta but then concluded that, even if the exception were to be
adopted, that this particular plaintiff would not qualify for it.
Whether such an opinion should count depends on how strongly
the opinion endorsed the theory. For example, in Abrisz v. Pulley
Freight Lines, Inc.," the Iowa Supreme Court stated:
This appeal is before us on a narrow and clearly defined
issue. Plaintiff asks us to carve out an exception to the
employment at-will rule and to provide a remedy when
such employment is terminated for reasons contrary to
public policy. This doctrine has recently gained consider-
able favor with courts .... We do not decide if an em-
ployee under an at-will contract is without a remedy under
any circumstances, as the dissent in Monge v. Beebe Rub-
ber Co. and authorities there cited insist. We hold only that
under the facts of this case there is no showing that
plaintiff's discharge was violative of public policy."4
Since the court avoided the issue entirely, I did not consider Abrisz
as adopting the public policy exception, even though a plaintiff
later argued the opinion established the exception. 4 ' On the other
hand, I did use Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District."4 In dic-
ta, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "[a]s a general exception to the
[at-will] rule.., an employee may claim damages for wrongful
discharge when the motivation for the firing contravenes public
policy."'47 This unambiguous statement, later relied on by the
same court as the source of the rule,"¢ is sufficient to create the
perception that the rule has changed.
Dicta must be handled carefully. Reliance on it can cause ma-
jor changes in datings. In the case of Idaho's public policy excep-
tion, for example, the dicta upon which Dertouzos and Karoly and
I relied predates the more conclusive opinion counted by Krueger
by eight years.'49 Scholars can avoid over-counting or under-
counting only by careful legal analysis of the opinions. 5
143. 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978).
144. Id. at 455-57 (citations omitted).
145. See Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 559-60 (Iowa 1988).
146. 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977).
147. Id. at 57.
148. See MacNeil v. Minidoka Mern. Hosp., 701 P.2d 208, 209 (Idaho 1985).
149. See Appendix B.
150. Dertouzos and Karoly cite dicta in Jones v. Keogh, 409 A.2d 581 (Vt. 1979) for a
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PRINCIPLE 6: Careful legal analysis of dicta is necessary to
determine whether it is a basis for counting a case.
4. Unpublished, Depublished, and Limited Authority Opinions
Courts do not publish all their opinions.. and not all pub-
lished opinions are officially published.'52 This creates a dilemma
narrow public policy exception and Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586 (Vt. 1986) for a
broad one. Krueger and I counted only Payne. In rejecting a public policy claim, the
Jones' court noted:
The basic common law rule which still is widely accepted is that which was
pronounced by this Court in Mullaney v. C.H. Goss Co. Ever present in those
opinions recognizing the common law rule is the concern that acceptance of a
rule extending enforceable contract rights to an at-will employee would destroy
the mutuality of obligation extant in such employment relationships. According-
ly, courts generally have been unwilling to uphold suits by discharged employ-
ees at-will unless there is a clear and compelling public policy against the
reason advanced for the discharge.
While full employment and employer-employee harmony are noble
goals to which society aspires, they alone do not present the clear and compel-
ling public policies upon which courts have been willing to rely in upholding
an action for discharge of an employee at-will. Nor is the fact that bad faith,
malice and retaliation are motives upon which we look askance sufficient to
impel us to find a clear and compelling public policy where, as here, there is
none.
Jones, 409 A.2d at 582 (citations omitted). Payne later cites a fragment of this language:
"In Vermont, under an "at-will" employment contract, an employee may be discharged at
any time with or without cause, 'unless there is a clear and compelling public policy
against the reason advanced for the discharge."' Payne, 520 A.2d at 588 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Jones, 409 A.2d at 582). Thus Payne's discussion of what "courts gen-
erally" have been unwilling to do was transformed into the definition of Vermont's public
policy exception. Justice Peck's dissent notes that Jones is actually a unanimous endorse-
ment of the at-will rule. Id. at 591-92 (Peck, J., dissenting). Despite the Payne court's
reference to Jones, it would be difficult to construe its passing reference to "courts gener-
ally" as forecasting a change in a Vermont rule it had just endorsed.
151. "Opinion" is an imprecise term. Courts issue a variety of products: orders, memo-
randa, per curiam opinions, signed opinions, judgments, and so forth.
152. Federal district court opinions are not officially published but are widely available
in West's Federal Supplement, online in WESTLAW and LEXIS, and in a variety of sub-
ject matter and other services which publish opinions (including those of other courts)
unofficially. Some of these, such as the CCH and BNA services, have wide circulation.
Others do not. One example is Coffey's Probate Decisions, which consist of the decisions
of Judge James V. Coffey, a 19th century judge of the probate court in San Francisco. A
commentator describe these reports as follows:
Although not buoyed up, nor made prominent through the prestige of a high
court, yet by virtue of his learning and great ability as a judge, his decisions
have attained renown and permanency on their merits, having been published in
six volumes at $5.00 each, and being of exceptional value to a practitioner.
Fred H. Peterson, Court Opinions and Reports, 86 CENT. L.J. 428, 430 (1918).
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for researchers: should they count unpublished opinions? If so, how
can scholars find these opinions? One appellate judge termed such
opinions "a personal letter from the panel to the trial court judge
and the parties informing them of the decision and the rationale
behind it.' 53 It is tempting to resolve these questions with a sim-
ple bright line rule: only opinions which appear in official reporters
count. Such a rule certainly eases the burden for the researcher. It
also has the ring of common sense: if a court chooses not to pub-
lish an opinion, it cannot be important and should not count be-
cause the law's addressees will not be aware of the change. In
many circumstances, however, adopting such a rule would be a
serious mistake.'54 For example, when unpublished decisions are
Ohio's publication history is well-documented and presents an excellent example of
the multiplicity of unofficial reports. Official reporting of Ohio Supreme Court decisions
began in 1823, although the Court was organized in 1803. In addition to the official
reports, a volume of "Ohio Supreme Court Decisions (Unreported)" was issued. Appellate
courts called "district courts" sat from 1851 to 1883 and a commentator notes that "[their]
opinions carried great weight." Feazel, supra note 122, at 10. Their decisions were not
officially reported, but many appeared in legal periodicals and many were later reprinted
in Ohio Decisions, Reprint which was published between 1869 and 1899. Id. at 11. This
reporter not only included decisions published earlier but also approximately 100 opinions
previously "overlooked." Id. at 12. The opinions of the Ohio Circuit Courts, courts which
existed from 1885 to 1912, were reported in three sets of reporters. George C. Trautwein,
Ohio Courts and The Reports of Their Decisions, 7 U. CIN. L. REV. 60, 64-65 (1933).
The Courts of Appeals, which replaced the Circuit Courts in 1912, had opinions reported
among six different reporters, some officially and some not. Id. at 65-66. In addition, a
number of trial courts also had opinions published in a variety of reporters. See generally
William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting
of Opinions: A Critique, 46 Omo ST. LJ. 313, 315-18 (1985); Robert L. Black, Jr.,
Unveiling Ohio's Hidden Court, 16 AKRON L. REV. 107 (1982); Trautwein, supra. Despite
repeated attempts to suppress the unpublished opinions, market demand continued to be
met by private publishers.
In 1915, Ohio appellate judges were given the power to choose which opinions
were to be published. The judges published a small fraction of all cases handed
down, successfully reducing the weight of the official reports, but unreported
cases refuse to lie dormant. Private periodical services began to appear. Unre-
ported cases from certain courts are kept in complete files in the courts and
collected by local firms by subscriptions. . . .Many cases turn upon the ade-
quacy of the unofficial reports and follow cases cited in the better unofficial
reports.
Mark Wood, Selective Publication of Case Law, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 608, 612 (1966).
153. Edwin R. Render, On Unpublished Opinions, 73 KY. LJ. 145, 151 (1984-1985)
(quoting Judge McDonald, Chance of Publishing?, 3 LOUISVILLE L. 26, 27 (Winter
1982)).
154. This is particularly true of research into cases' attributes, a subject not treated in
this paper. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 112, at 1150-56, for a review of the
differences between published and unpublished cases in this regard. For example,
Siegelman and Donohue found important differences between published and unpublished
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widely circulated, failing to count them may result in overestimat-
ing the time until adoption of a particular legal change.
Courts' creation and use of unpublished decisions poses a far
more complex problem than the "personal letter" characterization
suggests. Attorneys seek out and regularly make use of unpublished
opinions, and any study which attempts to measure the impact of
decisions on the bar and/or clients must consider unpublished opin-
ions generally available among the population of interest. 5
employment discriminations opinions with respect to the types of claims pursued, the stat-
ute relied on, the type of discrimination alleged, the occupation of plaintiffs, the industry
of the defendants, the remedy sought, and the outcomes. Id.
155. Although one of the goals of nonpublication is to avoid publication of opinions
which are merely repetitive statements of existing law, there is a substantial set of com-
plaints in the literature claiming that cases which have made new law are frequently
unpublished. See, e.g., James N. Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of
Equal Justice, 61 A.B.A. J. 1226 (1975); David Newbem & Douglas Wilson, Rule 21:
Unprecedent and the Disappearing Court, 32 ARK. L. REv. 37, 48 (1978); William L.
Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits,
1979 DuKE L.J. 807, 827-28 (1979) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publica-
tion]; Pamela Foa, Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law: the Seventh Circuit's Non-
Publication Rule, 39 U. PrrT. L. REv. 309, 316-38 (1977).
One commentator describes how the First District Court of Appeals in Ohio has an
index available to the bar, beginning with 1972 and containing 2500 cases; other districts
also have indices. Black, supra note 152,-at 109. Black also notes that Ohio Appellate
Decisions on microfiche covers all opinions beginning in 1981 and that Banks-Baldwin
Law Publishing Company publishes an Ohio Appellate Decisions Index. Id. at 112. The
Ohio Revised Code Annotated published by Banks-Baldwin also digests these unpublished
opinions.
In Arkansas, where "unpublished" opinions are in fact published in the Arkansas
Legislative Digest, an unofficial supplement to the official Arkansas Reports, over 65% of
attorneys responding to a questionnaire answered the question "Do you usually read the
'unpublished opinions' [of the Arkansas Supreme Court]?" as either "Definitely yes" or
"To some extent yes." Newbem & Wilson, supra, at 40-42. See also J. Myron Jacobstein,
Some Reflections on the Control of the Publication of Appellate Court Opinions, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 791, 792 n.4. (1975) (noting the formation of a subscription service by the Fed-
eral Bar Association for federal district court opinions in New Jersey); Gideon Kanner,
The Unpublished Appellate Opinion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 387, 436 n.12
(1973) ("My own practice is largely appellate in nature, and it generally falls into the
substantive field of eminent domain. I have, therefore, assiduously collected all unpub-
lished opinions relating to eminent domain. ... ).
Kanner mentions the "Unpublished Cases Department" of the California State Bar
Journal. Id. at 447 n.77. See also Jacobstein, supra, at 798 n.36 (noting California sub-
scription service for search and seizure cases and quoting editor as saying "subscribers
from all over the state report winning case after case in trial courts by citing unpublished
opinions"). In earlier times in California when the Supreme Court was the only court of
appeal, it did not publish all its opinions, which led to the privately published California
Unreported Cases Reporter. Eugene M. Prince, Law Books, Unlimited, 32 A.B.A. J. 134,
136 (1962). See also Wood, supra note 152, at 612 n.14. Similar circumstances existed in
Texas, where Posey's Unreported Cases filled the gap for Texas practitioners. See also
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Despite formal rules prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions,
these opinions often still reach and influence decisionmakers.5 6
Even among published opinions, subsequent court action limits
some opinions' authority in ways more subtle than a simple rever-
sal. Higher courts may indicate a degree of approval in denying a
request for discretionary review or, less subtly, an opinion may be
"depublished."'5 7
Although complaints about the volume of reported decisions'
Gerald T. Dunne, Editor's Headnotes, 99 BANKING LJ. 387, 387 (1982) ("Unfortunately
banking law decisions, either at the trial level or otherwise, may pass unreported for a
variety of reasons. Hence, the Journal would be pleased to receive copies of such materi-
al from the banking bar for appropriate reproduction in its pages."); Allan D. Vestal,
Reported Opinions of the Federal District Courts: Analysis and Suggestions, 52 IOWA L.
REV. 379, 396 n.63 (1966) (describing unofficial reports of unreported decisions in Cali-
fornia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia).
156. If the behavior of a large institutional litigant which repeatedly litigates in an area
is the issue (the government, for example, in criminal cases or appeals of social security
disability cases), it is quite likely that litigant will take steps to make use of unpublished
decisions. See, e.g., Lauren Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished
Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeal, 87 MCH. L.
REv. 940, 956-59 (1989). Prof. Robel surveyed offices within the Justice Department and
U.S. Attorneys. Id. at 956-59. The responses received indicated a universal use of unpub-
lished opinions within the office. Id. at 958-59. Interestingly, the Executive Office of the
United States Attorneys "determined that responses [to the survey] would not be in the
best interest of the Justice Department" and forbade responses. Id. at 959 n.87.
Render describes some of the ways in which unpublished opinions can influence a
decision maker
A trial judge is very likely to remember how the appeals court ruled on an
issue he decided. The judge is also very likely to decide a subsequent case in
accordance with prior decisions of the appellate court. Indeed, the judge may
feel duty bound to do so, whether the decision is published, cited or not. Trial
judges can also learn about unpublished cases from fellow judges, especially in
Kentucky's larger circuits ...
Judges have related stories to this author about receiving unpublished
decisions in the mail anonymously, or having them slipped under their office
doors.
Render, supra note 153, at 163.
157. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text (describing the "depublishing" pro-
cess).
158. The number of published opinions has grown dramatically over time. An oft-cited
estimate, which does not reveal how it was calculated, is that the following number of
decisions have been published:
1790-1840: 50,000
1840-1890: 450,000
1890-1940: 1,250,000
1940-1960: 600,000-700,000
Prince, supra note 155, at 134.
The percentage of federal circuit court opinions published fell dramatically after the
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date back almost to the first common law reports, 5 9 the time pe-
riod under consideration is an important factor in whether to count
a particular opinion, because publication and citation practices have
varied significantly across time as well as among courts."6 While
the variation is too great to permit a summary here, 6' the key
lesson is that the period under study will affect the decision of
Federal Judicial Center recommended limited publication in 1971, from 48.4% in 1973 to
37.2% in 1977. Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication, supra note 155, at 808.
159. Reporting in the United States began in the 19th century, largely in private hands.
See Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note 114, at 575-76. A short list of such
complaints includes John J. O'Connell, A Dissertation on Judicial Opinions, 23 TEMPLE
L.Q. 13 (1949) (expressing general concerns about the number of published opinions);
Edward H. Warren, The Welter of Decisions, 10 ILL. L. REV. 472, 472-73, 476 (1915-
1916) (noting 175,000 pages of decisions added to Harvard Law Library in year ending
June 30, 1915, and quoting Sir Edward Coke to the effect that there were too many
published opinions in his time); John B. Winslow, The Courts and the Papermills, 10 ILL.
L. REv. 157, 158 (1915) (noting that 65,379 decisions of federal courts and state courts
of last resort were published in 1909-13, filling 630 volumes). The earliest complaint I
have discovered is a reference to a complaint by Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice in
1671. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAw 141 (1965). The earliest
American complaint is a mention of an 1831 complaint by Joseph Story about the num-
ber of reports in Judge O'Connell's diatribe. O'Connell, supra, at 14.
160. See Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note 114, at 575-77, for a brief
history of publication of judicial opinions. Fragmentary results are available for some
states; no definitive survey exists. Courts' use of precedent has also varied over time. See
MORTON J. HORWrrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1780-1860, at 23-28
(1977).
161. Publication in the United States generally is a decision made by the court. West
Publishing, for example, never refuses to publish an opinion. Robert A. Leflar, Some
Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 CoLUM. L. REV. 810, 815 (1961). The
individual states and federal circuits have used various methods to determine which opin-
ions to publish. See Francis P. Whitehair, Some Suggestions for the Elimination or Reduc-
tion of Publication of Unnecessary Opinions, 21 FLA. L. REV. 225, 228-29 (1947).
Among the methods used are commissions, discretion of the court, and mandatory publi-
cation. Some courts publish all their opinions. The United States Supreme Court, for
example, publishes all its opinions, although a few early 18th century opinions were not
published. Most courts do not publish all their opinions. Some courts, such as the Fifth
Circuit, have rules allowing them to decide cases without written opinion. See, e.g., 5TH
CIR. R. 47.6. There is thus no "opinion" left unpublished in those cases; in others there
is a written but unpublished opinion. Some of the courts which selectively publish their
opinions have formal policies describing, with varying degrees of specificity, the criteria
used to select opinions for publication. There is a surprisingly large amount of legal liter-
ature on the merits of these policies which provides some guidance, but there is no com-
prehensive guide to publication policies across courts and across time. The most compre-
hensive source on this issue is Leah Chanin, A Survey of the Writing and Publication of
Opinions in Federal and State Appellate Courts, 67 LAW LIBR. J. 362 (1974). This article
covers the then-current policies in all states and federal circuits. The publication policies
which are the best documented are those of the federal appellate courts and these can be
used as examples here. See generally Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note
114, at 575-77 and Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication, supra note 155, at 810-14.
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how to handle unpublished and limited authority cases. From the
limited research in existence, there is evidence of considerable
variation both between and within courts in the content and nature
of these opinions.'62 Researchers deciding how to use unpublished
and limited authority materials need to consider several issues with
respect to particular courts: (i) publication policies; (ii) distribution
policies; (iii) citation policies; and (iv) limitations on authority.
Because the policies have changed over time and across courts, the
answer may also differ from court to court and across time.
Court opinions fill many needs other than providing prece-
dent." Both published and unpublished opinions resolve particu-
lar disputes. Although not providing general precedent, unpublished
opinions establish the law of the case for the case in which they
arose and are sometimes used for preclusion purposes." Under
some circumstances, they provide precedent. Where courts have
adopted formal publication policies which establish criteria for
publication, these policies provide valuable guidance to the re-
searcher. Even when such policies exist, and they are all too rare
at the state level,"e5 the researcher must still be alert to an opin-
162. The Ninth Circuit, for example, wrote lengthy unpublished opinions in social secu-
rity disability appeals. Robel, supra note 156, at 943 n.17. In Kentucky before 1976,
unpublished decisions of the Kentucky Supreme Court consisted of a simple statement that
the decision below was correct. One such opinion is quoted in full in Render, supra note
153, at 147: 'This case has been reviewed by a panel of three circuit judges and by this
court. All are of the opinion that the judgment is correct and should be affirmed."
Decoursey v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., No. F-20-72 (Ky. Sept. 27, 1974). Where un-
published decisions are of such character, the interest lies primarily in whether they
strengthen or weaken the lower court opinion.
163. Most obviously, opinions resolve a legal issue between parties. In doing so, the
opinion demonstrates that the appellate court has considered the issues raised by the ap-
pellant, and so encourages confidence in the judicial system. In the case of reversals,
opinions inform the lower court of the rationale for overturning decisions. Opinions also
provide a record for use in future assertions of collateral estoppel, law of the case, and
res judicata.
164. For example, a federal district judge in the Northern District of Illinois held that a
prior unpublished opinion from the same district holding a Chicago statute unconstitution-
ally overbroad and vague required the statute be held unconstitutional in a new suit five
years later by different plaintiffs. See George M. Weaver, The Precedental Value of Un-
published Judicial Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477, 482-83 (1988).
165. Most states have no official standards for publication. See Chanin, supra note 161,
at 362. The Federal Judicial Center has published Standards for Publication as a recom-
mendation for federal courts of appeal, and these standards are useful in considering what
may be published:
(1) the opinion lays down a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing
rule; (2) the opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; (3) the
opinion criticizes existing law; or (4) the opinion resolves an apparent conflict
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ion which gains widespread currency with the bar without publica-
tion.'" One cannot, therefore, regard such policies as conclusive.
When the research concerns the impact of decisions on the bar
and/or public, the distribution of unpublished decisions is an impor-
tant factor. Some courts limit distribution to the parties and lower
court;' 67  others permit subscription to unpublished decisions."es
When the distribution of the opinion is limited, its impact on the
public and bar is likely also to be limited.
In addition to limiting publication and distribution, some courts
have formal rules governing citation of unpublished decisions.
Some courts allow citation of unpublished opinions as precedential
authority without limit, 69  others limit the circumstances under
which they may be cited, 71 while still others forbid their cita-
of authority.
COMMTEE ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR
APPELLATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL CENTER RESEARCH SERIES No. 73-2 15-17 (1973).
166. For example, the intermediate appellate court opinion in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Mem. Hosp., 714 P.2d 412 (Ariz. 1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded, and
vacated, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985), gained widespread attention in Arizona despite being
unpublished until after the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in the case. See supra note
101. Its notoriety was due to the combination of its bizarre facts and the comprehensive
nature of the opinion. Wagenseller, 714 P.2d at 414. (See infra note 245 for a discussion
of Wagenseller's newsworthiness.) Since the opinion did not adopt a public policy excep-
tion, I did not count it here-the example is merely illustrative of the type of case which
attains widespread attention. Finding that opinion was easy when I was searching for the
opinions in 1992 because the intermediate appellate opinion was published by West after
the later Arizona Supreme Court opinion was published.
167. See DONNA STIENSTRA, UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS tbl. 6 (1985) (describing the
policies of the federal circuits).
168. The Tenth Circuit even created an index of unpublished opinions which was avail-
able by subscription and at 60 law libraries within the circuit See Reynolds & Richman,
Limited Publication, supra note 155, at 813-14 n.35.
169. See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3 (stating that "[u]npublished opinions are precedent");
TENN. S. CT. R. 4(5) (allowing citation of unpublished decisions if a copy is provided to
opposing counsel and the court). California no longer allows citation, but prior to adop-
tion of the current rule it did and followed unpublished cases as precedent. See, e.g.,
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 102 P. 927 (Cal. 1909).
170.- See 7TH CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv) (requiring litigant to appear before the court and have
an unreported decision certified before citing it); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3 (allowing citation if a
copy is provided to opposing counsel); IowA S. CT. R. 10(f) (allowing citation only for
cases involving the same parties); WIS. STAT. ANN. 809.23(3) (West 1994) (allowing
citation only to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case).
Ohio furnishes an interesting example of a state where unpublished opinions are
given limited precedential force. Although Ohio law specifically provides that courts are
not to recognize unreported opinions, in practice they routinely are cited. See Black, supra
note 152, at 109; Chanin, supra note 161, at 372. Since fewer than five percent of Ohio
intermediate appellate opinions are published each year, several systems have sprung up to
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tion.' Where the issue is when the law changed, the precedential
value of unpublished opinions is critical to the determination of
whether to count the opinion.
The inclusion of unpublished material on LEXIS and
WESTLAW makes identification of recent unpublished opinions
easier (and more important) for researchers. A study of legal
changes in all states in the 1920s, for example, could not include
as thorough an analysis of unpublished opinions (although it would
have to address the use of unofficial reporters), while a study of
changes in the 1980s could and should be much more complete.
Studies of a particular state, and treatment of the identified deci-
sions, should be based on consideration of factors such as citation,
publication, and distribution policies and the existence of distribu-
tion mechanisms.
Even when courts have published opinions, subsequent events
short of direct review may affect the opinions' precedential value.
Some states have or have had procedures for giving partial approv-
al or partial disapproval to opinions of lower courts. Opinions
also sometimes disappear between the advance sheets and the final
reporter volumes.73 These are not simply unpublished opinions
provide attorneys with unpublished opinions. See Black, supra note 152, at 107 n.2. Pro-
fessional associations of attorneys provide both summaries and full reports of unpublished
opinions in various areas. Id. at 108-09.
171. See 9m CIR. R. 36-3 ("A disposition that is not for publication shall not be re-
garded as precedent . . . except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, or collateral estoppel."); ARK. S. Cr. R. 5.2(d). See generally Newbern & Wil-
son, supra note 155. For a useful comparison of citation policies, see Reynolds &
Richman, Limited Publication, supra note 155, at 812-14.
172. In Texas, for example, the state Supreme Court can refuse to hear discretionary
cases with one of several notations. "Writ refused" and "writ refused no reversible error,"
for example, denote cases with greater and lesser authority, respectively; cases in which
no writ of error has been sought are reported with the notation "no writ." The writ histo-
ry is rarely reported outside Texas and is not mentioned in the Bluebook.
During the first part of this century, the California Supreme Court commented on
lower court opinions without writing new ones: it "withheld its approval" of some, "ap-
proved" part or all of others, and "expressed no opinion" as to the merits of others. See,
e.g., Robert G. Berrey, Comment, 13 S. CAL. L. REv. 461 (1940); Comment, Courts:
Significance of the Practice of the California Supreme Court of Commenting on the Opin-
ion of the District Court of Appeal When Denying A Hearing After Judgment, 28 CAL. L.
R V. 81 (1939). Clearly, researchers need to be aware of such procedures and their ef-
fects as to the validity of lower court opinions.
173. See Render, supra note 153, at 156-58 for a description of such a case in Ken-
tucky. The parties settled after the Kentucky Court of Appeals had ruled and the opinion
had appeared in the Kentucky Law Summary. After settlement, the parties made a joint
motion to the Kentucky Supreme Court asking that the Court of Appeals opinion not be
published; this motion was granted. Curiously, the order directing the case not be pub-
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but opinions whose bases have been questioned. They should there-
fore not be counted, although their existence should be noted.
Finally, since 1971, California has used a practice which allows
the California Supreme Court to order decisions of the lower courts
"depublished."' 74 These decisions are omitted from the official
reports 75 and are unavailable as precedent.'7 6 Depublished opin-
lished was itself unpublished, meaning that someone reading the case in the Kentucky Law
Summary would be unaware that the case should not be cited. Id.
174. Beginning in 1964, the intermediate appellate courts gained the authority to refrain
from publishing opinions. The presumption was in favor of publication. After 1972, the
presumption was reversed. See Kanner, supra note 155, at 388.
175. Estimates of the number of depublished opinions are given below.
Year Number Year J Number
1970-71 1 1981-82 N/A
1971-72 3 1982-83 120
1972-73 20 1983-84 N/A
1973-74 22 1984-85 N/A
1974-75 12 1985-86 N/A
1975-76 45 1986-87 N/A
1976-77 34 1987-88 126
1977-78 35 1988-89 142
1978-79 35 1989-90 117
1979-80 N/A 1990-91 100
1980-81 N/A
Sources: 1971-72: Robert S. Gerstein, "Law by Elimination:" Depublication in the
California Supreme Court, 67 JUDICATURE 293, 296 (1984).
1972-77: Julie Haywood Biggs, Note, Decertification of Appellate Opinions: The
Need for Articulated Judicial Reasoning and Certain Precedent in California Law,
50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1181, 1200-06 (1977).
1978-79: Julie Hayward Biggs, Censoring the Law in California: Decertification
Revisited, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1577, 1594-96 (1979).
1982-83: Philip L. Dubois, The Negative Side of Judicial Decision Making:
Depublication as a Tool of Judicial Power and Administration on State Courts of
Last Resort, 33 VILL. L. REv. 469, 486 (1988).
1987-91: Gerald F. Uelmen, Publication and Depublication of California Court of
Appeal Opinions: Is the Eraser Mightier Than the Pencil?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1007, tbl. 1, at 1022 (1993).
176. Unpublished opinions of the court of appeals may not "be cited or relied on by a
court or a party in any other action or proceeding." CAL. Cr. R. 977(a) (Supp. 1994).
One California Supreme Court Justice has written that depublication is generally ordered
"because a majority of the justices consider the opinion to be wrong in some significant
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ions may provide useful insights into the state of the law as well
as being worthy of study in their own right."
PRINCIPLE 7: Scholars should consider unpublished and
limited authority decisions on a case-by-case basis when
they have been identified. In determining the treatment of
such opinions, they should consider publication, citation,
and distribution policies, together with local practice.
PRINCIPLE 8: Researchers should consider both limitation of
authority and depublication when examining the impact of
an opinion; the effect prior to the limitation or
depublication may differ from the effect after the limitation
or depublication.
5. Statutory Interpretation Cases
Statutes and statutory interpretation' exert influence on
courts' decisions on common law rules; this influence may require
some choices by researchers. For example, a court may interpret
statutory language to provide a remedy similar to a common law
remedy instead of adopting a common law rule. When the statutory
language is clear, such an interpretation is not a common law
way, such that it would mislead the bench and bar if it remained as citable precedent."
Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme Court, 72 CAL.
L. REV. 514, 514-15 (1984).
177. Two recent empirical studies are, Dubois, supra note 175, and Uelmen, supra note
175.
178. Economic analysis of law has generally distinguished between analysis of common
law and statutory law. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 523-36
(1992). Although this distinction has been criticized for failing to recognize the fundamen-
tal similarities between the processes which produce common law rules and those which
produce statutes, see Paul H. Rubin; Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
205 (1982), the institutional differences are significant for the researcher conducting an
empirical investigation into the common law. To take an obvious example, there is no
reason to expect that the terms of judges will affect a legislature's deliberation on a stat-
ute in the same way that the same terms will affect a judge's decision. Legislatures might
regard a judiciary made up of judges with short terms as easier to control than one
which is made up of judges with life tenure. This could affect the optimal degree of
specificity in language used by the legislature. Judges with short terms might be more
concemed with reappointment or reelection, but there is no reason to believe the magni-
tude of the effect would be the same and hence an empirical investigation would need to
examine the two routes to a rule separately. An exception might be a competing risks
model of adoption of a rule. I am unaware of any such study. Curran, supra note 2,
examined the adoption of comparative negligence through both legislative and judicial
means by treating both as identical. He reported that his initial investigation into the
method of adoption was inconclusive. Id. at 311 n.35.
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innovation. When, on the other hand, a court interprets vague lan-
guage or strains to base the result on statutory interpretation, the
result properly may be counted as a common law innovation.'79
179. An example of this is the interpretation of workers' compensation statutes on the
issue of the existence of a remedy for discharge in retaliation for seeking benefits under
the compensation scheme. Some such cases simply applied relatively clear statutory lan-
guage to provide a remedy. See Smith v. Piezo Technology and Professional Adm'rs, 427
So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983), where the court concluded that Florida Statute § 440.205 created
a cause of action for a retaliatory discharge. Id. at 183. That section stated: "No employer
shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of
such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the
Workers' Compensation Law." FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1979). The only reason one might
question whether such a claim was possible was that the statute did not specify a fonim
for resolving such claims or describe the relief possible. Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184 n.1.
Recognizing that the statute clearly imposed a duty, the Florida Supreme Court had no
difficulty finding an implied right of action. Id. at 184. This recognition was eased by the
fact that § 440.205 was a response to Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89, 90
(Fla. Dist. CL App. 1978), which held that there was no such cause of action under the
prior statute. See Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1330 n.1 (Fla. Dist.
CL App. 1985).
Similarly, in Henderson v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 605 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. CL App.
1979), the statute explicitly permitted retaliatory discharge claims: "'No employer or agent
shall discharge or in any way discriminate against any employee for exercising any of his
rights under this chapter. Any employee who has been discharged or discriminated against
shall have a civil action for damages against his employer."' Id. at 802-03 (quoting Mo.
REV. STAT. § 287.780 (Supp. 1975)). The recognition of such a cause of action should
not count as an innovation. (Missouri amended the earlier version of this statute to pro-
vide a civil remedy in 1973.) See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon 1993).
In Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973), on the other
hand, the Indiana Supreme Court held that discharging an employee for filing a workers'
compensation claim was a "device" within the meaning of a workers' compensation statute
provision, which read: "'No contract or agreement, written or implied, no rule, regulation,
or other device shall, in any manner, operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part
of any obligation created by this act.' Id. at 427-28 (emphasis added) (quoting IND.
CODE § 40-1215 (1971)). The court held:
The Act creates a duty in the employer to compensate employees for work-
related injuries (through insurance) and a right in the employee to receive such
compensation. But in order for the goals of the Act to be realized and for
public policy to be effectuated, the employee must be able to exercise his right
in an unfettered fashion without being subject to reprisal. If employers are
permitted to penalize employees for filing workmen's compensation claims, a
most important public policy will be undermined. The fear of being discharged
would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory right. Employees
will not file claims for justly deserved compensation-opting, instead, to con-
tinue their employment without incident. The end result, of course, is that the
employer is effectively relieved of his obligation ...
* * * We believe the threat of discharge to be a "device" within the
framework of [the statute], and hence, in clear contravention of public poli-
cy. ...
* . * Retaliatory discharge for filing a workmen's compensation claim
is a wrongful, unconscionable act and should be actionable in a court of
1995] A FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE COMMON LAW 1049
Courts may also attempt to cloak the innovation in terms of filling
the gaps in statutory schemes.' In these cases the researcher will
have to pierce the veil of the court's language to determine wheth-
er the result in question is truly a matter of interpreting the statute
or whether it is a common law innovation.
A second problem arises when a common law remedy is tied
indirectly to a statutory provision.' Courts may use language
law....
... We agree with the Court of Appeals that, under ordinary cir-
cumstances, an employee at-will may be discharged without cause. However,
when an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred
right an exception to the general rule must be recognized.
Id. at 427-28. Thus, Frampton should count as an innovation since the court appears to
be recognizing a general principle rather than simply applying a specific statutory provi-
sion.
There are several reasons for the distinction. The first is the unique history of
workers' compensation statutes. ARTMR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.20, at 2 (1994). Because they require employees to give
up the chance for a large tort recovery to gain a (theoretically) swifter but (certainly)
smaller recovery, the comprehensiveness of the scheme is critically important. If employers
were able to defeat workers' compensation claims by simply threatening to fire employees
who filed claims, employees would have neither the workers' compensation remedy nor
the tort theories given up to gain the compensation scheme.
Second, firing an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim is a narrow
class of behavior which is easily avoided by an employer. If the only effect of the case
is to suggest that the court will not allow comprehensive social insurance programs to be
defeated by unethical behavior, it has relatively minor consequences for most employers.
(The constant stream of cases suggests underestimating employer stupidity may not be a
serious problem. Even the unethical employer determined to retaliate against an injured
employee ought, on a moment's reflection, to see the benefit of disguising the reason for
the discharge.) If, on the other hand, the case signals a willingness to freely interpret
statutory language which formerly bore no obvious relation to wrongful discharge law,
then the signal indicates that employers must beware of broader changes in the law. An
ex post confirmation of this approach lies in the scholarly treatment of Frampton as an
innovation rather than as a simple application of a statute. See, e.g., Christopher L.
Perrington, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Its
Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1583, 1600 (1994) (noting that Frampton
was the first case to supplement the statutory remedy with a tort action, since allowing
the employer to discharge the employee would subvert the statutory public policy).
180. In the wrongful discharge area, it is not uncommon to find courts rationalizing
innovations by looking to the remedies provided workers under collective bargaining con-
tracts or statutory schemes such as Title VII. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509 (NJ. 1980). ('The National Labor Relations Act and other
labor legislation illustrate the governmental policy of preventing employees from using the
right of discharge as a means of oppression. Consistent with this policy, many states have
recognized the need to protect employees who are not parties to a collective bargaining
agreement or other contract from abusive practices by the employer.") (citing Lawrence E.
Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV., 1404, 1418 (1967)).
181. For example, in the case of the public policy exceptions to the at-will rule, many
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that implies that the rule being adopted is merely the fulfillment of
an existing statutory policy. The researcher must therefore decide if
there has been a common law innovation.' This decision must
rest on an interpretation of both the decision's language and the
statutory provision. The legal change under study may be tied to
the language of state statutes; these statutes may use different lan-
guage to resolve the same issue.'83 Whenever conducting the
analysis requires some aggregation, the researcher will have to
make qualitative judgments about the statutes' similarities and dif-
ferences to avoid losing any impact in a welter of statute-specific
variables.
Finally, different courts may have different degrees of defer-
ence toward their legislatures.'84 Researchers should be especially
states have adopted exceptions which require plaintiffs to point to a statutory or constitu-
tional provision as the source of the public policy. See, e.g., Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770
P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989) ("discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy as artic-
ulated by constitutional, statutory or decisional law"). Other states have broader public
policy exceptions which impose fewer restrictions. See, e.g., Pierce, 417 A.2d at 152
(including administrative rules, regulations and decisions and some professional codes of
ethics as sources of public policy).
182. An example here is Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers,
Warehousmen & Helpers of America, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
The court simply asserted that
Generally, such a relationship [employment contract without fixed duration] is
terminable at the will of either party (Labor Code, §2922) for any reason what-
soever. However, the right to discharge an employee under such a contract may
be limited by statute or by considerations of public policy.
Id. at 27 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The last part of this claim is unsupported
by citation to any authority, and the remainder of the opinion discusses whether perjury is
an action prohibited by public policy and whether plaintiff had a claim for expulsion from
the union. Id. at 27-29. What is remarkable about Petermann is that no court had ever
made such a holding before and yet the court did not attempt to justify its conclusion.
The issue of whether a court has the ability to limit at-will contracts in the same fashion
as the legislature continues to be a major issue in many courts. Compare Vigil v. Arzoia,
699 P.2d 613, 619 (N.M. CL App. 1983) (allowing claim for discharge in retaliation for
publicly opposing certain public expenditures, and rejecting claim that court should defer
to legislature in modifying the at-will rule outside workers' compensation area), rev'd, 687
P.2d 1038 (N.M. 1984) with Bottijliso v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 635 P.2d 992, 997-98
(N.M. CL App. 1981) (deferring to the legislature with respect to retaliation claim in
workers' compensation area), overruled by Michaels v. Anglo Am. Auto Actions, Inc., 689
P.2d 279 (N.M. 1994).
183. One might examine the adoption of retaliatory discharge causes of action under
workers' compensation schemes. See supra note 179.
184. Compare the attitudes of the Montana and Georgia Supreme Courts toward their
respective codified at-will rules. Montana has developed one of the most pro-plantiff
wrongful discharge doctrine with barely a mention of the code provisions, while Georgia
has consistently deferred to the legislature. See infra Appendix B.
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cautious in interpreting decisions in those states which have civil
codes that purport to be substantive substitutes for the common
law. During the nineteenth century California, the Dakotas, Geor-
gia, Louisiana, and Montana all adopted substantive civil codes
which were intended to supplant, in varying degrees, the common
law. 8
5
PRINCIPLE 9: Researchers should not categorically reject
statutory interpretation cases as sources of common law
innovation. They must examine the content of each case
carefully before counting or rejecting it.
6. Sources of Cases
There are two methods for locating cases. The first is to rely
on secondary sources."' The second is to conduct independent
legal research. The first is relatively inexpensive, but the potential
for inaccuracy is high. When the secondary sources are primarily
aimed at practicing lawyers, such as publications by the Bureau of
National Affairs or the Practicing Law Institute, the criteria for
selection of a case are not the same as an empirical researcher
might use.' Even when the secondary sources are historically
oriented, a researcher must carefully ensure that the criteria used
are similar to those she wishes to employ. In general, there is no
substitute for independent legal research. To facilitate independent
evaluation of empirical work, researchers should provide, and jour-
185. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws"-
Lessons from One Hundred Years of Codification in Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1995) [hereinafter Morriss, Plenty of Laws]; Andrew P. Morriss, The Law
and Economics of Employment At Will, ch. 2 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology) [hereinafter Morriss, Law and Economics] for a discus-
sion of the employment at will provisions of these codes and a history of these codes,
and Robert G. Natelson, Running with the Land in Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV. 17
(1990) for a thorough discussion of the theories of displacement in the California, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana codes.
186. This is the method used by Krueger. See Krueger, supra note 8, tbl. 1, at 649
(deriving figures from Bureau of National Affairs and Shepard, Heylman, and Duston).
187. The historical evolution of the doctrine is less important in these materials than the
current state of the law. Thus the careful research necessary to find the original case is
likely to be subordinated to the need to discuss the current contours of a course of ac-
tion. There are also mistakes in these types of materials. For example, Krueger refers to
Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, 486 A.2d 798 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) but lists the
date as 1987. Krueger, supra note 8, at 649. This appears to be a repeat of a typographi-
cal error in the BNA Individual Employment Rights Manual which incorrectly lists the
date as 1987 rather than 1985. 9A BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOY-
MENT RIGHTS MANUAL 505:414 (1993).
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nals should publish, complete citation lists.18
PRINCIPLE 10: Researchers should perform independent
legal research to discover the common law events.
PRINCIPLE 11: Researchers should publish complete citation
lists and disclose all choices made.
7. Flip-Flops
Courts sometimes change their minds about doctrines. These
changes may occur when a question finally reaches a higher
court, 8 9 opinions change on a question, 190 or a court reinterprets
its own precedents.'"' Some projects will require that the models
specified allow for the possibility of a doctrinal reversal."9 It is
also important that reversals of doctrines be recognized as exactly
that; researchers should not be deceived by a court's attempt to
portray a rule change as simply a clarification. 93 In general, em-
pirical work should focus on the contemporaneous view of a deci-
sion, not the ex post rationalization. 94
188. One might argue that providing a list of cases on request is adequate. It is not.
Only a published list will enable a reader to determine whether to rely on the research.
No one would consider publishing an empirical economics article without including both
the source of the data and descriptive statistics. Including a citation list is a minimal cost
in most instances. Krueger's paper, for example, relied on only 64 cases. Krueger, supra
note 8, unpublished appendix (on file with author). The citation list of only case names,
as in that paper, creates additional confusion. Only by examining the actual data set and
conducting independent research (since the list does not reveal whether there is more than
one opinion in any particular case) can a reader determine which opinion was relied upon
for Connecticut's implied covenant or Mississippi's public policy exceptions. See infra
notes 381-88, 475-76 and accompanying text. Where both intermediate and final opinions
are published, as in those cases, the full citation is necessary to eliminate confusion.
Ideally an appendix which briefly discloses choices made, possible in those journals such
as law reviews which have relatively high page limits, would be desirable.
189. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
190. See, e.g., Vigil v. Arzoia, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (modifying
Bottijliso v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 635 P.2d 992 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981)).
191. See, e.g., Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980). Counting Erie
guesses and intermediate court opinions will increase the probability of a reversal. See,
e.g., Samples v. Hall of Miss., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1413, 1415 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (inter-
preting Mississippi state law); Foley, 765 P.2d 373, 401-02 (reversing the intermediate
appellate court in part).
192. Dertouzos and Karoly specifically address this. See DERTouzos & KAROLY, supra
note 2, at 16.
193. See, e.g., Dorr, 414 A.2d at 1274 and discussion supra note 86.
194. Interpretations of a case by other courts, law review articles, and other legal litera-
ture provide valuable indications of the contemporaneous view of an opinion. See supra
note 81 on interpretation of Monge.
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PRINCIPLE 12: When appropriate, researchers should focus
on the contemporaneous view of an opinion rather than on
a court's ex post rationalization.
PRINCIPLE 13: Model specifications should allow for rever-
sals.
8. Dismissals and Summary Judgments
When the plaintiff seeks recovery under a new cause of action,
it is not uncommon for the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff's
case 19  or to grant summary judgment against the plaintiff. An
appellate court may then affirm the dismissal or summary judg-
ment, sometimes on slightly different grounds. These opinions
present a difficult choice for the researcher. The appellate court
may address the claim as follows: "B does not have a claim be-
cause Rule X applies. Even if Rule X applied, however, this claim-
ant does not have a claim under Rule X, since B has received all
the benefit he might obtain under Rule X."' Scholars should
195. while there are no statistics on use of state procedures to accomplish dismissal,
the analogous federal procedural device, Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, has been studied. Three studies looked at samples of cases drawn from selected
federal district courts and found between 6 and 12% of cases had motions to dismiss and
4 to 8% of cases had such motions granted. THOMAS E. WILLGING, USE OF RULE
12(B)(6) iN Two FEDERAL DiSTRicr CouRTS 6-8, Federal Judicial Center Staff Paper
(1989). As these statistics indicate, relatively few federal cases are disposed of through
motions to dismiss. The importance of these types of motions will vary with the subject
matter. In the case of states which have not yet adopted a common law exception to the
at-will rule, motions to dismiss, based on my reading of thousands of employment cases,
appear to have been more important than the federal (12)(b)(6) motions are today. This is
to be expected since a broad gatekeeper rule such as the at-will rule would preclude most
discharge-related claims. A tort suit, on the other hand, based on a well-established course
of action would be more likely to turn on the factual dispute rather than the legal validi-
ty of the claim. One consequence for empirical researchers is that challenges to rules like
the at-will rule are likely to rise through the legal system more rapidly since courts are
more likely to dismiss them at the trial level. Although opinions concerning dismissal
appear more quickly, final opinions resolving the existence of a claim may be delayed by
the intermediate appellate trip. If the claim is not dismissed, a potentially more conclu-
sive final appellate opinion will also be delayed while the case is tried below. The
researcher's decision concerning how to handle these types of opinions can therefore have
a substantial impact on the timing of the common law event. This highlights the need for
a consistent approach to the issues surrounding dating.
196. See, e.g., Knox v. American Sterilizer Co., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2341, 2342 (M.D.
Ala. 1984) (holding employee had received all of the benefits promised under handbook
prior to adoption of an implied contract exception in Alabama).
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distinguish these cases from cases which potentially recognize a
rule in other forms of dicta. In dismissal or summary judgment
cases, the court is often simply being careful. If a plaintiff's claim
fails even under the most favorable interpretation of a rule and the
facts, there is no need to address the issue of whether the rule
actually applies and the court has avoided a potential legal mistake.
Holding that a claim has failed on the facts is a cheap form of
insurance against reversal on the merits." Particularly in the case
of decisions by intermediate appellate courts these decisions should
not be counted as innovations. By contrast, a court sends a differ-
ent signal when it goes out of its way to acknowledge that differ-
ent facts might lead to a new rule.'98
PRINCIPLE 14: Dicta in opinions dismissing causes of action
or granting summary judgment against proponents of a new
rule should be counted as establishing a rule only when the
dicta directly indicates a willingness to adopt a new rule in
a future case.
9. Denials
Courts sometimes reject a doctrinal change.'" The rejection
may stand for a lengthy period or the court may overturn it soon
thereafter. It may be a simple rejection of a claim or it may be a
firm endorsement of deference to the legislature in a particular
area." How should a researcher approach these opinions? One
197. It is cheap because factual determination by trial courts are reviewed with a much
greater level of deference then legal determinations. See FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a) ("clearly
erroneous" standard of review applies to factual determinations).
198. See, e.g., Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974). The dicta
in Geary noted that:
It may be granted that there are areas of an employee's life in which his em-
ployer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of these areas by virtue
of the employer's power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a cause of
action, particularly where some recognized facet of public policy is threatened.
Id. at 180. The employer won in Geary based on the particular facts: the employer suc-
cessfully argued that the employee was discharged for failing to follow company proce-
dure when making his complaint about the safety of the product, not because he com-
plained. Id. at 179-80. The clear message of Geary was that the at-will rule was no lon-
ger absolute.
199. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla.
1980); Ochab v. Morrison, Inc., 517 So. 2d 763, 763-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987);
Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
200. Compare Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814, 814 (Ala. 1984) (four
of nine justices dissent and call for public policy exception) with Goodroe v. Georgia
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possibility is to model the outcome as a choice between two alter-
natives, although this may not always be possible. These decisions
have important information, the loss of which would be especially
undesirable for models of the behavior of a court. A court which
has just issued a ringing endorsement of Rule X, for example, is
far less likely to adopt Rule X the following day. Moreover, attor-
neys and litigants are less likely to present cases raising an issue if
the court has just rejected a rule change."'
PRINCIPLE 15: Models of doctrinal change should include
the possibility of rejection of the change.
10. Ex Post Verification
How much attention should researchers pay to courts' own
assessments of their precedents? As demonstrated in the discussion
of the habeas "new rule" cases' and of the Monge-Dorr histo-
ry,203 courts have difficulty agreeing amongst themselves about
the meaning of their decisions, and their assessment of opinions
should not be binding on researchers. At the same time, courts'
assessments of the meaning of precedent provide valuable informa-
tion. If a case is never cited after it is issued, that is at least some
indication that other courts did not regard it as breaking important
new ground. If another case is simply cited more, however, it may
be that the other case is from a higher court, is better written, con-
tains facts more closely analogous to the current case, is written by
a particularly well-regarded judge, or provides a more complete
analysis of the cause of action. Lack of extensive citation is not
necessarily fatal to a case's claim on history, however. °4
Power Co., 251 S.E.2d 51, 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (declaring unanimously that "there is
no room for this exception in Georgia as [the at-will] rule is statutory and the statute,
Code § 66-101, does not encompass the exception").
201. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and its state analogues require a good faith belief that there is
a cause of action before filing suit, a standard which is difficult to meet if the state
appellate courts have just decisively rejected a similar claim. Priest's approach, described
in note 6, supra, is one way to handle this problem.
202. See supra notes 13-62 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 81.
204. See Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 263-67 for a discussion of precedent as
capital and an empirical examination of citation practice. In the at-will area, cases estab-
lishing the at-will rule in Alabama are a good example of the changing pattern of cita-
tion. Modem Alabama cases generally cite a recent opinion such as Meeks v. Opp Cotton
Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814 (Ala. 1984), for the rule. See, e.g., Hoffrnan-La Roche, Inc.
v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 728 (Ala. 1987). Pre-Meeks Alabama cases cited earlier
cases, and so on, back to the original opinion adopting the rule in 1891. See Howard v.
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PRINCIPLE 16: Citation history is only one factor in decid-
ing whether or not to count a case.
PRINCIPLE 17: Researchers must do more than trace the
courts' own dating of legal changes. They must develop
theoretically sound methods.
C. The Choice of Structure
Empirical researchers must choose a method of categorizing. the
cases in order to be able to fit the common law into a quantitative
model. The three analyses discussed below used three different
ways to categorize the common law: (1) by doctrinal base; °. (2)
by quantity;"e and (3) by remedy.2" Which categorization is
appropriate will depend on the question asked. It will also depend
on the hypothesis concerning the method through which the com-
mon law is thought to influence the dependent variable (or, if the
change is the dependent variable, be influenced by the independent
variables.)
An example of a different resolution of this issue than that
used in this Article was the classification Dertouzos and Karoly
used in their examination of the growth of the modem common
law exceptions."' Using the dates of adoption, they estimated a
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. R.R. Co., 8 So. 868, 869 (Ala. 1891).
205. Similar to the author's analysis, Krueger, supra note 8, at 655, categorizes data ac-
cording to its doctrinal base in specifications 1, 2, and 3 as displayed in Krueger's tbl. 4.
206. Id. at 655, 656 (using quantity as part of specifications 4, 5, and 6).
207. Dertouzos and Karoly developed a two-way characterization of remedies based on
either contract or tort law. DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 23-26.
208. They examined what they termed "the supply and demand for new legal doctrines."
Id. at 18. Unfortunately, data unavailability meant that no sensitivity testing of this model
was possible. They explained their approach as follows:
Demand for new legal doctrines is determined by those who would benefit
from the legal changes, for example nonunionized or unemployed workers.
Supply is determined by those who would bear the costs of the legal changes,
such as employers or the judiciary. Some supply and demand factors may be
operating at the national level and may affect all states equally. Changes in
these aggregate variables over time can explain the increased recognition of the
wrongful-termination doctrines in the 1980s. Other supply or demand factors
may vary substantially across states and over time. These factors may explain
the variation across states in the pattern and timing of adoption of the new
legal doctrines.
Id. at 18-19 (emphasis in original). Their empirical model included several types of vari-
ables: (i) declining unionization; (ii) business cycle (unemployment rate); (iii) increased
litigiousness (percent change in lawyers per capita); (iv) increased awareness of workers'
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model of the probability of adoption of the various doctrines and
used it to examine the effect of various factors.' In doing so,
Dertouzos and Karoly used two slightly different methods of char-
acterizing legal doctrines, both of which differ from those Krueger
and I used. In the method most similar to the other analyses, they
categorized cases as one of the following: (1) narrow public policy;
rights (year dummies); (v) ideological factors (existence of right to work law, percent
unionization); and (vi) other costs (percent of geographic neighbors that have adopted
doctrine). Id. at 19-21.
209. Formally, the probability of having doctrine d in state s at time t for years 1980-
1987 is:
1o Pdsc x B + Ysy + Za + [Ldstlo 1 - Past=
where pd. is the probability, X. is a vector of time-varying state-specific variables, Y, is a
vector of time-invariant, state-specific variables, Z is a vector of time-varying aggregate
variables, and u,, is a random disturbance term. Id. at 23. The problem of how to model
courts' behavior is a difficult one for which there is currently no satisfactory answer.
Dertouzos and Karoly's approach, however, has a number of implications which suggest it
is incorrect. Although courts undoubtedly "supply" legal doctrines, these doctrines are not
separate goods. They are joint products with the other output which the same courts si-
multaneously supply: decisions in particular cases. The consumers of legal doctrines also
"demand" changes at times. Consumers' general demands are also bound up with their
demands in particular cases. When people go to court they want two things: justice and
victory. The private rank ordering of these two goals does not always favor the social
good.
In Dertouzos and Karoly's model, courts respond to the "demand" for new doctrines
by changing the common law. Id. at 18-19. Political events from judicial elections to
presidential elections clearly influence the coirts. How these events pressure judges in
particular cases is difficult to model. There are certainly reasons why a state with right to
work laws, for example, might have a judiciary more or less favorable to developing a
common law of wrongful discharge, but the effects are complex and difficult to specify.
'Are right to work laws simply a proxy for an underlying political climate which is "pro-
employer," or does the weakness of the union movement make judges more inclined to
favor alternative legal doctrines which benefit nonunion employees? Or might a "pro-em-
ployee judge see wrongful discharge remedies as a method of making unions less attrac-
tive? See Susan L. Catler, The Case Against Proposals to Eliminate the Employment At
Will Rule, 5 INDUS. REL. LJ. 471, 494 (1983) (opposing common law exceptions to the
at-will rule because they will lessen the demand for unionization). Without an underlying
model of how judges decide cases, it is hard to predict how political variables will affect
their decisions.
Further, Dertouzos and Karoly's model excludes court structure itself. State judges in
the United States are both elected and appointed, serve limited and unlimited terms, are
chosen in partisan elections and in nonpartisan elections, and so forth. Regardless of the
political variable under consideration, one would expect that the method of judicial selec-
tion and system of tenure would lead to different types of influence. See Morriss, Explod-
ing Myths, supra note 132, at 713-15 (describing interstate differences among courts as a
factor in their decision-making processes).
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(2) implied contract or good faith contract exception; and (3) broad
public policy or good faith tort exception.21 They also used a
two-way classification, based on whether the remedy was tort or
contract based.2 '
The time period used as a basis for the study is a problem
which has a more generalizable answer. Krueger used a time unit
of one year for his study of the influence of common law deci-
sions on the introduction of bills providing statutory remedies.2 ' 2
However, courts' decisions are issued during a year at a specific
point in time in a year. By treating all decisions within a year as
simultaneous, Krueger lost information on the time of adoption.
This information was particularly important in his case since many
state legislatures meet only for part of a year,213 and so the tim-
ing of the decision would be even more likely to affect whether a
decision would influence those legislatures. 214 Smaller time units,
when possible, thus have significant advantages.
The fact that Louisiana's unusual legal system contains more
elements of a civil law system than other states' suggests that it
should be excluded from the analysis. Similarly, the fact that
Georgia has codified the at-will rule,215 and that its courts give
great deference to that legislative judgment,216 suggests, in my
judgment, that its inclusion in Krueger's model was inappropriate.
The failure to adopt an exception in Georgia would not indicate
the same thing as the failure to adopt in, for example, Montana.
Actually reading cases is the only way to discover these types of
peculiarities, since both Montana and Georgia have codified at-will
rules, but Montana's courts ignored their code provision while
developing one of the most pro-employee set of remedies for
wrongful discharge among the states.2
Structural problems in analyzing legal institutions are not limit-
210. DERTOuZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 21.
211. Id.
212. Krueger, supra note 8, at 856-57 & tbl. 5.
213. See infra note 218.
214. Krueger makes some accomodation for time lag, yet this does not solve the prob-
lem because opinions may still lag past the point at which legislatures have stopped meet-
ing. Krueger, supra note 8, at 856-57 & tbl. 5.
215. See, e.g., Garmon v. Health Group of Atlanta, Inc., 359 S.E.2d 450, 452 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1987) (rejecting discharged employee's request to alter Georgia's legislative pro-
nouncements regarding employment discharges stating that "[t]his is a matter of public
policy, within the legislative arena").
216. See Morriss, Law and Economics, supra note 185, at ch. 2.
217. See Morriss, Exploding Myths, supra note 132.
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ed to the common law, of course. For example, although Krueger's
paper noted that some state legislatures do not meet annually, his
data included observations for years in which state legislatures did
not meet."8 Since the probability of a bill's being introduced in
these state legislatures in years in which the legislature is not in
session is virtually zero,2"9 the thirty-six observations for those
states in the appropriate years should be deleted. Close attention to
such institutional details is necessary to make empirical work credi-
ble.
PRINCIPLE 18: Researchers should choose an analytical
structure for categorizing the law which reflects the mecha-
nism through which the law is hypothesized to influence or
be influenced by the other variables as well as the institu-
tional environment being studied.
Ill. CASE STUDIES OF THE DECLINE OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
Having established the foregoing principles theoretically, I now
move to their application to the area of employment-at-will. The
erosion of the employment-at-will rule presents an unusual natural
experiment.' Not only has the at-will rule been in place since
218. Seven state legislatures meet only biannually: Arkansas, Kentucky, Montana, Neva-
da, North Dakota, Oregon, and Texas. All of these legislatures but Kentucky meet only in
odd numbered years. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES
137-38 (1992).
219. The state legislature could, of course, be called into special session to consider an
agenda which included unjust dismissal legislation. Id. None of the state-years affected,
however, is listed by Krueger as a year in which such legislation was introduced.
Krueger, supra note 8, tbl. 2, at 650.
220. These developments in the law are themselves interesting. An extensive legal litera-
ture critical of the at-will rule exists. This literature has influenced courts to alter the rule
and adopt these exceptions. Almost every opinion adopting an exception cites the critical
literature. Most also repeat arguments made by the critics, sometimes without attribution.
See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509 (NJ. 1980), where the
court made, but failed to cite, essentially the argument made in FRANK TANNENBAUM, A
PILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1954) that
[w]e have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for
our means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely de-
pendent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for
the relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such dependence of
the mass of people upon others for all of their income is something new in
the world. For our generation, the substance of life is in another man's hands.
Prof. Lawrence Blades quoted this argument in an important 1967 article critical of em-
ployment-at-will and from there it found its way into many judicial opinions and law
review notes. See Blades, supra note 180, at 1404. Much of this success appears to be
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the early part of this century in every jurisdiction in the United
States, but the common law has evolved toward relatively uniform
alternatives.22' I analyze the effects of those changes on the dura-
tion of employment using the methodology described in the previ-
ous section. Most importantly for methodological purposes, other
researchers have conducted several analyses of the decline of em-
ployment-at-will in which they have approached the dating of com-
mon law changes differently. 2  This presents a unique opportuni-
ty to examine the practical consequences of the assumptions about
changes in the law necessary to empirical research on the common
law.
Since the end of the nineteenth century, the default rule for the
interpretation of indefinite employment contracts in the United
States has been employment-at-will. 2 3 The rule's operation is
quite simple: either party can end the contract at any time without
liability. 24 The most important legal consequence of this rule is
that discharged at-will employees could not sue their employers for
wrongful discharge."a
The development of the modern common law exceptions to the
rule began in 1959, when an intermediate appellate court in Cali-
fornia allowed an employee of the Teamsters union to bring a
claim against his employer for wrongful discharge despite his at-
due to the claims made in this literature that employers routinely discharge at-will em-
ployees for "bad reasons" and that most, if not all, of these discharges would be prevent-
ed by adopting legal modifications of employment-at-will. See, e.g., Cornelius J. Peck,
Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OFHo ST. LJ.
1, 48 (1979); see generally Jack Stieber & Michael Murray, Protection Against Unjust
Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319 (1983). Given the
variation across states and across time in adopting these exceptions, it would be interest-
ing to discover whether the critics' claims have been proven correct.
221. See infra notes 226-34 (discussing the different types of exceptions).
222. See generally DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2; Krueger, supra note 8.
223. See Morriss, Exploding Myths, supra note 132, at 683-89 (providing more details
about the rule's history).
224. Employers and employees are, of course, free to contract around the rule, to make
definite term contracts or indefinite contracts which restrict either party's ability to termi-
nate the contract. Prominent examples of the former are professional athletes with definite
term contracts, while two examples of the latter are teachers and university faculty with
tenure and employees covered by collective bargaining agreements.
225. Some commentators have argued that employees systematically misunderstood their
employers' obligations under indefinite contracts. See, e.g., Note, Protecting At Will Em-
ployees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1816, 1831 (1980). Given the clarity and brevity of the at-will rule, how-
ever, it is difficult to imagine that such a systematic misunderstanding could have persist-
ed since the end of the 19th century.
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will status.' The court allowed the claim because the employee
alleged that he was discharged for refusing to commit perjury. 7
The court held that
in order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy
against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the employer
his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee
whose employment is for an unspecified duration, when the
reason for the dismissal is the employee's refusal to com-
mit perjury. To hold otherwise would be without reason
and contrary to the spirit of the law. .. . The public
policy of this state ... would be seriously impaired if it
were to be held that one could be discharged by reason of
his refusal to commit perjury.'
The significance of Petermann was not that employers could not
fire employees who refused to commit perjury, a relatively rare
occurrence, but that for the first time at-will employees could
frame a cause of action for their discharge. After Petermann, com-
mentators began to call for changes in the at-will rule. 9 In the
1970s state courts began in earnest to modify the at-will rule, and
by the mid-1980s three theoretically distinct approaches had devel-
oped: public policy exceptions, implied contract exceptions, and
actions based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.230
Most states have adopted public policy exceptions similar to
Petermann." Many states adopted implied contract exceptions to
the rule, allowing claims based on statements made by employers
either orally or in writing which implied restrictions on the
226. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousmen &
Helpers of America, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 27.
229. The most influential early criticism of the at-will rule has been by Lawrence E.
Blades, see supra note 180.
230. See infra Appendix B (detailing the exceptions for various states).
231. The primary difference among them is how broadly the courts defined the public
policy. Some states require the public policy to be defined by statute or constitutional
provision, while others take a broader view. Nebraska, for example, requires that a specif-
ic statute or constitutional provision be the source of the public policy. See Schriner v.
Meginnis Ford Co., 421 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Neb. 1988). Utah, on the other hand, allows a
much looser definition of public policy. See Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033,
1043 (Utah 1989) (allowing judicial decisions to be a source of substantial principles of
public policy in areas which the legislature has not spoken).
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employer's ability to discharge.2 Finally, some states allowed a
cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. 3 Unlike implied contract claims, these claims
rest on a promise implied by law, and thus represent a much
broader potential claim.
The development of the modem exceptions has been dated for
three empirical projects. Each employed somewhat different meth-
odologies. My examination applied the principles developed in this
paper; Dertouzos and Karoly made different choices; and Krueger
relied entirely on secondary sources. Not surprisingly these methods
produced significantly different datings. Tables 5 to 7 contain the
datings and Tables 8 and 9 show the correlations both among and
between methods for particular exceptions for the period 1976-89,
treating each month as an observation. Figures 1 to 3 present the
differences in dates graphically. As can be seen from these tables,
the three approaches produced quite different results.
232. Again, there are differences among states in the level of specificity required to
make a statement enforceable. In Alabama, for example, the courts recognized the possi-
bility that there might be an implied term to a contract before they recognized other
implied limitations on the right to discharge. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Etowah Quality of
Life Council, 484 So. 2d 1075 (Ala. 1986) . Other differences exist among states over
whether employers can disclaim the statements. See, e.g., Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 302
N.W.2d 307, 311 (Mich. App. 1981) (written disclaimer effective against claim based on
employee handbook but not against oral statement by supervisor).
233. See infra Appendix B (detailing the exceptions in various states).
234. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980) ("The duty which arises from the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is uncon-
ditional and independent in nature; it is not controlled by events in the same manner as
conditions precedent or subsequent."). Cleary's allowance of tort damages was later disap-
proved. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 401 n.42 (Cal. 1988); see also
infra notes 359-61 and accompanying text. Again there is significant variation among
states, with some construing the claim in tort (which carries with it much greater damag-
es) and some in contract. Between the Cleary decision on October 29, 1980, and the
Foley decision on December 29, 1988, for example, tort damages for breach of the im-
plied covenant were available in California. Since Foley, only contract damages are avail-
able. See infra notes 359-61 and accompanying text.
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Table 4 Motions to Dismiss
1975 Cases 1978 Cases 1988 Cases
N = 3,114 N = 809 N = 640
MotionsI Cases* Motions[ Cases* Motions Cases*
Total 582 462 98 79 103 81
in sample (15%) (10%) (13%)
Total 449 368 55 49 86 67
rulings (12%) (6%) (10%)
Total 292 259 32 29 45 37
granted (8%) (4%) (6%)
Total dis- 186 9 36 19
positions -- (6%) -- (1%) (3%)
*Cases with motions filed.
Source: THOMAS E. WILLGING, USE OF RULE 12(B)(6) IN Two FEDERAL DISTRICr COURTS,
Federal Judicial Center Staff Paper (1989), Tables 1 (1975, reporting results from P.
Connolly & P. Lombard, Judicial Controls and the Civil Litigative Process: Motions (Feder-
al Judicial Center 1980)); 2 (1978, reporting results from the Civil Litigation Research Pro-
ject); and 3 (1988, reporting original data).
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Table 5 Public Policy
[Vol. 45:999
State Morriss Krueger RAND
Alaska 2/21/86 2/21/86
Arizona 6/17/85 6117/85 6/17/85
Arkansas 3/24/80 9/21/82 3/24/80
California 9/30/59 6/2/80 9130/59
Colorado 9/18/85 7/1/88
Connecticut 1/22/80 1/22/80 1/22/80
Hawaii 10/28/82 10/28/82 10/28/82
Idaho 421/7 4/28/85 4/21M
Illinois 12/4/78 4/17/81 12/4/78
Indiana 5/1n3 12/30/80 5/1n3
Iowa 7/31/85 7/31/85
Kansas 6/19/81 619/81 6/19/81
Kentucky 11/23183 11/23/83 11/23/83
Maryland 7/16/81 7/16/81 7/16/81
Massachusetts 5/28/80 2/18/82 2118/82
Michigan 6/24/76 6/24/76 6/24/76
Minnesota 11/18/86 11/18/86 11/18/86
Mississippi 7/17/87
Missouri 11/5/85 12/26/79 11/5/85
Montana 1/30/80 1/30/80 1/30/80
Nebraska 11/25/87 11/25/87
Nevada 1/25/84 1/25/84 1/25/84
New Hampshire 2/28/74 2/28/74 2/28/74
New Jersey 7/28/80 7/28/80 7/28/80
New Mexico 7/5/83 7/5/83
North Carolina 5/7/85 5/7/85 5/7/85
North Dakota 11/19/87 11/19/87 11/19/87
New York 7/17n8
Ohio 2/11/85 2111/85
Oklahoma 2/7/89 2/7/89
Oregon 6/12/75 6/12/75 6/12/75
Pennsylvania 3125/74 4/28/78 4/28/78
Rhode Island 4/7/88
South Carolina 11/18/85 11/18/85 11/18/85
South Dakota 12/7/88 1/4/84
Tennessee 8/20/84 7/26/85 8/20184
Texas 6/7/84 4/3/85 6/7/84
Utah 3/20/89 3/20/89
Vermont 9/26/86 9/26/86 11/5/79
Virginia 6/14/85 6/14/85 6/14/85
Washington 7/5/84 7/5/84 8/18/77
West Virginia 7/14/78 7/14/78 7/14/78
Wisconsin 1/28/80 1/28/80 7/1/83
Wyoming 7/5/89 5/2185
Note: There is no applicable data for states not listed.
1995] A FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE COMMON LAW 1065
Table 6 Implied Contract
State Moniss Knmeger RAND
Alabama 7110/87 8/14/84 7/10/87
Alaska 5/27/83 5/27/83 5/27/83
Arizona 6/14/83 4/25184 425/84
Arkansas 6/4/84 4/1185 11/22/82
California 2/6/76 2/6/76 3/31/72
Colorado 10/18/83 6/14/84 6/14/84
Connecticut 10/1/85 213/87 7/3184
Hawaii 8/26/86 8/26/86
Idaho 421M 4/21/77 421M
Illinois 12/20174 7/22186 1/30/87
Indiana 8/20/87 8/20/87
Iowa 11/25/87 11/25/87
Kansas 8/2184 8/2184 8/2184
Kentucky 8/31/83
Maine 11/2/77 11/2/77 12131/84
Maryland 1/14/85 1/14/87 1/14/85
Massachusetts 5/16/88 7/14/88
Michigan 6/10180 6/10180 6/10/80
Minnesota 4/29/83 4/29/83 4/29/83
Missouri 1/18/83 1/18/83
Montana 7/1/87 1/5/82 7/1/87
Nebraska 11/18/83 11/18/83
Nevada 8/31/83 2/27/86 8/31/83
New Hampshire 8/5/88
New Jersey 519185 5/9/85 519185
New Mexico 211/80 211/80 211/80
New York 11/18/82 11/18/82 11/18/82
North Dakota 2/23/84 12116/86
Ohio 3/21/82 3/30/84 3/21/82
Oklahoma 12128/76 12128/76 6/9/87
Oregon 3/28/78 2120/79 3/28/78
South Carolina 6/8/87 6/8/87
South Dakota 4/13/83 4/13/83 4/13/83
Tennessee 11/5/81
Texas 4/11/85
Utah 5113/86
Vermont 8/9/85 8/9/85 7/18/86
Virginia 9/9/88
Washington 8/18/77 1119/78 8/18/77
West Virginia 4/4/86 4/4/86 4/4/86
Wisconsin 6/5/85 6/5/85 6/5/85
Note: There is no applicable data for states not listed.
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Table 7 Implied Covenant
Staw Morriss leer RAND
Alabama 7/10187
Alaska 5120183 511/81 5/2083
Arizona 6117/85 6P17/85
California 10129/80 10/29/80 10/29/80
Connecticut 6110/80 6f10/80 1316185
Idaho 8/8/89 8/8/89
loa 3/16184
Massachusets 7/2077 7/2077 7/20177
Montana 115f82 I/5/82 1/5/82
Nevada 2/24/87 2/24/87 2/24187
New Hampshire 2/28174 2/28/74
Oklahoma 5/21/85
Note: There is no applicable data for states not listed.
Table 8 Correlations Within Methods and Between Exceptions
Exceptions Study Exceptions
Public Policy Implied
Contract
Implied Morriss 72.54
Contract Krueger 69.04
RAND 77.10 -
Implied Morifiss 69.91 67.70
Covenant Krueger 72.04 77.86
RAND 68.41 75.12
Source: calculated from case assignments in Appendix B.
Table 9 Correlations Between Methods and Within Exceptions
Exceptions / Study Krueger RAND
Public Policy Morriss 90.37 93.50
Krueger - 87.37
Implied Morriss 87.61 88.76
Contract Krueger - 90.77
Implied Morriss 96.69 98.03 -
Covenant Krueger - 96.16
Source: calculated from case assignments in Appendix B.
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A. The Probability of Job Termination and Wrongful Discharge
Turning to the specific case studies, I begin with an original
investigation into the impact of the common law changes. Many of
the legal arguments against employment-at-will have focused on the
consequences for individuals of job loss for "bad reasons." 5 A
natural avenue of investigation is the impact the law has had on
the probability that jobs end. If the critics are correct that (a) there
are a significant number of discharges for "bad reasons" and (b)
changing the at-will rule will reduce or eliminate these discharges,
then changes in the legal rules should significantly affect the prob-
ability of discharge.
Examining the impact of the law on the probability of job
termination for individuals has several advantages over using aggre-
gate measures such as state unemployment data. First, aggregate
approaches generally rely on yearly data, while the legal changes
occur at specific points during a given year. An approach focused
on individuals thus allows for more precise control for the changes
in the legal environment. Second, aggregate employment data is far
more sensitive than the end of individual's employment to other
changes in a state's legal environment outside of employment
law. 6 If those changes are both imperfectly controlled for and
correlated with the adoption of exceptions to employment-at-
will,237 then the aggregate approach may overestimate the influ-
ence of the changes in the at-will rule. Unfortunately, the individu-
al approach also has a significant disadvantage, which is that there
are no available data limited to firings.23  My approach uses the
probability of a job's ending from all causes as the dependent
variable and explores through a logistic model whether changes in
the legal environment affect that probabilityY9
235. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 180, at 1406-15; Clyde W. Summers, Individual Pro-
tection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 481-83 (1976).
236. A state's decisions on tax levels, for example, would be likely to affect aggregate
employment significantly. Similarly, state-mandated benefits are generally thought to de-
crease employment.
237. It is quite likely that there would be some correlation in types of changes. Many
state courts have reputations as "pro-consumer" or "pro-plaintiff" and could be expected to
adopt rules in many areas consistent with a general philosophy. See, e.g., Canon & Baum,
supra note 2, at 982 (finding that certain traits of judges and methods of their selection
influence the way they decide cases).
238. Even if such data existed, they would inevitably include significant measurement
error to the extent that they relied on individuals to report discharges separately from
voluntary quits or layoffs.
239. The model used is
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Because the employment-at-will rule is simply a default con-
BLP = [i + (I -) e- BL-1 _
where P,, is the probability of employee i's job ending at time t, X, is a vector of char-
acteristics of employee i and his current job (such as marital status, industry, and occupa-
tion), Z,, is a vector of dummy variables which are I if the state has adopted a particular
exception to the at-will rule and 0 otherwise, and ui, is a random error term. P, is the
sum of the probabilities of a job ending from different causes: (i) discharge for cause; (ii)
discharge not for cause; (iii) quits; and (iv) layoffs. Because I am concerned only with
the effect of legal changes on (ii), there is the potential for bias if the legal changes are
correlated with (i), (iii), or (iv). If the changes in the' law are uncorrelated with changes
in these other reasons for termination, the only effect will be the additional noise.
In the absence of uncertainty, legal rules prohibiting discharges for "bad reason"
should have no impact on (i). In the presence of uncertainty concerning the courts' appli-
cation of the rules, however, employers would be less likely to fire those employees who
deserve it, and so one might expect the inclusion of (i) in P, to bias the results in favor
of finding an effect.
There is no theoretical reason to believe (iii) will be affected by changes in the
employment-at-will rule, and hence no reason to suspect a systematic biasing of the re-
suits. Legal rule changes allowing wrongful discharge suits may increase (iv), since firms
will have an incentive to cloak discharges that are prohibited under the rule as layoffs to
escape liability. The courts which have directly considered whether "for cause" contracts
restrict the employer's ability to discharge employees for economic reasons have all recog-
nized economic necessity as a valid defense. See Gesina v. General Elec. Co., 780 P.2d
1376, 1378 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) ("A bona fide decision based on sound economic rea-
sons can constitute cause for discharge. . .. [I]n the case of a reduction in force due to
economic reasons, as between two persons of equal ability, the one who has a lifetime
contract is to be preferred for retention" (citations omitted)); Crawford v. David Shapiro
& Co., 490 So. 2d 993, 995 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that a recession can
be "just cause" for termination); Telesphere Int'l, Inc. v. Scollin, 489 So. 2d 1152, 1153
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing company to terminate employee after project in
which employee was engaged was abandoned); Wilde v. Houlton Regional Hosp., 537
A.2d 1137, 1138 (Me. 1988) (permitting layoffs in light of financial difficulties); Heltborg
v. Modem Mach., 795 P.2d 954, 961 (Mont. 1990) (reducing staff for economic reasons
is not subject to a negligence analysis); Coombs v. Ganer Shoe Co., 778 P.2d 885, 887
(Mont. 1989) (emphasizing the importance of business viability); Velantzas v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 536 A.2d 237, 239 n.2 (NJ. 1988) (discharge justified if needed to
achieve a reduction in the work force); Linn v. Beneficial Commercial Corp., 543 A.2d
954, 957 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (allowing employee removal to achieve a
legitimate business objective); Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483,
486 (Utah 1989) (finding an exception to a "for cause" agreement in an employee manual
to allow for a reduction in force under the "involuntary terminations" clause); see also
Tripp v. Hall, 395 So. 2d 33, 34 (Ala. 1981) (the lack of funds for a position was held
to be a sufficient defense); Webster v. Schauble, 400 P.2d 292, 293 (Wash. 1965) (clos-
ing office sufficient defense); Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d 25, 28-
29 (Wyo. 1984) (stating that a manual does not act as a defense to employment-at-will in
the face of economic adversity). Since such terminations are merely a relabeling of (ii) as
(iv), they should be included to measure the extent of a real effect. Thus, although poten-
tially noisy, the data should be adequate for this purpose.
1072 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:999
tract rule, two groups are generally excluded from the rule: govern-
ment employees" ° and employees covered by collective bargain-
ing agreements.24' These groups must be excluded from the sam-
ple because they are unlikely to be affected in the same way, if at
all, by the changes in the common law.242 Union workers provide
a convenient control group that should be unaffected by the chang-
es in the common law.243
An empirical examination of the effects of these changes re-
240. Civil service laws and rules protect the former from arbitrary discharge, and consti-
tutional guarantees of due process also limit government employers' ability to discharge
employees. See, e.g., Mowery v. Adams, 641 N.E.2d 1186, 1188-89 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994). Whether indefinite contracts are contracts at-will affects the level of process which
is due, of course, but most government employees have some degree of protection from
arbitrary dismissal under civil service provisions. Courts have applied employee handbooks,
for example, to provide additional protection to public employees through a due process
analysis. See, e.g., Brandy v. City of Cedar Hill, 884 S.W.2d 913, 914-15 (Tx. CL App. -
Texarkana 1994). Public employee law is sufficiently different from that governing private
employees to warrant the exclusion of government workers from the sample. The changes
in public employee liw prevent their use as a reference group, however.
241. Union contracts almost always require cause for dismissal, and typically provide an
arbitration mechanism as a method of review of employer decisions. FRANK ELKOURI &
EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 6 (4th ed. 1985).
242. In addition to the substantial common law erosion of the rule, there has been a
parallel erosion through federal, state, and local statutes, regulations, and ordinances. Many
states, for example, prohibit by statute discharges of certain whistleblowers. See, e.g., ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 395/1(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (Illinois whistleblower statute protect-
ing some state employees who disclose information which the employee reasonably be-
lieves shows mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substan-
tial and specific danger to public health or safety and employees who file worker's com-
pensation claims). Federal statutes bar discharges in retaliation for filing health and safety
complaints, or asserting rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act or many other statutes.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 623(d) (West 1985) (stating that it is unlawful for an employer
to discriminate against any of his employees because such employees opposed a discrimi-
natory practice or filed a charge alleging discriminatory practice). As these laws apply
generally, however, it is not possible to exclude the populations affected by them.
243. Employees covered by collective bargaining agreements generally have been unable
to make common law wrongful discharge claims because their contracts provide for man-
datory arbitration. See David L. Durkin, Comment, Employment At-Will in the Unionized
Setting, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 979, 1004 (1985) (noting that a union member wishing to
sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement must exhaust that procedure, and then
judges will defer to the arbitrator, such that absent an exception the suit will not be al-
lowed to proceed). There have been exceptions, however. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky
Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.) (finding that a remedy in tort superseding the
contractual arbitration remedy does not pose a threat to collective bargaining), cert. denied
471 U.S. 1099 (1984); see also Durkin, supra, at 1014-18 (discussing scenarios in which
unionized workers can bring state tort claims). In the landmark New Hampshire Supreme
Court decision in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 553 (N.H. 1974), the
plaintiff was a union member who ignored an established grievance procedure. The Monge
court majority did not address this issue.
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quires a theory about how legal changes affect people who are
outside the legal events which produce the change. I assume that
the most important effect is the creation of legal uncertainty over
the outcome of a wrongful discharge claim. Prior to the develop-
ment of the modem exceptions, an employer could be confident
that a white male employee under forty would be unable to file a
claim in almost all cases of discharge. After a court decision which
suggested that such claims were possible in the employer's state,
however, the employer could no longer be as confident and would
be forced to prepare for a potential claim.2' These preparations
would be the mechanism by which discharges for "bad reasons"
would be avoided.
Before their behavior changes, employers must learn of the
change in legal rules. There are a large number of channels
through which news of an opinion might reach employers. The
popular press may publicize a decision, which becomes more likely
as the amount of money involved increases, the rank of the decid-
ing court rises, and the facts become more interesting.24 Special-
ized employment law services 4 publicize decisions to both em-
ployment lawyers and personnel -departments. Lawyers often pro-
vide clients with notice of important decisions which might affect
them through newsletters, phone calls, or meetings. Continuing
legal education seminars disseminate news of changes in the
244. The authority to discharge might be taken from line managers and given to the
personnel department, for example, or the amount of documentation of bad or unproduc-
tive conduct required for a discharge might be raised.
245. In Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985), for
example, an employee alleged she was fired after she refused to participate in a parody
of the song "Moon River" staged by other employees which involved "mooning" the
audience. Id. at 1029. She claimed this discharge violated the Arizona public policy
against indecent exposure. Id. at 1035. The Arizona Supreme Court determined that it was
unnecessary to decide whether mooning was an actual violation of the indecent exposure
statute but that since it might involve conduct prohibited by that statute, a public policy
claim was stated. Id. The spread of news of the Wagenseller decisions was enhanced by
the subject matter. See, e.g., Nurse Gets OK to Pursue Suit in 'Moon' Case, ARIZ. RE-
PULIBuC, June 22, 1984, at BI, B2 (reporting Court of Appeals opinion; story also listed
in News Summary, at A2, as the lead item in local news); Bum Rap? Nurse Fired after
Refusal to Bare Bottom Can Sue, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 18, 1985, at 12B1, B3 (reporting
Supreme Court opinion).
246. The Bureau of National Affairs, for example, has published a looseleaf service on
Individual Employment Rights since 1986. See 9 INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS (BNA)
(looseleaf compilation of applicable cases) and 9A INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
(BNA) (looseleaf manual). Before that, all at-will cases were published in a cumulative
index. See generally LABOR REL. CUMULATVE DIGEST & INDEX wiTH TABLE OF CASES,
(BNA). Both of these publications are continously updated.
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law,247 as do management seminars. Computerized legal databases
boast of instant retrieval of new opinions. Local services exist
which disseminate opinions of courts almost immediately.2' I as-
sume therefore that news of opinions adopting exceptions to em-
ployment-at-will is disseminated to employers rapidly and that most
employers quickly become aware that a new remedy has been
created.249
1. Case Selection
Based on this model of the way in which legal decisions affect
employer behavior, I examined the case law in each of the fifty
common law jurisdictions." In general, I used the date of the
earliest court opinion which met my other criteria. I included
courts other than the court of last resort in a state, including some
state trial and intermediate appellate courts and federal district and
circuit courts interpreting state law,"' because the issuance of an
247. Two of the major continuing legal education providers regularly survey the law in
this area. See Frederick Brown, Wrongful Termination and Emerging Fads in PRACTING
LAW INSTITUTE, 20TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 1991, at 703 (PLI Litig.
& Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 416, 1991) (discussing the direction of
the law in this field); David A. Cathcart & Pamela J. Thomason, State-by-State Survey of
Wrongful Termination Case Law in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 553 (Peter M. Panken
ed.) (6th ed. 1992) (giving a state-by-state summary of the case law).
248. See supra part ll.B.4 (describing the way in which even unpublished opinions have
helped construct the common law via ad hoc distribution methods).
249. This is not the same as assuming that employers are aware of the precise legal
contours of the new cause of action. The courts themselves take years to determine those.
Both the New Hampshire experience with Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549,
553 (N.H. 1974), and the California experience with Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. CL App. 1980), demonstrate how long this process may take
(six and eight years respectively). See supra notes 6 and 234. (discussing Monge's and
Cleary's history, respectively). Similarly, litigation in New Hampshire over the extent of
the effect of the reinterpretation of Monge continued for several years. See supra note 6
(discussing Monge's history). All that matters for this paper is that the issuance of an
opinion produces a rapid rise in employers' uncertainty concerning their potential liability
for discharging an employee.
250. The District of Columbia and all states but Louisiana.
251. Federal courts often find themselves presented with wrongful discharge claims that
have not yet been recognized by the courts of the state whose law governs. In Pennsylva-
nia, for example, there was an extensive period during which federal court opinions were
the primary source of law on employment-at-will. From 1959 to the early 1980s, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of at-will employment only once, in
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974). Since Geary, federal courts
in Pennsylvania have addressed the issue 37 times. See Kramer, supra note 132, at 253;
see also Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123, 128 (10th Cir.) (the first
case to apply the at-will rule in New Mexico and cited as the source of the rule by the
New Mexico courts), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953); Laws v. Aetna Fin. Co., 667 F.
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opinion by -any of them would create a significant amount of un-
certainty concerning the applicability of the at-will rule in that
state. Further, lower courts are rarely far in front of supreme courts
when modifying a longstanding rule like the employment-at-will
rule, and are likely to defer to the supreme court on such a major
change. 2 When lower courts do adopt a change, therefore, it is a
good indicator that the law has in fact changed. Even if the lower
court were later reversed, during the period between its opinion
and the reversal, employers in that state would have good reason
to behave as if the legal rule had changed. Since my specification
allows for the law to change back, 3 I can capture such an inter-
mediate period.
When the first opinion to adopt an exception in a state is from
a federal court which has unambiguously predicted the state courts'
acceptance of a common law exception, 4 I have used the date
of that opinion for the exception."5 When the federal court opin-
Supp. 342, 348 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (adopting public policy exception in advance of the
Mississippi state courts); Morriss, Exploding Myths, supra note 132, at app. A (illustrating
sources used by courts in formulating the at-will rule).
252. See, e.g., Maus v. National Living Ctrs., Inc., 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Ct.
App.-Austin 1982) (writ ref'd n.r.e.):
Thus we stand at the crossroads of two important public policies .... As
neither the Texas Legislature nor the Texas Supreme Court has established the
State's position in this sensitive area, this Court must exercise judicial restraint
and refrain from creating this new right of recovery. To do otherwise would be
to exceed our proper authority within the legal framework.
Id. at 676. Maus discusses the resolution of a similar question, whether to extend strict
liability beyond the only area expressly approved at the time by the Texas Supreme
Court, "food for human consumption." The Amarillo intermediate appellate court refrained
from doing so, and when the Texas Supreme Court ultimately did extend the doctrine, it
"commended the Amarillo Court's restraint." Id. (citing Sales Associates, Inc. v.
McKisson, 408 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966), rev'd 416 S.W.2d 787, 791
(Tex. 1967). See also Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Ct.
App.-Dallas 1979) ("If the case were one of first impression, we would have the respon-
sibility as well as the opportunity to consider the social implications of our decision ...
When the law is admittedly settled, however, the obligatory course for an intermediate
court is judicial self-restraint") (writ ref'd n.r.e.).
253. In the case of New Hampshire, for example, I consider the implied covenant ex-
ception to have been in effect between February 28, 1974, the date of Monge, and May
5, 1980, the date of Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980). See supra
note 6.
254. Increasingly, states are adopting provisions which allow federal courts to certify
questions of state law to the state supreme court for decision. See, e.g., MAss. SUP. Jun.
CT. R. 3:21, 359 Mass. 787, 790-92 (1971), amended 366 Mass. 853, 871 (1974). This
solves the problem in most cases, although the state court is free to decline to answer the
question. See supra note 111 (describing limitations on a state court's ability to certify a
federal court's question).
255. See, e.g., Laws v. Aetna Fin. Co., 667 F. Supp. 342, 348-49 (N.D. Miss. 1987)
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ion simply refused to dismiss a case for failure 'to state a
claim, 6 I have not used it. I also excluded opinions from federal
district courts located in states other than the one whose law is
being interpreted, 7 as the presumptive expertise in local law
would not exist." Many court decisions are unpublished. Al-
though in all cases I relied on published opinions, I did not use a
blanket presumption against unpublished opinions but examined
each case I identified individually."
Some retaliatory discharge cases in which employers invoke the
at-will rule are based on interpretation of statutes, particularly
workers' compensation statutes."W When the opinion simply inter-
preted relatively clear language to provide a remedy, I did not
consider that such an opinion created a new common law excep-
tion. When the opinion indicated it was creating a common law
cause of action to prevent subversion of the statutory scheme or
when the language interpreted would appear to a reader armed with
common sense to create such a cause of action, I considered the
case to have created a public policy exception."
2. Case Categorization
Although there are three generally recognized categories of
common law exceptions,262 these categories are not the only way
to subdivide the cases. One could consider, as Dertouzos and
(explicitly guessing that Mississippi would recognize a public policy exception).
256. See, e.g., High v. Sperry, 581 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
257. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Telesphere Int'l, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(applying Texas law).
258. Such cases are also not necessarily available to lawyers in the home jurisdiction.
Whitehead, for example, is digested in the Illinois digest and not the Texas digest, and
was not available in the Texas library in LEXIS when I researched these cases..
259. An example of a close case was the Ohio public policy exception. The Sixth Cir-
cuit opinion in Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 787 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S.
990 (1986) notes that the district court in that case had made an Erie guess that Ohio
would recognize a public policy exception. Id. at 180. Since Merkel was argued at the
circuit on December 6, 1985, and since the district court's ruling is identified as having
been made prior to the post-trial motion stage, it is possible that the federal district court
ruling precedes the opinion in Goodspeed v. Airborne Express, Inc., 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985), issued February 12, 1985. I did not count the district court
opinion in Merkel since it was unpublished, a federal court opinion, and a trial court
opinion which was known to be on appeal. (Even if this choice was incorrect, the close-
ness in time of Goodspeed means the difference is unlikely to be significant.).
260. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
261. This problem arose most frequently in connection with workers' compensation
statutes. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
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Karoly did, the significant division to be whether tort or contract
damages are available.263 Alternatively, one could subdivide the
exceptions into smaller categories, such as broad or narrow public
policy exceptions. I adopted the conventional legal view and sepa-
rated the cases into the three doctrinal categories for several rea-
sons. First, this division corresponds to a number of important
legal distinctions. The public policy claims, even at their broadest,
are relatively narrow, since to be liable, the employer must fire an
employee for a reason contrary to some public policy, not simply
because the employer dislikes the employee. This limits the types
of behavior against which the employer must guard.' Any dis-
charge, by contrast, is a potential source of implied contract claims.
These cannot be prevented simply by reviewing discharges at the
time of discharge, as the claim rests on conduct occurring prior to
discharge.265 Finally, the implied covenant claims are extremely
broad, since they require the employer to engage in good faith
behavior measured by an uncertain standard and are implied by
law into all contracts.
3. Alternative Datings
To further guard against errors in dating, I also used the alter-
native dates developed independently by Dertouzos and Karoly and
by Krueger for their analyses. They made different choices in some
instances, providing a valuable check on the robustness of my
results. To test whether the conclusions are sensitive to the dating
methodology, I used all three sets of dates. In addition to these
dating methods, I constructed two additional sets of dates. In the
"narrow" method, I date an exception only when all three primary
263. DERTouzos AND KAROLY, supra note 2, at 8-9.
264. See, e.g., Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322, 1324 (correcting
misinformation given to general public not sufficient), affd, 539 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir.
1976); Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(right to work law not sufficient basis); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54,
56-58 (Idaho 1977) (participation in unauthorized Christmas party fund does not implicate
public policy); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127, 129-30 (Mont. 1980) (no public policy
to prevent firing for complaining that employer did not adequately service product or pay
bonuses); Marsh v. Boyle, 530 A.2d 491, 495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (no public policy ex-
ists "protecting against termination of employees who have performed their duties proper-
ly"); Cisco v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(public policy of presumption of innocence insufficient); Jones v. Keogh, 409 A.2d 581,
582 (Vt. 1979) (full employment and employee-employer harmony insufficient).
265. See Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1937 (1983) (recognizing public policy excep-
tions are based on type of activity prior to discharge).
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methods have listed it as adopted. In the "broad" method, I use the
earliest date of the three. Thus the implied contract date for Arkan-
sas, for example, would be November 22, 1982 under the broad
method and April 1, 1985 under the narrow method.2" Although
there is no substantive content to the constructed categories, they
will be useful to examine whether the "correct" dating method's
results are bracketed by "narrow" and "broad" methods.
Table 10 shows the correlation for each type of exception
across the primary dating methodologies for the union and non-
union samples. The implied covenant exception is the most highly
correlated, which is to be expected as the fewest states have adopt-
ed it. Krueger's and Dertouzos and Karoly's methods yield more
highly correlated assignments for the implied contract exception
than do my method and either of the others, but are less highly
correlated for the public policy exception than my method is with
either.
The exceptions themselves are highly correlated, and Table 11
presents correlations within methods and between methods for each
of the three types. Dertouzos and Karoly's method and my method
produce assignments significantly more highly correlated between
the public policy and implied contract exceptions, while the
Krueger dating results in a slightly higher degree of correlation
between the public policy and implied covenant exceptions. All
three methods find a much higher degree of correlation between
the implied covenant and implied contract exceptions than either of
the other two pairings, which is to be expected since both are
based on contract theories.
266. See infra notes 339-49 and accompanying text (discussing Arkansas' implied con-
tract cases).
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Table 10 Sample Correlations Between Methods and Within
Exceptions
Exception / Study Union Nonunion All
Observations Observations Observations
Knege RAND Kmega RAND Kxeger J RN7
Public Morriss 88.49 87.91 90.34 90.75 89.85 90.00
Policy Krueger - 85.49 - 87.94 - 87.29
Implied Morriss 87.12 88.31 85.07 85.62 85.61 86.32
Contract Krueger - 95.02 -- 93.65 -- 94.01
Implied Morriss 98.82 99.67 98.12 99.01 98.30 99.18
Covenant Krueger - 99.05 - 98.73 -- 98.81
Source: calculated from the sample and case assignments in Appendix B.
4. Results
If the critics of the at-will rule are correct, (i) there are signifi-
cant numbers of discharges for reasons unconnected with productiv-
ity and which are not justified by employers' business needs and
(ii) modification of the at-will rule will halt many, if not all, of
these discharges.sl If both (i) and (ii) are true, then the adoption
of exceptions to the at-will rule should reduce the probability of
discharge. If either is false, then the effect of the common law
changes will be indeterminate. For all three exceptions the results
should be indeterminate for union sector data, since none of the
exceptions is generally applicable,"5 and stronger for white men
under forty, who are unprotected by the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Acta 9 and have historically not brought numerous Title
VII suits over individual discharges.
A statistically significant negative probability coefficient for an
267. It may be that fired employees are reluctant to take advantage of the remedies
available to them for reasons unconnected to their claims. Kristin Bumiller makes such an
argument with respect to Title vii claims, contending that the employees are reluctant to
see themselves as victims. KRISTIN BUMiLLER, THE CIviL RIGHTS SOCIMTY 99-103 (1991).
I am unaware of any similar claim with respect to nondiscriminatory arbitrary discharges.
268. Occasionally an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement is able to
make a claim. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1984); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549
(N.H. 1974); Durkin, supra note 245, at 1006 (discussing Garibad).
269. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a) (West 1994 Supp.) (stating that "[tihe prohibitions
(against age discrimination] shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of
age.").
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exception indicates that recognition of that exception decreases the
probability that an employee's job will end in any given month. As
can be seen from the probability coefficient2 ° results in Table 12,
a significant negative effect on the probability of discharge under
my dating method for all white men resulted only from the public
policy exception.2" ' The implied covenant coefficient was general-
ly negative although insignificant. Although generally insignificant,
the sign of the implied contract exception coefficient depended on
the specification. With differences in the magnitude of coefficients
and the significance levels, this result was generally true for the
Dertouzos and Karoly, Krueger, and narrow dating methods as
well. Interestingly, the broad method resulted in different
coefficients' attaining significance. Table 14 gives the results for
the sample of nonunion white men under forty. The signs, magni-
tude, and significance are generally similar to the results for all
nonunion white men.
270. With dichotomous independent variables the appropriate formula is:
Morley Gunderson et al., Logit Estimates of Strike Incidence from Canadian Contract
Data, 4 J. LAB. ECON. 257, 267 (1986).
271. The details of the various specifications are discussed in Appendix C. The specifi-
cations used included both methods of identifying job changes described above, various
variables describing personal characteristics of employees, and in some cases, variables for
occupation and profession. See infra Appendix C.
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Table 11 Sample Correlations Within Methods and Between
Exceptions
Exceptions strdy Exceptions
Public Policy Implied Contract
Union I Nonunion I All Union I Nonunion All
Implied M 64.08 70.01 68.45
Contract K 64.18 65.22 64.95 .. .. ..
R 66.36 68.94 68.26 .. .. ..
Implied M 56.43 62.56 60.95 69.39 69.17 69.23
Covenant K 63.05 67.70 66.48 77.03 78.28 77.96
R 54.29 60.06 58.95 75.07 76.04 75.78
Source: calculated from the sample and case assignments in Appendix B.
Table 12 White men, nonunion members
[[Specification I Morriss Krueger RAND INarrow Broad
-0.00215 -0.00107 I -0.00037 1-0.00121 -0.001234 +4 2 -0.00436 -0.00336 1-0.00526 -0.0000295
(3) -0.00202 -0.00009 -0.00031 -0.00104 -0.00122
(4) -0.00411 -0.00417 -0.00329 -0.00515 -0.000263
(1) 0.003477 0.002777 0.001124 0.001742 0.001936
(2) -0.00105 0.001019 0.000255 0.000519 -0.00378
(3) 0.0023345 0.002722 0.000967 0.001592 0.002014
(4) -0.00103 0.000966 0.000272 0.00468 -0.00369
(1) -0.00293 -0.00455 -0.0021 -0.00226 -0.00511
(2) -0.00299 -0.00278 -0.00169 -0.0004 -0.00971
(3) -0.00305 -0.00372 -0.00212 -0.00225 -0.00971
(4) -0.00296 -0.00297 -0.00172 -0.00041 -0.01006
Note: Bold indicates underlying logit coefficient significant at 5% level.
-0.00215 -0.00107 1-0.00037 1-0.00121 -0.00123
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Table 13 White men, union members
Specification] Morriss Krueger RAND I Narrow Broad
Public (1) 0.000572 -0.00135 0.001396 0.000113 -0.0005
Policy (2) -0.00275 -0.0037 -0.0016 -0.00409 -0.003436
(3) -0.00039 -0.00183 -0.00071 -0.00049 0.0000805
(4) -0.00287 -0.00358 -0.00191 -0.00419 0.000282
Implied (1) -0.00196 0.004895 0.002616 0.001869 -0.00494
Contract (2) -0.00173 0.000568 -0.00072 0.000382 -0.00121
(3) -0.00101 0.005661 0.004038 0.001998 -0.0047
(4) -0.00195 0.000262 -0.00084 0.000193 0.001077
Implied (1) -0.00335 -0.00364 -0.00591 -0.003 0.003235
Covenant (2) -0.00269 -0.0027 -0.00317 -0.00202 -0.00218
(3) -0.00225 -0.00289 -0.0051 -0.00253 0.003558
(4) -0.00195 -0.00239 -0.00291 -0.00161 -0.00218
Note: Bold indicates underlying logit coefficient significant at 5% level.
Table 14 White men under 40, nonunion members
Specification Morriss Krueger RAND I Narrow Broad
Public (1) -0.00291 -0.0013 -0.00088 -0.002 -0.0007
Policy (2) -0.00288 -0.00417 -0.00298 -0.0051 -0.00107
(3) -0.0027 -0.00184 -0.00253 -0.00175 -0.00071
(4) -0.003 -0.00405 -0.003 -0.00507 -0.0008
Implied (1) 0.002073 0.00296 0.000162 0.000764 0.002679
Contract (2) -0.00209 0.001778 0.000162 0.001038 -0.004990
(3) 0.001923 0.001224 -0.000003 0.00061 0.002815
(4) -0.00195 0.001542 0.000268 0.000816 -0.005120
Implied (1) -0.00293 -0.00386 -0.00193 -0.00229 0.00705
Covenant (2) -0.00297 -0.00215 -0.00126 0.0000763 -0.00920
(3) -0.00288 -0.00368 -0.00126 -0.00201 -0.00732
(4) -0.00281 -0.00226 -0.00127 -0.000185 -0.00948
Note: Bold indicates underlying logit coefficient significant at 5% level.
Table 13 shows that the results for the union sample were
generally insignificant. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
changes in the common law of wrongful discharge would not af-
fect those working under collective bargaining agreements and so
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would not change the probability of a job's ending. Table 15
shows the results for union employees under forty, which are reso-
lutely and gratifyingly insignificant.
There is fairly strong evidence of a small negative effect2
on the probability of a nonunion job's ending from the appearance
of a public policy exception. This may be because employers react
more to those decisions than to the other types or because employ-
ers are likely to learn quickly about public policy exceptions. The
facts of public policy cases generally make good press--employees
who win decisions in cases in which they accuse their employer of
violating public policy are likely to get wider coverage than are
claims about contract violations. Public policy claims are also more
likely to generate large awards since they generally sound in tort.
Clearly this is a subject for further investigation.
The more interesting conclusion is the sensitivity of the results
to the method of dating. The public policy coefficient, for example,
varies between -0.00037 and -0.00215 for specification (1), an
almost six-fold difference, depending on which method of dating
was used. In some cases, there were changes in the sign of the
coefficient. 3 In addition, the broad method of dating produced
results with quite different levels of significance from the other
methods. This highlights the need for both legal accuracy in identi-
fying changes in the common law and explicit discussion of the
method used in empirical work. Perhaps most interestingly, the
differences in the results are not bounded by the constructed meth-
ods of dating. 4 Dating changes in the law is thus not something
one can address simply by making "narrow" or "broad" assump-
tions.
272. Even where significant, however, the effects are very small. Part of the explanation
is the time scale of the data. It would be surprising indeed if a change in wrongful dis-
charge law had a large impact on the probability of discharge during a given month.
There is also a potential bias because of the lack of available data on state level econom-
ic conditions.
273. Several of the implied contract specifications had this characteristic. See infra tbls.
12 & 14.
274. In other words, neither the broad nor the narrow method produces consistently high
or low estimates compared to the others. lat
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B. Changes in the Law
Alan Krueger examined the impact of changes in the common
law on state legislatures' consideration of statutory remedies for
wrongful discharge.275 He used data on the introduction of just-
cause dismissal laws in state legislatures between 1981 and
1988.276 Because both employer and employee groups sometimes
jointly support statutes which create a cause of action for wrongful
discharge, he argued that a general explanation of just-cause dis-
missal laws as employee-initiated reform of employment-at-will is
inadequate.2' Instead, Krueger suggested a tradeoff by employers
similar to the compromise which produced workers' compensation
laws in the early twentieth century, noting that "many employers
are willing to support unjust-dismissal legislation and accept a 'just
cause' firing requirement in exchange for the implementation of a
strict standard for employees to recover punitive damages and a
consistent, well-defined legal definition of unjust dismissals."278
He then concluded that the testable implication279 of the theory is
"that unjust-dismissal legislation is more likely to be proposed and
ultimately enacted into law in states where the courts have recog-
nized exceptions to the traditional employment-at-will doctrine than
275. See Krueger, supra note 8, at 648-50.
276. Id. at 655.
277. Id. at 653.
278. Id. at 653.
279. The statistical framework used is straightforward: employer resistance to legislation
is determined by a latent variable, y*, which depends on the costs of claims under legis-
lation, the cost in the absence of legislation, and a random disturbance. Id. at 654. The
hypothesis is that a proposed statute will receive employer support if the difference be-
tween the costs under legislation and the costs in the absence of legislation is greater
than the disturbance term. Id. Krueger assumes, correctly I believe, that employee groups
always support such legislation. Id. at n.18; see also Jack Stieber, Recent Developments in
Employment-At-Will, 36 LAB. LJ. 557, 562 (1985) (citing union support for proposals in
Connecticut, California, and Michigan). The proposal of a bill, y,, is an indicator of y*,
and is 1 if a bill is introduced and 0 if no bill is introduced. Dummy variables are used
to control for the common law exceptions' existence, represented by E,, for exception i in
year t. The basic equation estimated is then:
Yt =  F(El, C-1, I 2, C-1I E3,C-3, X0
where X, is a vector of state-level explanatory variables and F is the logistic cumulative
distribution function. Krueger, supra note 8, at 654. Covariates included union member-
ship, proportion of Democratic members of legislature, unemployment rate, and proportion
of employment in manufacturing. Id. at 655-56. Krueger uses the same doctrinal division
as my analysis: (i) public policy, (ii) implied contract, and (iii) implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Id. at 655.
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in states where they have not."'  Krueger found that the exis-
tence of the good faith and public policy exceptions had a positive
and significant effect on the likelihood of legislation being enacted,
while the existence of the implied contract exception had a posi-
tive, but not significant, effect. 8
Jack Stieber and Richard Block criticized Krueger's analy-
sis."aa Their primary criticismni 3 was that employers generally
oppose just-cause legislation. 4 Most interesting for the purposes
of this paper is what Stieber and Block do not criticize. They do
not quarrel with Krueger's analysis of the common law, with his
tripartite division of exceptions, or with his model of how court
decisions influence legislative action. In all of these areas it is at
least possible to differ with Krueger's model; given Stieber's posi-
tion as a leading critic of the at-will rule, it is at least surprising
that a generally hostile piece would fail to mention any of these
areas. Perhaps this is due to the lack of any foundation principles
on which to base such criticism and the lack of information in
empirical articles which makes discovering problem areas without
extensive research possible.'
To test the sensitivity of Krueger's results, I reestimated
Krueger's equations using the alternative methods of dating de-
scribed in detail above.86 As Table 16, Table 17, and Table 18
280. Id. at 653.
281. Id. tbl. 4, at 655.
282. Jack Stieber & Richard N. Block, Comment on Alan B. Krueger, "The Evolution
of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United States," 45 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 792
(1992). Stieber is one of the main academic critics of employment-at-will. See generally,
e.g., Jack Stieber, The Case for Protection of Unorganized Employees Against Unjust
Dismissal, 32 IRRA ANN. PROC. 155 (1974); Stieber & Murray, supra note 220; Stieber,
supra note 279.
283. Stieber and Block also question whether Krueger accurately determined which states
introduced bills and criticize the interpretation of the econometric results. These criticisms
are generally inaccurate or incorrect See Alan B. Krueger, Reply, 45 INDUS. & LAB. RnL.
REV. 796, 797-99 (1992) (refuting the criticisms of Stieber and Block). However, there
are a number of other problems with Krueger's analysis. See infra note 285 and accompa-
nying text.
284. Stieber & Block, supra note 282, at 794-95.
285. Krueger's case citations are available, for example, only as an unpublished appen-
dix which includes case names but not citations. See Krueger, supra note 8, unpublished
app. (on file with author).
286. These were: (i) my own dating, see supra part Ml1.A.; (ii) the tripartite dating used
by Dertouzos and Karoly, see DERTouZous & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 21; (iii) the
"narrow" definition of changes in the law, which recorded a change only when all stud-
ies' dating concurred; and (iv) the "broad" definition which recorded a change as occur-
ring on the earliest date listed by any of the three methods. Krueger graciously provided
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demonstrate, Krueger's data and results 7 are
method of dating.288
sensitive to the
Table 15 White men under 40, union members
Specification Morriss Krueger RAND
Public (1) 0.000612 -0.00178 -0.00053
Policy (2) -0.00148 -0.0024 -0.00031
(3) -0.00187 -0.00286 0.000438
(4) -0.00192 -0.00269 -0.00079
Implied (1) -0.00144 0.005241 0.00057
Contract (2) -0.00127 -0.0024 -0.00043
(3) -0.00059 0.004164 0.002627
(4) -0.00118 -0.00269 -0.00017
Implied (1) -0.0015 -0.0039 -0.00632
Covenant (2) -0.0012 -0.00153 -0.00248
(3) -0.00094 -0.00333 -0.00619
(4) -0.00092 -0.00132 -0.0021
Specification - _ Narrow Broad
Public (1) 0.000606 -0.00338
Policy (2) -0.00229 0.002886
(3) -0.00111 -0.00206
(4) -0.00257 0.003004
Implied (1) 0.000318 -0.00537
Contract (2) 0.00031 -0.00169
(3) 0.001003 -0.00506
(4) 0.000246 -0.00164
Implied (1) -0.00593 0.011738
Covenant (2) -0.00097 -0.00142
(3) -0.00568 0.010144
(4) -0.00063 0.000938
Note: Bold indicates underlying logit coefficient significant at 5% level.
me with his data set, enabling these comparisons.
287. The issue in this Article is the sensitivity of results to the dating method. To com-
pare results, therefore, I simply reestimated Krueger's results with the different dates
produced by each dating method.
288. See infra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
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Table 16 Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables
States States
Variables With Without All States
Laws Laws
Proposed Proposed
Morriss Public 0.929 0.482 0.498
Policy (0.267) (0.500) (0.501)
Implied 0.571 0.448 0.453
Contract (0.514) (0.498) (0.498)
Implied 0.429 0.083 0.095
Covenant (0.514) (0.276) (0.294)
Krueger Public 0.929 0.430 0.448
Policy (0.267) (0.496) (0.498)
Implied 0.643 0.319 0.33
Contract (0.497) (0.467) (0.471)
Implied 0.429 0.080 0.925
Covenant (0.514) (0.272) (0.290)
Rand Public 0.857 0.526 0.538
Policy (0.363) (0.500) (0.499)
Implied 0.571 0.347 0.355
Contract (0.514) (0.477) (0.479)
Implied 0.429 0.073 0.085
Covenant (0.514) (0.260) (0.279)
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Table 17 Means and Standard Deviations for Constructed Dating
Methods
States States
Variables With Without All States
Laws Laws
Proposed Proposed
Broad Public 0.560 0.929 0.573
Policy (0.497) (0.267) (0.495)
Implied 0.477 0.643 0.483
Contract (0.500) (0.497) (0.500)
Implied 0.098 0.429 0.11
Covenant (0.298) (0.514) (0.313)
Narrow Public 0.412 0.857 0.428
Policy (0.493) (0.363) (0.495)
Implied 0.262 0.571 0.273
Contract (0.440) (0.514) (0.446)
Implied 0.648 0.429 0.078
Covenant (0.246) (0.514) (0.268)
The results are sensitive in several ways. First, the assignments
of states to the two categories of the dependent variable are differ-
ent. Table 16 shows the assignments across the dating methods
used by Krueger, Dertouzos and Karoly, and me. Table 17 shows
the assignments across the methods constructed through combina-
tions of those three (the "narrow" and the "broad" method). Sec-
ond, the linear estimates of the probability of the enactment of the
unjust discharge statutes differ significantly. 9 The estimates vary,
289. Krueger calculated the linear probability estimates using the formula
BLP _ AP = P (1 -P) BL
See Krueger, supra note 8, at 656 n.2l. This formula is valid only for marginal changes
in independent variables and is therefore inappropriate for use with dummy variables such
as the ones used to control for legal environment changes. With dichotomous independent
variables the appropriate formula is the one given in note 239.
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for example, from an increase of 7.6% under Dertouzos and
Karoly's method,' to an increase of 28.5% under Krueger's
method.29
Table 19 and Table 20 examine the correlations among the
dating methods for the observations in Krueger's data set.2' As
expected, the correlations between methods are highest for the im-
plied covenant exception, which has rarely been adopted, and for
the public policy exception, where the differences are smaller. The
implied contract exception, which is most affected by the different
treatment of dicta and dismissed cases, has the lowest correlations
across methodologies.
Table 18 Comparison of Linear Probability Coefficients
Specification Krueger Morriss I Rand Broad J Narrow
Public (1) 0.285 0.232t 0.076t 0.190t 0.133t
Policy (2) 0.279 0.203t 0.058t 0.053 0.127
(3) 0.273 0.190 0.050t 0.147 0.120t
Implied (1) 0.044 0.004t 0.010t 0.143t 0.042t
Contract (2) 0.030 -0.005t 0.017t -0.001t 0.026*
(3) 0.027 -0.001* 0.002t 0.006t 0.023t
Implied (1) 0.199 0.124t 0.158t 0.124t 0.142t
Covenant (2) 0.149 0.159$ 0.197t 0.402t 0.169**
(3) 0.175 0.180 0.242t 0.190t 0.200t
Total (4) 0.105 0.075t 0.063t 0.067t 0.065t
Exceptions (5) 0.102 0.073t 0.058t 0.065- 0.068t
(6) 0.109 0.075t 0.061t 0.071t 0.076t
*Differs at 5% level from Krueger point estimate.
**Differs at 1% level from Krueger point estimate.
1Differs at % level from Krueger point estimate.
Note: Bold indicates underlying logit coefficient is significant at 5% level.
290. DERTOUZOs & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 32-33.
291. Krueger, supra note 8, at 655-56.
292. The correlations are generally smaller than in my data set, which is to be expected
since Krueger's data set contains only one observation per state per year instead of an
observation per individual per month.
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Table 19 Correlations within Dating Materials
Variable Study Public Policy Impliedl Ii Contract
Public Morriss -- 0.22
Policy Krueger -- 0.11
RAND -- 0.33
Implied Morriss 0.21 0.12
Covenant Krueger 0.13 0.16
RAND 0.19 0.19
C. Aggregate Impacts
Dertouzos and Karoly examined the impact of changes in
wrongful discharge law on state aggregate employment levels.2
The basic premise of the model294 is similar to the familiar eco-
nomic analysis of laws which add to the cost of employing a
worker, such as worker's compensation laws:295 employment lev-
els will be reduced, perhaps after a period of adjustment, when
states adopt a new exception to employment-at-will.296 Dertouzos
and Karoly use three slightly different specifications of the legal
environment:
293. DERToUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 46. They also examined the effects on
different industries and firm types and on the speed of employment adjustment. Id. at 53.
In a different section they examined the development of exceptions to the at-will rule; no
data was available to conduct a reevaluation with alternative dating. Id. at 5-7.
294. The model estimated is a straightforward test of this hypothesis:
1n(Ei,) = Bo + B 1 n(GSP., )
+ B2 [1n(GSPi,t - 1n(GSPi,t_]
50 6
+ E 1 XSki + C~ i + Xit
k=2j =
+ YW2  +Ilt
here GSP. is the gross state product in constant dollars for state i in year . S, is a set
of state dummy variables; Y, is a set of year dummy variables; X,, is a vector of other
control variables; W,, is a set of variables indicating the presence of common law chang-
es; and u,, is a random disturbance. Id. at 47.
295. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS oF LAW 235 (3d ed. 1986).
296. DERTouzos & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 44.
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Model I a tort/contract damages distinction, dividing excep-
tions into cases of whether a tort or contract remedy is
allowed;
Model II: a tripartite division of exceptions into (i) good
faith tort or broad public policy; (ii) implied contract or
good faith contract; and (iii) narrow public policy;
Model IlI: a tripartite division of exceptions into (i) tort
damages; (ii) contract damages; and (iii) broad public poli-
cy or good faith tort claim.2"
When the effect of liability on total employment was estimated,
they found that both the tort and contract doctrines had a signifi-
cant negative effect on employment under Model I, the broad pub-
lic policy and good faith doctrine had a significant negative effect
under Model II, and the tort doctrine had a significant negative
effect under Model 1n." 9 Dertouzos and Karoly also estimated
the model for separate industrial sectors' and separately for
large and small employers. In general, they found that adoption of
common law exceptions to employment-at-will had a significant,
negative impact on gross state product, suggesting that the social
cost of wrongful discharge suits is large." °
297. Id. at 8-9.
298. Id., tbl. 5.2, at 50.
299. Id., tbl. 5.3, at 34 (including estimates for the nonmanufacturing, manufacturing,
service, retail, wholesale, and finance sectors).
300. Id. at 62-63. Specifically, they concluded that after states adopt the most liberal
tort versions of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the broad public policy
exceptions to employment-at-will, the following labor-market changes occur.
* Aggregate employment drops by 2 to 5%. This result is insensitive
to the use of alternative models, statistical assumptions, and
econometric methodologies.
* Employment reductions are even higher in some nonmanufacturing
industries, particularly the service sector, the retail trade, and the
financial, insurance, and real estate group. This difference could stem
from a variety of factors. Possible explanations include less frequent
union protection, higher expected damage claims by dismissed em-
ployees due to greater levels of skills that are not transferable to
other firms, systematic differences in management organization, and
differences in the availability of objective criteria for evaluating job
performance ....
* The decline in employment appears to be greater for larger business-
es, i.e., those having more than 250 workers. This suggests that most
costs associated with wrongful termination are not fixed (that is, the
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As noted earlier, Dertouzos and Karoly used a different method
of characterizing common law doctrines and different dates."' Of
particular interest is their choice of a model which examines the
influence of particular common law changes on such aggregate
variables as state level employment and which uses years as the
period of observation. The choice of an aggregate analysis is a
natural one, suggested by the state-by-state nature of change in the
common law. As discussed below, this choice requires some trade-
offs and assumptions about the impact of the common law, which
each researcher must evaluate in the context of her particular pro-
ject. Similarly, the choice of an annual basis for observations loses
some information known about court decisions, since the date on
which an opinion is issued is known.3" While this loss may be
justified in the context of a particular project, it must inevitably
result in some loss of precision in estimating the impact of a deci-
sion, since a decision adopted December 31st is treated the same
as one issued the preceding January 1st.
Only limited testing of the sensitivity of Dertouzos and
Karoly's results to alternative dating methods is possible. 3 Ta-
ble 20 shows that using my dating methods changes the results
somewhat. The impact of the contract cause of action on employ-
ment in Model I goes from being negative and marginally signifi-
cant to being positive and insignificant, while impact of the Model
II broad public policy exception becomes larger and more signifi-
cant, and the impact of the Model II implied contract/good faith
exception goes from positive to negative, although it is insignifi-
cant under both methods.
Table 20 Correlations Across Different Methods
Public Po Implied Contract Implied Covenant
Morriss Krueger Morriss Krueger Morriss Krueger
Morriss0.85 0.67 - 0.81
0.75 0.83 0.72 0.76 0.94 0.86
same regardless of the number of employees), but, rather, vary on a
per-employee basis.
Id. at 62-63.
301. See supra note 208-11 and accompanying text.
302. This is different from positing a lag in the effect of a legal change, since one can
lag the indicator variables regardless of the period chosen.
303. Lynn Karoly kindly reestimated this model using my alternate dates and provided
me with the results.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Empirical research on the development of the common law and
the impact of common law changes on the economy promises
significant rewards. Not only will it lead to greater understanding
of how and why the common law changes, but it can contribute to
the assessment of the costs and benefits of those changes. Without
such empirical evaluation, economics' contribution to understand-
ing the law remains incomplete. Conducting such research requires
the development of an analytical framework for dating changes in
the common law.
The discussion of the empirical analyses of the development of
wrongful discharge law demonstrates three important things. First,
the method of dating common law changes does matter when those
changes are included in empirical work. Researchers must therefore
take care in dating those changes. Second, although dating matters,
it does not matter too much. If the conclusions in these case stud-
ies dramatically changed, it would suggest that the results were so
sensitive as to be driven by the dating methodology.3 The close-
ness of results reassures us that empirical work is possible. It is
encouraging that three quite different research methods, ranging
from Krueger's complete reliance on secondary sources to the
different counting methods Dertouzos and Karoly and I used, pro-
duced results which were not incompatible. Finally, the existence
of differences suggests the need for a framework for making these
choices. Such a framework would both ensure consistency and
allow readers to evaluate the validity of the research design.
The results presented in Part I of this Article are sufficiently
likely to be generalizable that empirical researchers should, as a
minimum, make explicit the methodology they use to select cases
and the case citations they rely upon. Good practice should include
additional elaboration of the choices made in dating; the reader
should not be required to perform original research to evaluate the
reasonableness of these choices. Where space does not permit the
publication of such explanatory material with the original report of
the results, in, for example, an article published in an economics
journal, it should be stated in the article that such material is avail-
able on request.3 5 The peer review of such papers should include
304. This consistency, however, may simply be an artifact of these particular papers, so
it is important not to allow overconfidence to encourage sloppy research methods.
305. See generally Richard S. Markovits, Second Best Theory and the Standard Analysis
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legally trained reviewers, who are more likely to detect errors in
dating methodology.
The eighteen principles suggested above provide a framework
for making clear the research choices inevitable in empirical work
which includes information on the common law. Those choices
have a clear impact on the results, and it is therefore important
that they be made visibly, carefully, and consistently with the theo-
ry which underlies the analysis. These principles are only a first
step, however. Much research is needed before empirical work
which includes common law events as either independent or depen-
dent variables will be capable of being judged reliably by readers.
Future work in this area should also include the collation of data
on court structure and caseloads and distribution of such informa-
tion through vehicles such as the Interuniversity Consortium on
Political and Social Research.
The costs of such steps would not be trivial. Conducting the
legal research for this paper, for example, consumed considerable
effort, as I investigated the law in each U.S. jurisdiction. Without
such an investment, however, the results are both unstable and
untrustworthy. Economics has often been accused of imperialistic
designs on other disciplines, including the law. It is time for eco-
nomics to acknowledge that its conquest cannot be complete and
that "law and economics" must truly be law and economics, not
just economic analysis of law.
of Monopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, A 'Sociological' Account, and
Some Illustrative Examples, 78 IOWA L. REv. 327 (1992), for an analysis of the difficulty
of publishing nontraditional law and economics analysis.
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Appendix A: Votes in Teague Supreme Court Cases
Case Rule New Old
Teague Sixth Amendment fair cross section re- Blackmun* Brennan
quirement applies to petit juries Kennedy MarshallO'Connor Stevents
Rehnquist
Scalia
Wbite'
Penry Jury instructions required on consideration Kennedy Brennan
of mitigating evidence Rehnquist Blackmn
Scalia Marshall
White O'Connor
Stevens
Penry Eighth Amendment bars execution of re- Blackman Brennan
tarded defendants Kennedy Marshall
O'Connor
Rehnquist
Scalia
Stevens
White
Sawyer Prosecutorial comments during jury argu- Kennedy Blackanun
ment concerning juror's responsibilities O'Connor BrennanRehnquist Marshall
barred by Eighth Amendment Scalia Stevens
White
Butler Fifth Amendment bars police initiated Kennedy Blackmun
interrogation following a suspect's re- O'Connor Brennan
Rehnquist Marshallquest for counsel in the context of a Scalia Stevens
separate investigation White
Saffle Eighth Amendment requires jury be al- Kennedy Blackmun
lowed to base sentencing decision upon O'Connor BrennanR ehquist M arshall
sympathy they feel for defendant after Scalia Stevens
hearing his mitigating evidence White
Stringer Use of aggravating factor in sentencing of Blackmun Scalia
"heinous, atrocious, or cruel" conduct was Kennedy SouterO'Connor Thomas
so vague as to violate Eighth Amendment Rehnquist
Stevens
White
Graham Constitutionality of Texas jury instruc- Kennedy Blackmun
tions on mitigating evidence Rehnquist O'Connor
Scalia Souter
Thomas Stevens
White
Gilmore Constitutionality of Illinois jury instruc- Kennedy Blkmun
tion on mitigating mental state O'Connor & Stevens
Rehqaist dissent on
Scalia other
Thomas grounds
White
Attribution based on concurrence in result with respect to Swain claim.
Attribution based on concurring opinion where White agrees test is properly applied but
disputes whether test itself is proper.
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Appendix B: Case Selection Notes
This appendix describes the specific cases I selected for the
three exceptions to the at-will rule for each state. Where the state
did not adopt the exception within the relevant time period, the
text so indicates. Where my choices differ from those made by
Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly, I list their choices and explain
briefly why I made the choice I did. The appendix covers the time
period up to 1989, when my data ended. Both Dertouzos and
Karoly's and Krueger's data ended in 1987,"° while mine con-
tinued through 1988. As a result, there are some states where I
identified an opinion after their ending dates. Each citation includes
the date of the opinion.
Alabama
1. Public Policy
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
2. Implied Contract
I date the implied contract exception from Hoffman-La Roche,
Inc. v. Campbell (7/10/87),"7 as do Dertouzos and Karoly.
Krueger dates the implied contract exception from Knox v.
American Sterilizer Co. (8/14/84).30 There the employee claimed
that the employer breached the employment contract as defined by
a handbook.3" The federal district court found that "it is apparent
from the handbook that no such mutual contractual obligation was
ever intended by the parties."31 It then found that the employee
had failed to provide any factual support for his claim that he did
not receive everything he alleged the handbook promised.' Sig-
306. DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 72; Krueger, supra note 8, at 654-55.
Although Krueger's analysis covered through 1988, he lagged the adoption variables by
one year, so the last adoption which counts for him is 1987. Id. at 657.
307. 512 So. 2d 725, 728-29 (Ala. 1987).
308. 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2341 (M.D. Ala. 1984).
309. Id. at 2342.
310. Id. (emphasis in original).
311. Id.
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nificantly, none of the benefits alleged to have been promised by
the handbook (and mentioned by the district court) included protec-
tion from discharge."' Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court
had made a similar determination twenty months earlier in White v.
Chelsea Industries (1/21/83).' White is cited for this point (that
review of the handbook indicates it is possible for the handbook to
create a contract) by the Alabama Supreme Court in Hoffman-La
Roche.314 (Interestingly, Hoffnan-La Roche does not cite Knox
although it reviews Alabama cases as far back as the 1920s to
support its analysis.)
The belief that Knox and White constitute the adoption of the
implied contract exception to the at-will rule rests on the assump-
tion that a court engaging in a review of the facts alleged would
find some facts which could create a contract. This is too tenuous
to support a public perception that the rule had changed in light of
longstanding Alabama law allowing permanent contracts where
additional consideration was supplied by the employee 5 and Ala-
bama's steadfast refusal to adopt a public policy exception." 6
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
I date this exception from Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell
(7/10/87)?'" Dertouzos and Karoly and Krueger cite no case.
Alaska
1. Public Policy
I use Knight v. American Guard & Alert,. Inc. (2/21/86)."8
Dertouzos and Karoly also rely on this case. Krueger lists no case
for a public policy exception.
312. Id.
313. 425 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. 1983).
314. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 728 (Ala. 1987).
315. See id. (citing cases).
316. Id.
317. Id. at 725.
318. 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1986).
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2. Implied Contract
I cite Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group
(5/27/83). 3 9 Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this
case.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
I use Mitford v. de Lasala (5/20/83),2 ° which explicitly
adopts the implied covenant theory.32' The Alaska Supreme Court
cited Milford as the primary case on the implied covenant theory
in Knight.322 Dertouzos and Kar also cite Mitford.
Krueger cites Conway, Inc. v. Ross (5/1/81)"z as support for
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although
Conway discusses an implied covenant, it is the implied covenant
that "the employee will do nothing which could tend to injure the
employer's business interests. 324 There is no mention of an im-
plied covenant which would protect the employee. The specific
claim was that a topless dancer engaged in an act of prostitu-
tion.3"s Although the opinion discusses the need for good cause to
fire the dancer, it does so because there was an explicit written
term contract for the employee's services.a
Arizona
1. Public Policy
I cite Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital
(6/17/85).32' Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this
case.
319. 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983).
320. 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983).
321. Id. at 1006-07.
322. Knight, 714 P.2d at 792.
323. 627 P.2d 1029 (Alaska 1981).
324. Id. at 1030.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
1098 [Vol. 45:999
1995] A FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE COMMON LAW 1099
2. Implied Contract
I date the exception from Leikvold v. Valley View Community
Hospital (6/14/83), vacated (4/25/84).3' Krueger and Dertouzos
and Karoly use the subsequent supreme court opinion; the excep-
tion was first recognized by the appellate court. The supreme court
opinion substituted its own analysis of the case, but reached the
same result as the appellate court.329
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
I cite Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital
(6/17/85).3" Krueger does not cite a case for this exception;
Dertouzos and Karoly cite this case.
Arkansas
1. Public Policy
In M.B.M. Co. v. Counce (3/24/80),331 the Arkansas Supreme
Court, although finding no claim on the facts before it, suggested
that on different facts it might recognize an exception.332 This
was acknowledged by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Oxford (1/19/88), 333 where the court said "In
Counce, supra, we acknowledged that we might recognize an ex-
ception [based on public policy] to the at-will doctrine" for some
circumstances. 34 Dertouzos and Karoly cite Counce for a narrow
public policy exception and Sterling Drug for a broad exception.
Krueger cites Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc.
(9/21/82),"'5 which made an Erie guess that Arkansas would rec-
ognize an exception to the at-will rule for four classes of public
policy violations. 36 A similar Erie guess was made by the Eighth
328. 688 P.2d 201 (Ariz. App. 1983), vacated, 688 P.2d 170 (Ariz. 1984).
329. Leikvold, 688 P.2d at 174.
330. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
331. 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 1980).
332. Id. at 683.
333. 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988).
334. Id. at 383.
335. 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
336. Id. at 494. The four classes of public policy violations are:
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Circuit in Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc."' Scholtes' Erie guess
was based on a citation to Counce and references to other jurisdic-
tions.33 Counce is thus the more appropriate basis for the doc-
trine.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Jackson v. Kinark Corp. (6/4/84)."39 Dertouzos and
Karoly cite Griffin v. Erickson (11/22/82)." 4 Krueger cites French
v. Dillard Department Stores (4/1/85)."a'
In French, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that a particular
profit-sharing plan did not create the conditions under which an
exception might be made to the at-will rule. In that case, the em-
ployee had signed a written employment application which included
the statement "I understand and agree that Dillard's may terminate
my employment at any time, without prior notice or liability of
any kind, except for wages earned and unpaid at the time of such
termination."342 Similar positions had been taken by the court in
both Griffin and Jackson, which predated French.343
In Griffin, however, the court avoided the question of whether
a handbook claim could be made by finding that the employee had
received all the process he was due under the public employer's
rules and that cause to discharge him existed.3" In addition, Grif-
fin involved a claim by a public employee, making the issue of
procedural fairness particularly important.345 It is interesting to
(1) cases in which the employee is discharged for refusing to violate a criminal statute;
(2) cases in which the employee is discharged for exercising a statutory right; (3) cases
in which the employee is discharged for complying with a statutory duty; and (4) cases
in which employees are discharged in violation of the general public policy of the state.
337. 736 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (8th Cir. 1984).
338. Scholtes, 548 F. Supp. at 493.
339. 669 S.W.2d 898 (Ark. 1984).
340. 642 S.W.2d 308 (Ark. 1982).
341. 686 S.W.2d 435 (Ark. 1985).
342. Id. at 436.
343. Jackson, 669 S.W.2d at 899 (stating the common law rule that a contract of em-
ployment for an indefinite term is subject to at-will termination even if it contains a "for
cause" provision, but recognizing a trend towards a less harsh rule); Griffin, 642 S.W.2d
at 311 (finding that an employee not claiming to have been employed for a definite term
is subject to termination without cause).
344. Griffin, 642 S.W.2d at 311.
345. Id. at 309. The Court held that the at-will rule did apply to public as well as
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note that the BNA Labor Relations Reference Manual reporter di-
gests the case under the headnote "Wrongful Discharge-Public
Employee,""s while the West reporter headnotes concerning the
manual are listed under Municipal Corporations key numbers, and
the West Master and Servant headnotes all simply affirm the at-
will rule.347
In Jackson, the Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of
the employer to allow development of a factual record on which to
base the decision." French later referred to "the Jackson excep-
tions" to the at-will rule.349 Jackson is thus the more appropriate
source of the handbook exception.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
California
1. Public Policy
California adopted the first public policy exception in the Unit-
ed States in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Local 396
(9/30/59)?3" Dertouzos and Karoly cite this as establishing a nar-
row public policy exception. Krueger cites Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (6/2/80),"s' which Dertouzos and Karoly cite as a
broad public policy exception. Tameny explicitly relies on
private employees. Id. at 310. However, the fact that the case involved a public employer
would tend to favor an employee's claim based on an official document since an em-
ployee may acquire a constitutionally protected property interest in public employment if
the public employer has restricted its ability to discharge employees. See Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972) (recounting Supreme Court holdings in which
a property interest in public employment has been recognized where a legitimate expecta-
tion of private employment exists); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972)
(stating that a property interest in employment protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
may exist absent an explicit contractual provision regarding continued employment).
346. Griffim v. Erickson, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4300, 4300 (1982).
347. Griffin, 642 S.W.2d at 308-09.
348. Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 669 S.W.2d 898, 899-900 (Ark. 1984).
349. French v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 686 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Ark. 1985).
350. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
351. 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
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Petermann, and notes that the major question is whether the public
policy-based claim sounds in tort or contract, not whether the ex-
ception exists."
2. Implied Contract
I use Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Industries (2/6/76)... to date the
implied contract exception. Krueger also cites this case. Dertouzos
and Karoly cite Drzewiecki v. H. & R. Block, Inc. (3/31/72).354
Rabago-Alvarez cites Drzewiecki for its statement that 'a con-
tract for permanent employment, whether or not it is based on
some consideration other than the employee's services, cannot be
terminated at the will of the employer if it contains an express or
implied condition to the contrary."'355 The cited passage comes
from Drzewiecki's analysis of an employer's claim that a contract
which purported to be "permanent" must therefore be at-will. 6
The court rejected that claim, instead finding that the written con-
tract which specified that termination could occur only if the em-
ployee were "improperly conducting the business" limited the em-
ployer's ability to discharge the employee.357 No state had adopt-
ed the implied contract theory in 1972. Drzewiecki involved an
explicit written employment contract, rather than an employee man-
ual or oral promises.358 Under those circumstances, relying on a
general statement like the one quoted from a case is an inappro-
priate basis for the creation of the exception.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
I cite Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. (10/29/80). 319 Krueger
and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Dertouzos and
Karoly also cite Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (12/29/88), 36
352. Id. at 1334-35.
353. 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
354. 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
355. Rabago-Alvarez, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (quoting Drzewiecki, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 174,
24 Cal. App. 3d at 704).
356. Drzewiecki, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
357. Id. at 171, 174-75.
358. Id. at 170-71.
359. 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
360. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
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which restricted the damages available for breach of the covenant
to contract damages, while Cleary had allowed tort damages. 6'
Since all observations in the sample are from before December
1988, the change is unimportant for my purposes.
Colorado
1. Public Policy
I use Winther v. DEC International, Inc. (9/18/85).362 Winther
contains the type of careful and thorough analysis which would
have created the expectation among employers that the public poli-
cy exception was now available in Colorado courts.363 Brooks v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. (10/18/83), an earlier federal opinion,
also found a public policy exception to exist in dicta.3" Brooks
cited Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center as the source of a
public policy exception based on discharges for exercising a "spe-
cifically enacted right or duty."'3" This is a misstatement of the
Lampe court's discussion of cases from other jurisdictions, which
it then distinguished from the facts before it.3" The exception
should therefore date from Winther rather than Lampe or Brooks.
Krueger does not count Colorado as having adopted the public
policy exception. Dertouzos and Karoly, who do not rely on feder-
al court opinions, cite Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric Ass'n
(7/l/88).67
2. Implied Contract
I cite Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (10/18/83).68
Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly cite Salimi v. Farmers Insur-
361. Cleary, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
362. 625 F. Supp. 100 (D. Colo. 1985).
363. See id. at 104.
364. 574 F. Supp. 805, 808-10 (D. Colo. 1983) (the facts concerned an employment
manual).
365. Id. at 809 (citing Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 590 P.2d 513, 515 (Colo.
App. 1978)).
366. See Lampe, 590 P.2d at 515.
367. 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
368. 574 F. Supp. 805 (D. Colo. 1983).
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ance Group (6/14184).69 Although Brooks' analysis of Lampe
was mistaken,37° the remainder of its argument that an implied
contract exception would be found by the Colorado courts is well
reasoned.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Connecticut
1. Public Policy
I date the exception from Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods,
Inc. (1/22/80). 31' Dertouzos and Karoly and Krueger3" also cite
this opinion.
2. Implied Contract
I date this exception from Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.
(10/1/85), which was later reversed by the Connecticut Supreme
Court on January 27, 1987. 3  Krueger cites D'Ulisse-Cupo v.
Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School (2/3/87)."7
Dertouzos and Karoly cite Magnan v. Anaconda Industries(7/3/84).375
As both the supreme court and the appellate court in D'Ulisse-
Cupo note, Finley had already applied a similar theory to an em-
ployee handbook.3 76 The D'Ulisse-Cupo appeals court summa-
rized the appellate court opinion in Finley by saying "Finley thus
369. 684 P.2d 264 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
370. See supra notes 366-67 and accompanying text.
371. 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980).
372. Krueger lists the opinion as Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Flakes. Krueger, supra
note 8, unpublished appendix (on file with author).
373. 499 A.2d 64 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985), rev'd, 520 A.2d 208 (Conn. 1987).
374. 520 A.2d 217 (Conn. 1987).
375. 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984).
376. See D'Ulisse-Cupo, 520 A.2d at 221 n.3; D'Ullise-Cupo v. Board of Directors of
Notre Dame High Sch., 503 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 520 A.2d 217 (Conn. 1987).
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establishes that an employer may be bound by an implied promise
to fire an employee [only] for cause if the employee reasonably
relies on that promise."'3 Finley is thus clearly the more appro-
priate basis for the exception.
While discussing the general erosion of the at-will rule in the
United States in Magnan the Connecticut Supreme Court states, in
dicta:3
78
For those employees not protected by collective bargaining
agreements, civil service statutes or other laws, the courts
have occasionally found an implied promise to discharge
only for cause in the circumstances of particular employ-
ment relationships. Sometimes the promise has been found
in the representations contained in an employee relations
manual or handbook. In appropriate circumstances, such an
agreement may arise when an employee, in reliance on an
implied representation that the position will not arbitrarily
be terminated, leaves his current employment, or otherwise
acts in reasonable and significant reliance on the represen-
tation? 7
9
Although the appellate court in Finley relies on this dicta in
the same manner as Dertouzos and Karoly,50 the dicta is so
vague and limited by the condition that the employee act in reli-
ance on the representation that I date the exception from Finley
rather than from the Magnan dicta.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
I use Magnan v. Anaconda Industries (6/10/80), reversed and
remanded on other grounds (7/3/84).381 The trial court rejected an
employer's request for summary judgment, noting that an implied
377. D'Ulisse-Cupo, 503 A.2d at 1196.
378. The Dertouzos and Karoly appendix identifies some opinions as containing the rule
in dicta. See DFRTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 2, at 67-71. The appendix does not
indicate that they considered Magnan to have adopted the rule in dicta. Id. at 68.
379. Magnan, 479 A.2d at 785 (footnote omitted).
380. See Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 499 A.2d 64, 73 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985),
rev'd 520 A.2d 208 (Conn. 1987).
381. 429 A.2d 492 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 479
A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984).
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing existed in employment
contracts under Connecticut law."2 The court did not delineate
the boundaries of the covenant. 3 When the case reached the
state supreme court several years later, after trial, the supreme
court restricted the covenant to public policy violations in the case
of at-will contracts.384 It did not disavow the existence of the
covenant as a separate basis for recovery where a contract provi-
sion existed to give it content, suggesting (in dicta) approval for
the manner in which the Massachusetts courts had applied the
covenant.385
Dertouzos and Karoly cite Cook v. Alexander & Alexander of
Connecticut, Inc. (1/16/85).386 That case in turn cites the above
mentioned dicta from the state supreme court opinion in
Magnan.387 Krueger also cites the Connecticut Supreme Court
opinion in Magnan
Delaware
Delaware did not recognize any common law exceptions to the
at-will rule in the period under study.
District of Columbia
Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not include the District
in their analyses.
1. Public Policy
I use Newman v. Legal Services Corp. (1/26/86).389 In this
case the federal court is making an Erie guess about District law,
382. Id. at 493-94.
383. Id.
384. Magnan v. Anaconda Indus. 479 A.2d 781, 789 (Conn. 1984).
385. Id.
386. 488 A.2d 1295 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1985).
387. Id. at 1279.
388. Krueger incorrectly cites the case as "Magnam". See Krueger, supra note 8, unpub-
lished appendix (on file with author). Also, although he did not identify which opinion he
used, his data showed that it was the supreme court opinion. Id.
389. 628 F. Supp. 535 (D.D.C. 1986).
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rather than a District of Columbia court deciding the issue directly.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Washington Welfare Ass'n v. Wheeler (8/12/85)."'
There are two earlier District cases which BNA cites as implied
contract cases.39' Both involved university faculty and interpreta-
tion of faculty rules in relatively specific ways. In Bason v. Ameri-
can University,3" the court noted that both parties agreed that the
faculty handbook in question was part of the contract, and the
dispute was over the interpretation of the manual's language. In
Howard University v. Best,393 the parties differed over what ten-
ure category a faculty member fell into, not whether the handbook
was part of the contract. Washington Welfare, which addressed the
substantive issue of implying a contract directly, did not cite either
case.394 Because of the special circumstances of Bason and Best
and the lack of general language in either, I date the exception
from Washington Welfare.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Florida
Florida did not recognize any common law exceptions to the
at-will rule in the period under study.
Georgia
Georgia did not recognize any common law exceptions to the
at-will rule in the period under study.
390. 496 A.2d 613 (D.C. 1985).
391. See infra notes 392-93 and accompanying text.
392. 414 A.2d 522, 523, 525 (D.C. 1980).
393. 484 A.2d 958, 966 (D.C. 1984).
394. See Washington Welfare, 496 A.2d 613.
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Hawaii
1. Public Policy
I date this exception from Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc.
(10/28/82). 395 Dertouzos and Karoly and Krueger also cite this
case.
2. Implied Contract
I use Kinoshita v. Canadian Pacific Airlines (8/26/86).39
Krueger does not cite a case for this exception. Dertouzos and
Karoly cite this case.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Idaho
1. Public Policy
I cite Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District (4/21/77). 3
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger cites MacNeil v.
Minidoka Memorial Hospital (4/28/85).98
In dicta in Jackson, the Idaho Supreme Court stated "[a]s a
general exception to the [at-will] rule ... an employee may claim
damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing
contravenes public policy." 3  On the particular facts of the case,
however, the court found there was no violation of public poli-
cy.400 MacNeil relies on Jackson as the source of the rule."'
395. 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982).
396. 724 P.2d 110 (Haw. 1986).
397. 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977).
398. 701 P.2d 208 (Idaho 1985).
399. Jackson, 563 P.2d at 57.
400. Id. at 58.
401. MacNeil, 701 P.2d at 209.
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2. Implied Contract
I use Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District (4/21/77).'
Dertouzos and Karoly and Krueger also cite this case.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
I cite Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co. (8/8/89). 40 3 Dertouzos
and Karoly also cite this opinion. It is after Krueger's time period;
he cites no case for this exception.
Illinois
1. Public Policy
I date this exception from Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.
(12/4/78).' Dertouzos and Karoly cite this case for a narrow
public policy exception. Krueger cites Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co. (original opinion 4/17/81, modified 6/8/81). 41'
Dertouzos and Karoly cite this case for a broad public policy ex-
ception.
In Kelsay, the court reversed a lower court ruling that an em-
ployee discharged in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation
claim had no claim.' The Illinois Supreme Court found a com-
mon law remedy independent of the statutory scheme (which at
that time did not provide a retaliatory discharge cause of ac-
tion).' The Illinois Supreme Court later accepted the appeal in
Palmateer "to determine the contours of the tort of retaliatory
discharge approved in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc."' Prior to the
Illinois Supreme Court opinion in Kelsay, an appellate panel had
recognized a public policy exception in a workers' compensation
retaliation case in Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co. ((8/31/77).' This
402. 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977).
403. 778 P.2d 744 (Idaho 1989).
404. 384 N.E.2d 353 (Il. 1978).
405. 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981).
406. Kelsay, 384 N.E.2d at 361.
407. Id. at 358-59.
408. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 877.
409. 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
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case was decided the same day as the appellate court opinion in
Kelsay,41 ° in which the court had ruled for the employer. Given
the simultaneous and conflicting decisions and the workers' com-
pensation context, I date the exception from the Illinois Supreme
Court opinion in Kelsay.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency
(12/20/74)."' Dertouzos and Karoly cite Duldulao v. St. Mary of
Nazareth Hospital Center (1/30/87).4 Krueger cites Pundt v.
Millikin University (7/22/86)."'
Illinois' intermediate appellate courts issued a number of deci-
sions on whether a contract could be implied from an employee
handbook or other material before the matter was settled in favor
of the implied contract exception by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Duldulao."4 Duldulao cites Carter as the first case to create the
exception" 5 and most post-Carter cases cite it, distinguishing it if
they find no contract and applying it if they find a contract." 6
Pundt is a post-Duldulao case and therefore clearly inappropriate.
Given the goal of identifying the decisions which introduced the
uncertainty into the employer's decision process, Carter is the
appropriate source.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
410. 366 N.E.2d 1141 (i1. App. Ct. 1977), rev'd 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978).
411. 322 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
412. 505 N.E.2d 314 (il. 1987).
413. 496 N.E.2d 291 (IIl. App. Ct. 1986).
414. See Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 317.
415. Id.
416. See, e.g., Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 397 N.E.2d 443, 446 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1979) (distinguishing Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 322 N.E.2d 547
(Ill. App. Ct. 1974)); Kaiser v. Dixon, 468 N.E.2d 822, 830-32 (il. App. Ct. 1984) (re-
jecting the Sargent distinction).
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Indiana
1. Public Policy
I date this exception from Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas
Co. (5/1/73).' Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case for a
narrow public policy exception. Krueger cites Campbell v. Eli Lilly
and Co. (12/30/80).'
Frampton concerned the interpretation of the Indiana workers'
compensation statute. It held that a retaliatory discharge was a
"device" within the meaning of the word in the statute and there-
fore prohibited by the language "[n]o contract or agreement, writ-
ten or implied, no rule, regulation or other device shall, in any
manner, operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any
obligation created by this act.
419
The court, however, used very broad language to define the
cause of action, stating that "when an employee is discharged sole-
ly for exercising a statutorily conferred right an exception to the
general [at-will] rule must be recognized."4' The case is fre-
quently cited as an example of a public policy claim.42 In addi-
tion, the Campbell court based its analysis of the facts on
Frampton.4' Frampton is thus the appropriate basis for dating the
exception.
2. Implied Contract
I use Romack v. Public Service Co. of Indiana (8/20/87).' 2
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not list this
exception as adopted.
417. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
418. 413 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
419. Frampton, 297 N.E.2d at 427-28 (quoting IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1215 (emphasis
by the court)).
420. Id. at 428.
421. See, e.g., Campbell, 413 N.E.2d at 1060-62.
422. Id.
423. 511 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. 1987).
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3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Iowa
1. Public Policy
Northrup v. Farmland Industries, Inc. (7/31/85).424 Dertouzos
and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not count this excep-
tion as adopted.
In Northrup, the Iowa Supreme Court says that is had previ-
ously "hinted" that it would recognize a public policy exception
under the right circumstances.4 ' 5 As in Abrisz, however, the
Northrup court found that facts did not support a public policy
claim.426 The exception was finally adopted in Springer v. Weeks
& Leo Co. (9/21/88).427 Abrisz is discussed as an example in the
text and is not used for the reasons given there.4 s
2. Implied Contract
I cite Young v. Cedar County Work Activity Ctr., Inc.
(11/25/87).429 Krueger does not consider this exception to have
been adopted. Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Both Dertouzos and Karoly and I do not consider this excep-
tion to have been adopted in Iowa. Krueger cites the federal dis-
trict court opinion in High v. Sperry Corp. (3/16/84).430
424. 372 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 1985).
425. Id. at 196 (citing Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa
1978)).
426. Id. at 196-97 (noting that the public policy claim of discrimination against disabili-
ties was preempted by a statutory remedy for such discrimination).
427. 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988).
428. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
429. 418 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1987).
430. 581 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
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High refused to dismiss for failure to state a claim a cause of
action which sought recovery under the implied covenant theory,
noting that "[t]he terms of the employment relationship between
plaintiff and defendant are not before the court. Perhaps plaintiff
can prove an employment relationship and other facts giving rise to
a cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.""43 Given the extremely low standard for pre-
venting dismissal on these grounds,432 this can hardly be said to
have created an expectation that such a cause of action exists in
Iowa. 3
Kansas
1. Public Policy
I cite Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Department
of Labor Services (6/19/81).4"4  Krueger cites this opinion;
Dertouzos and Karoly list it as the source of a narrow public poli-
cy exception. Dertouzos and Karoly cite Palmer v. Brown
(3/25/88)4"5 as the source of a broad public policy exception.
2. Implied Contract
I use Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Center
(8/2/84).436 Dertouzos and Karoly and Krueger both cite this case.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Kentucky
431. Id. at 1248.
432. Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is granted only
if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
433. See Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446 N.W.2d 451, 457 (Iowa 1989) (noting
that the question of the acceptance of the exception was still undecided and declining to
decide it).
434. 630 P.2d 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
435. 752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988).
436. 684 P.2d 1031 (Kan. CL App. 1984).
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1. Public Policy
I cite Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows (11/23/83)."' 7 Krueger
and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.
Firestone cites two appellate opinions as support:438 Pari-Mu-
tuel Clerks' Union of Kentucky, Local 541 v. Kentucky Jockey
Club439 and Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp.'4° The former finds a
remedy based on a Kentucky statute prohibiting the discharge of an
employee for supporting a union."' Although there was no ex-
plicit remedy provided by the statute, the court found an implied
remedy existed."2 The Firestone court stated that "[wie have
already recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge based
on public policy implicit in an act of the legislature."" 3 This
analysis of Pari-Mutuel is difficult to sustain from the language of
the case itself, and it would not be appropriate to date the excep-
tion from Pari-Mutuel.
Scroghan held that firing an employee who announced his
intention to attend night law school did not involve a public policy
question." Therefore, neither case suggested that a general public
policy exception to the at-will rule existed.
2. Implied Contract
I use Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp. (8/31/83).'~
Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly cite no case.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
437. 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983).
438. Firestone, 666 S.W.2d at 732.
439. 551 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1977).
440. 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
441. Pari-Mutuel Clerks', 551 S.W.2d at 802.
442. Id.
443. Firestone, 666 S.W.2d at 732 (citing Pari-Mutuel, 551 S.W.2d at 803).
444. Scroghan, 551 S.W.2d at 812.
445. 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983).
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Louisiana
Louisiana did not recognize any common law exceptions to the
employment at-will rule in the period under study.
Maine
1. Public Policy
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hospital (11/2/77).4 6
Krueger also cites this case. Dertouzos and Karoly cite Larrabee v.
Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc. (12/31/84).' 4
Terrio upheld a jury verdict for an employee who claimed an
implied contract for a definite term based on a retirement plan, an
employee handbook, and oral statements by supervisors.' 8 Al-
though Larrabee did not mention Terrio, its main innovation was a
relaxation of the evidentiary standard by which contracts can be
taken out of the at-will rule."9 Terrio clearly adopted a somewhat
more limited implied contract exception, but given the early date of
its adoption its impact must have been relatively large.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Maryland
1. Public Policy
I cite Adler v. American Standard Corp. (7/16/81)." ° Krueger
446. 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977).
447. 486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984).
448. Terrio, 379 A.2d at 140.
449. Larrabee, 486 A.2d at 99-100.
450. 432 A.2d 464 (Md. 1981).
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and Dertouzos and Karoly both cite this case.
2. Implied Contract
I use Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc. (1/14/85)."5'
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger cites Staggs but
lists the date as 1987.452
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Massachusetts
1. Public Policy
I use McKinney v. National Dairy Council (5/28/80)."53
Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly cite Cort v. Bristol-Meyers Co.
(2/18/82). 454
McKinney carefully surveyed Massachusetts law and brought
the public policy exception into the implied covenant context.4"5
Massachusetts courts quickly began to cite McKinney.456 Cort
cites Gram,57 which cites McKinney in support of the excep-
tion.458 Therefore, McKinney is a better source of the exception
than Cort.
451. 486 A.2d 798 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), cert. denied, 493 A.2d 349 (Md. 1985).
452. Krueger, supra note 8, unpublished appendix (on file with author). This appears to
be a repeat of a typographical error in the BNA IER manual which correctly cites Staggs
as 486 A.2d 798, but incorrectly lists the date as 1987 rather than 1985. BUREAU OF NA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS MANUAL 505:414 (June, 1993).
453. 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980).
454. 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982).
455. McKinney, 491 F. Supp. at 1120-22. Massachusetts law is unique in this respect:
the implied covenant is the source of the public policy exception. See Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256-57 (Mass. 1977) (discussing the public policy
exception in the context of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court eventually held that it was not necessary to instruct
the jury on the covenant in public policy cases. Mello v. Stop & Shop Co., 524 N.E.2d
105, 105 n.7 (Mass. 1988).
456. See, e.g., Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21, 27 n.6 (Mass. 1981).
457. Cort, 431 N.E.2d at 910 (citing Gram, 429 N.E.2d at 21).
458. See supra note 456 and accompanying text.
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2. Implied Contract
I cite Hobson v. McLean Hospital Corp. (5/16/88). 451
Dertouzos and Karoly cite Jackson v. Action for Boston Community
Development, Inc. (7/14/88).' Krueger does not cite a case for
this exception; these cases are outside the time period of his study.
Hobson cites no authority, but simply asserts the exception
exists in Massachusetts." Jackson cites Hobson as the source "of
the exception. 2 One earlier case deserves mention. The BNA In-
dividual Employment Rights Handbook summarizes the three para-
graph opinion in Hass v. Picker International, Inc. 3 as allowing
a claim based on "statements in an employee handbook and repre-
sentations by the employer's agent that he [the employee] would
be employed for a term in excess of a year."' In fact, that opin-
ion merely rejected a summary judgment motion, saying "although
Plaintiff's evidence appears to be gossamer thin, it cannot be ruled
with certainty that there is no question of material fact lurking in
this case."' Given the procedural posture, this is less than "gos-
samer thin" authority for the existence of such a cause of action in
Massachusetts.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
I cite Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. (7/20/77).'
Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.
459. 522 N.E.2d 975 (Mass. 1988).
460. 525 N.E.2d 411 (Mass. 1988).
461. Hobson, 522 N.E.2d at 977.
462. Jackson, 525 N.E.2d at 415 (citing Hobson, 522 N.E.2d at 977, 402 Mass. 413,
415).
463. 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2367 (D. Mass. 1986).
464. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS MANUAL
505:434 (January, 1991).
465. Hass, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2368.
466. 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
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Michigan
1. Public Policy
I use Sventko v. Kroger Co. (6/24/76).' 7  Krueger and
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan
(6/10/80)." 8 Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this
case. The Michigan Supreme Court opinion in Toussaint actually
decided two cases, one involving Toussaint and the other a plaintiff
named Ebling."9 In the appellate court Ebling won and Toussaint
lost. The appellate opinion in Toussaint was published.7 The ap-
pellate opinion in Ebling was not. It was issued on 11/9/77. I date
the exception from the Supreme Court opinion for the reasons dis-
cussed above concerning the Illinois cases of Leach and
Kelsay.
471
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Minnesota
1. Public Policy
I use Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Co. (1 1/ 18/ 86).4'l
Dertouzos and Karoly and Krueger also cite this case.47
467. 245 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. 1976).
468. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
469. Id. at 883.
470. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 262 N.W.2d 848 (Mich. App.
1977) (11/8/77).
471. See supra notes 404-10 and accompanying text.
472. 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), affid 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) (in
an opinion dated 6/26/87).
473. Although Krueger did not identify which of the two opinions he counted in his
list, his data showed that it was the intermediate appellate opinion. See Krueger, supra
note 8, tbl. 1, at 649 (illustrating the years that Kxeuger uses as the starting point of the
recognition of the at-will doctrine in each state; thus, implying which cases Kreuger relies
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2. Implied Contract
I use Pine River State Bank v. Mettille (4/29/83).' 74 Krueger
and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Mississippi
1. Public Policy
I cite Laws v. Aetna Finance Co. (7/17/87).' 75 The Laws
court gives an exhaustive analysis of state court dicta and makes a
convincing argument that Mississippi would adopt a public policy
exception for employees discharged for refusal to commit an illegal
act.476 Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not consider this
exception to have been adopted in Mississippi.
2. Implied Contract
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Missouri
1. Public Policy
I date this exception from Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc.
(11/5/85).' Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger
on).
474. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
475. 667 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
476. Id. at 345-46.
477. 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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cites Henderson v. St. Louis Housing Authority (12/26/79)."78
In Boyle, the Missouri appellate court adopted a public policy
exception after an exhaustive survey of both Missouri and other
states' law.479 Henderson had allowed a claim under the work-
ers' compensation statute where employees alleged they had been
discharged for filing claims." ° Because the Missouri workers'
compensation statute explicitly allows such claims,"8 and because
no mention is made in Henderson of the at-will rule (as the defen-
dant's claim is that the plaintiff failed to prove his case)," 2
Boyle is the appropriate case from which to date the exception.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Arie v. Intertherm, Inc. ( 1/18/83 ).3 Dertouzos and
Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not cite a case.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Montana4
1. Public Policy
I cite Keneally v. Orgain (1/30/80)." 5  Krueger 6  and
Dertouzos and Karoly both cite this case.
478. 605 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
479. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 871-78.
480. Henderson, 605 S.W.2d at 800. The same issue was present in Hansome v. North-
western Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
481. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.780 (1993).
482. Henderson, 605 S.W.2d at 802.
483. 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
484. For a comprehensive analysis of the interplay between Montana's code provisions
and court decisions in this area see Morriss, Plenty of Laws, supra note 185.
485. 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980).
486. Krueger cites the case as "Kenealy". Krueger, supra note 8, unpublished appendix
(on file with author).
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2. Implied Contract
I use the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act
(effective July 1, 1987).' Dertouzos and Karoly also cite the
statute. Krueger cites Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co.
(1/5/82).8 Gates rejected a claim under an employment manual,
citing the fact that it had been distributed after employment began
and relying on the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v.
National Beef Packing Co."89 As there were no dicta indicating
sympathy toward the exception and as Johnson is a particularly
firm rejection of the theory, Gates is an inappropriate basis for the
exception. It is not surprising that no implied contract exception
developed in Montana, despite its status as one of the most pro-
employee jurisdictions, given the wide reach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, which is based on Gates.'
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
I cite Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co. (1/5/82)."9'
Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.
Nebraska
1. Public Policy
I use Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd. (11/25/87).'
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not cite a
case for this exception in Nebraska.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center (11/18/83). 493
487. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1987).
488. 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982).
489. Id. at 1066 (citing Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan.
1976)).
490. See infra note 491 and accompanying text.
491. 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982).
492. 416 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1987).
493. 340 N.W.2d 388 (Neb. 1983).
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Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.494 Krueger does not cite
a case for this exception in Nebraska.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study. In
one case, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated: "Except in cases
where an employee is deprived of constitutional or statutory rights
or where contractual agreements guarantee that employees may not
be fired without just cause, the law in this state continues to deny
any implied covenant of good faith or fair dealing in employment
termination." Jeffers v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hospital
(5/30/86)."95 Although this implies that the covenant does exist in
the three types of cases mentioned, those cases either fall within
the public policy exception or protect employees with contracts
which take them out of the at-will rule's coverage. For this reason
I did not rely on Jeffers.
Nevada
1. Public Policy
I cite Hansen v. Harrah's (1/25/84).496 Krueger and
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.
2. Implied Contract
I use Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad (8/31/83).4' 7 Dertouzos
and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger cites Mannikko v. Harrah's
Reno, Inc. (2/27/86).498 That case explicitly cites Ahmad as the
basis for the implied contract exception.499
494. Dertouzos and Karoly incorrectly list the case as "Morriss."
495. 387 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Neb. 1986).
496. 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984).
497. 668 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1983).
498. 630 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1986).
499. Id. at 196 (citing Ahmad, 668 P.2d at 261-62).
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3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
I cite K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock (2/24/87)."0  Krueger and
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion.
New Hampshire
1. Public Policy
I use Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. (2/28/74)."' Krueger and
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case."°
2. Implied Contract
I date this exception from Panto v. Moore Business Forms,
Inc. (8/5/88).503 Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not cite
any cases for this exception. In Panto, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court held that a "unilateral promulgation to present at-will
employees" of a statement of intent to provide benefits can modify
the contract of employment."° The difference will not affect any
of the comparisons in this Article, since Panto was issued in Au-
gust 1988 and the comparisons with the data do not rely on any
decisions after their time periods.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
I cite Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. (2/28/74).505 Dertouzos and
Karoly also cite this opinion. Krueger does not cite an opinion for
this exception.
Monge was universally thought to have adopted a particularly
broad version of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
500. 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987).
501. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
502. Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (N.H. 1980), reinterpreted
Monge to be a public policy exception to the at-will rule. However, even prior to Dorr,
public policy claims were clearly within Monge. See supra note 6 (providing a more
extended discussion of Monge and Dorr).
503. 547 A.2d 260 (N.H. 1988).
504. Id. at 261.
505. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
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ing until the New Hampshire Supreme Court announced in 1980
that Monge was actually a public policy exception."° Thus the
implied covenant should not be considered to have continued after
1980.
New Jersey
1. Public Policy
I cite Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (7/28/80)."0
Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion.
2. Implied Contract
I use Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc. (5/9/85)."8 Krueger
and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
New Mexico
1. Public Policy
I date this exception from Vigil v. Arzola (7/5/83)."0
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion. Krueger does not cite
an opinion for this exception. New Mexico had previously rejected
a public policy argument in a case involving the worker's com-
pensation law, holding that it was a matter for the legislature in
Bottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit Co. (9/22/81).5Io In Vigil, however,
the court held that as the at-will rule had been judicially created, it
could be modified outside of comprehensive statutory schemes like
506. Dorr, 414 A.2d at 1274. See supra note 6 (providing an extended discussion of
Monge and Dorr).
507. 417 A.2d 505 (NJ. 1980).
508. 491 A.2d 1257 (NJ. 1985), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (NJ. 1985).
509. 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 687 P.2d 1038 (N.M. 1984).
510. 635 P.2d 992 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
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workers' compensation."'
2. Implied Contract
I cite Forrester v. Parker (2/1/80).512 Krueger and Dertouzos
and Karoly also cite this case.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
New York
1. Public Policy
I do not view New York as having adopted this exception.
Krueger does not cite a case for this exception. Dertouzos and
Karoly cite Chin v. AT&T Co. (7/17/78).51' Dertouzos and Karoly
also cite Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.,514 in which
New York's highest court rejected the public policy exception.
In Chin, a trial court rejected a claim of "abusive discharge"
by holding that the plaintiff had failed to persuade the court that
New York public policy barred discharge of at-will employees due
to the employees' political beliefs and associations.515 The Chin
court, after noting that the public policy exception had not yet
been recognized in New York, stated
it is appropriate, on a motion of this nature [motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim], to examine the ele-
ments of the cause of action to determine whether the
complaint alleges sufficient facts upon which relief can be
granted at trial. Since plaintiff is proceeding on a cause of
action not presently recognized in this state, he bears a
heavy burden of demonstrating that this new cause of ac-
511. Vigil, 699 P.2d at 620.
512. 606 P.2d 191 (N.M. 1980).
513. 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
514. 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
515. Chin, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
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tion should be adopted.516
Given this language, it is difficult to argue that Chin represented
anything more than a careful analysis of a motion to dismiss.
There is no dicta indicating a favorable view of the doctrine in
question.
Finally, it is worth noting that Murphy, which rejects the public
policy exception, does not mention Chin, an indication that Chin
was not thought to have suggested the exception might exist.517
The lack of any other published opinions in the almost five years
between Chin and Weiner reinforce the view that Chin was not
seen as a signal that the door had opened to such claims.
2. Implied Contract
I use Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc. (11/18/82).' Krueger and
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
North Carolina
1. Public Policy
I date this exception from Sides v. Duke Hospital (5/7/85)."9
Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.
2. Implied Contract
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
516. Id. at 740.
517. See Murphy, 448 N.E.2d 86.
518. 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982).
519. 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
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3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
North Dakota
1. Public Policy
I date this exception from Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing
Home (11/19/87).'20 Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite
this case.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Board
(2/23/84)2' Krueger does not cite a case for the implied contract
exception. Dertouzos and Karoly cite Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants,
Inc. (12/16/86)."
In Hammond, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a
state agency which had promulgated a Personnel Policies Manual
"must be held accountable under those provisions in its employ-
ment relationship with" the employee."z Although Hammond in-
volved a public employer, the holding does not rely on the public
character of the employer. 24 Bailey discussed Hammond in the
context of a private employer. 5 Further, in Bailey the plaintiffs
cited Hammond as the source of the rule, indicating that the bar
viewed Hammond as creating the exception." Further, Bailey
concerned the effect of a disclaimer in the employment manual, not
whether the manual itself was part of the contract. 27 As the ef-
fectiveness of the disclaimer is an issue only if the manual is oth-
erwise potentially effective, this further supports the rule predating
Bailey.
520. 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987).
521. 345 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1984).
522. 398 N.W.2d 120, 122-23 (N.D. 1986).
523. Hammond, 345 N.W.2d at 361.
524. See id.
525. Bailey, 398 N.W.2d at 122-23.
526. See id.
527. Id.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Ohio
1. Public Policy
I cite Goodspeed v. Airborne Express, Inc. (2/11/85)."
Krueger does not cite a case for Ohio for this exception. Dertouzos
and Karoly cite this case.
Goodspeed is the earliest case adopting the exception. The
Ohio Supreme Court subsequently recognized the exception in
Greely v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc.529 and not-
ed that this case not only found a cause of action but is cited by
the BNA Individual Employer Rights Manual for the proposition
that Ohio recognized the exception.53 Between Goodspeed and
Greely, however, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Phung v. Waste
Management, Inc. (4/16/86).31 There the Court rejected a public
policy claim and stated that Ohio had not yet recognized any pub-
lic policy exceptions.53 Dertouzos and Karoly and I consider this
case to reverse the exception.
2. Implied Contract
I use West v. Roadway Express (3/21/82).533 Dertouzos and
Karoly also cite this case. Krueger cites Helle v. Landmark, Inc.
(3/30/84).134 Although West rejected the specific claim at issue, it
carefully examined the evidence offered by the plaintiff and con-
cluded that a contract not to fire except for just cause had not
been created.535
528. 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3216 (Ohio CL App. 1985).
529. 551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990).
530. Id. at 986 n.3.
531. 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986).
532. Id. at 1196.
533. 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4553 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982), cert. den., 459 U.S. 1205
(1983).
534. 472 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
535. West, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 4555-56.
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3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Oklahoma
1. Public Policy
I cite Burke v. K-Mart Corp. (2/7/89) .536 Dertouzos and
Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not cite a case for this
exception in Oklahoma.
2. Implied Contract
I date this exception from Langdon v. Saga Corp.
(12/28/76). 5" Krueger also cites this case. Dertouzos and Karoly
cite Hinson v. Cameron (6/9/87). 538 While Hinson is the first state
supreme court case on the subject, it cites the court of appeals
opinion in Langdon, and finds it "compatible" with a later public
employee case.539 Because Langdon predates Hinson it is the ap-
propriate benchmark.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was rejected by Hinson v. Cameron (6/9/87)51
and Burke v. K-Mart Corp. (2/7/89).54' Many courts, however,
interpreted the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Hall v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange (5/21/85),542 which found an implied
covenant in an insurance agent's contract with the insurance com-
pany, to apply to the employer-employee relationship as well. 43
Thus from May 1985 to June 1987, it appeared that Oklahoma had
adopted this exception, and I consider it to have been adopted
536. 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
537. 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
538. 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987).
539. Id. at 555.
540. Id. at 554.
541. Burke, 770 P.2d at 26.
542. 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
543. See, e.g., Grayson v. American Airlines, Inc., 803 F.2d 1097, 1099 (10th Cir.
1986).
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during that period.
Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not
to have adopted this exception.
consider Oklahoma
Oregon
1. Public Policy
I cite Nees v. Hocks (6/12/75).' 44 Krueger and Dertouzos and
Karoly also cite this case.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald
(3/28/78). 45 Dertouzos and Karoly also cite
cites Speciale v. Tektronix, Inc. (2/20/79)."4
Publishing Co.
this case. Krueger
Oregon courts cite Yartzoff as authority for implied contract
claims. Two such cases are: Simpson v. Western Graphics
Corp.5 47 and Fleming v. Kids and Kin Head Start."4 Speciale is
a particularly inappropriate source of the rule: it concerned an
appeal of a denied motion to replead a complaint after dismissal on
demurrer and the standard applied was thus very low.5
49
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
576 P.2d 356 (Or. 1978).
590 P.2d 734 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
643 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Or. 1982).
693 P.2d 1363, 1364 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
Speciale, 590 P.2d at 737.
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Pennsylvania
1. Public Policy
I use Geary v. United States Steel Corp. (3/25/74).50 Krueger
and Dertouzos and Karoly cite Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.(4128/78).-'51
In 1974, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted in dicta in
Geary that
[i]t may be granted that there are areas in an employee's
life in which his employer has no legitimate interest. An
intrusion into one of these areas by virtue of the employ-
er's power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a
cause of action, particularly where some recognized facet of
public policy is threatened." 2
The employer won in Geary because of its particular facts.553 The
clear message of Geary was that the at-will rule was no longer
absolute. 4 Reuther based a public policy exception on this dicta
from Geary."5 Federal courts in Pennsylvania have also relied on
Geary in upholding public policy claims.556 Geary is thus a more
appropriate basis for dating the public policy exception.
2. Implied Contract
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
550. 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
551. 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
552. Geary, 319 A.2d at 180.
553. The employer successfully argued the employee was discharged for failing to fol-
low company procedure in making his complaint about the safety of a product, not be-
cause he complained. Id. at 176.
554. See id. at 180.
555. Reuther, 386 A.2d at 120-21.
556. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 897-98 (3d Cir. 1983)
(citing cases).
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3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Rhode Island
I do not consider Rhode Island to have adopted any exceptions
to the at-will rule in the period under study. Krueger also does not
count Rhode Island as adopting any exceptions to the at-will rule.
Dertouzos and Karoly cite to dicta in Volino v. General Dy-
namics (4/7/88)... as supporting a public policy exception. Al-
though the plaintiff in Volino did allege that he was discharged for
reporting violations of government construction standards to the
Navy, the only mention of that claim is when the court notes it
was not presented at the state administrative hearing at which the
employee lost his bid for unemployment compensation. 58 After
reaffirming the at-will rule, the court also notes that the plaintiff
failed to present any evidence supporting his claim and thus failed
to meet his burden in creating a fact question under Rhode Is-
land's summary judgment standard."9 Although the court could
have simply stopped after stating the at-will rule, the fact that the
court also mentioned that the plaintiff failed to produce any evi-
dence supporting his theory is difficult to construe as support for
the existence of a public policy exception given the strong endorse-
ment of the at-will rule in the preceding paragraph."S Whether
Volino counts as an adoption of the exception will not materially
affect the results of this paper since there are no observations after
April 1988.
South Carolina
1. Public Policy
I cite Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc. (11/18/85).6
557. 539 A.2d 531 (R.I. 1988).
558. Id. at 532.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985).
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Both Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.
2. Implied Contract
I date this exception from Small v. Springs Industries, Inc.
(6/8/87).562 Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger
does not cite a case for this exception.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
South Dakota
1. Public Policy
I cite Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc. (12/7188).63 Krueger does
not cite any cases for this exception. Dertouzos and Karoly cite
Tombollo v. Dunn (1/4/84)."6
In Tombollo, an employee alleged that she was discharged by a
supervisor who was sexually harassing her. 65 The Court held that
any wrongful discharge claim based on those facts was barred
because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative reme-
dies under South Dakota law."6 There is nothing in this opinion
which suggests that a public policy exception exists in South Da-
kota.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Osterkamp v. Alkota Manufacturing, Inc. (4/13/83).567
Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this opinion.
562. 357 S.E.2d 452 (S.C. 1987).
563. 433 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1988).
564. 342 N.W.2d 23 (S.D. 1984).
565. Id. at 25.
566. Id. She had failed to appeal the dismissal of her administrative action based on a
finding of the South Dakota Division of Human Rights that she had been fired for cause.
Id. (her claims before the agency were based on the South Dakota anti-discrimination
statute).
567. 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983).
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3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Tennessee
1. Public Policy
I use Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co. (8/20/84).6 Dertouzos and
Karoly also cite this case. Krueger cites Watson v. Cleveland Chair
Co. (7/26/85).69
In Clanton, the Tennessee Supreme Court created a claim for
retaliatory discharges for exercising rights under the workers' com-
pensation law. 70  The Court followed the Indiana Supreme
Court's opinion in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,5 7' not-
ing that the Tennessee and Indiana statutes were similar." Wat-
son, which Krueger cites, refers to Clanton as the source of the
exception, saying "Tennessee recently recognized one exception to
this rule in Clanton.'573
2. Implied Contract
I cite Hamby v. Genesco, Inc. (11/5/81).5 4 Krueger and
Dertouzos and Karoly do not cite a case for this exception. In
Hamby, the court of appeals found that an employee handbook was
part of an employee's contract of employment without any discus-
sion of legal authority.575 Although the specific claims made in
the case concerned benefits rather than the standard for discharge,
court did not limit its analysis to such claims but used general lan-
guage.57
6
568. 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984).
569. 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2076 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
570. Clanton, 677 S.W.2d at 445.
571. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
572. Clanton, 677 S.W.2d at 443.
573. Watson, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2077.
574. 627 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
575. Id. at 376.
576. Id. at 375.
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3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Texas
1. Public Policy
I use Hauck v. Sabine Pilots, Inc. (6/7184), affirmed
(4/3/85)." Dertouzos and Karoly and I cite the court of appeals
decision; Krueger cites the supreme court decision.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (4/11/85).78 Krueger and
Dertouzos and Karoly do not cite a case for this exception.
Johnson simply ignores the earlier decision of the Corpus
Christi appellate court in Reynolds Manufacturing Co. v.
Mendoza,5 79 which had rejected the exception. Shortly after John-
son, the Texarkana Court of Appeals followed suit on 7/9/85.580
When faced with this split, the Fifth Circuit followed Johnson and
United."'
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Utah
1. Public Policy
I cite Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd. (3/20/89).582 Dertouzos
577. 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaunont 1984), affd sub nom. Sabine Pilot
Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
578. 690 S.W.2d 90 ('ex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
579. 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
580. United Transp. Union v. Brown, 694 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
581. See Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1199 (5th Cir. 1987).
582. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
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and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not cite a case for
Utah for this exception (this case is beyond his time period).
2. Implied Contract
I cite Rose v. Allied Development Co. (5/13/86)."'3 Krueger
and Dertouzos and Karoly do not cite a case for this exception.
Rose analyzed an implied contract claim based on statements
alleged to have been made by the employer.584 Although the
court found for the employer on the facts of the case, clearly an
exception to the at-will rule existed."' Rose cited Bihlmaier v.
Carson586 as creating the implied contract exception." The
cited language from Bihlmaier is, in full:
The general rule concerning personal employment contracts
is, in the absence of some further express or implied stipu-
lation as to the duration of the employment or of a good
consideration in addition to the services to be rendered, the
contract is no more than an indefinite general hiring which
is terminable at the will of either party.588
As this language from Bihlmaier is far from a clear endorsement
of an exception to the at-will rule, it seems more appropriate to
date the exception from Rose.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
583. 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986).
584. Id. at 85.
585. Id. at 85-86.
586. 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979).
587. Rose, 719 P.2d at 85-86 (citing Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah
1979)).
588. Bihlmaier, 603 P.2d at 792 (footnote omitted).
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Vermont
1. Public Policy
I cite Payne v. Rozendaal (9/26/86).589 Krueger also cites this
case. Dertouzos and Karoly cite dicta in Jones v. Keogh
(11/5/79)"90 for a narrow public policy exception and Payne for a
broad one. In rejecting a public policy claim, the Jones court not-
ed:
The basic common law rule which still is widely accepted
is that which was pronounced by this Court in Mullaney v.
C.H. Goss Co., supra [122 A. 430, 432 (Vt. 1923)]. Ever
present in those opinions recognizing the common law rule
is the concern that acceptance of a rule extending enforce-
able contract rights to an at will employee would destroy
the mutuality of obligation extant in such employment
relationships. Accordingly, courts generally have been un-
willing to uphold suits by discharged employees at-will
unless there is a clear and compelling public policy against
the reason advanced for the discharge.
While full employment and employer-employee harmo-
ny are noble goals to which society aspires, they alone do
not present the clear and compelling public policies upon
which courts have been willing to rely in upholding an
action for discharge of an employee at will. Nor is the fact
that bad faith, malice and retaliation are motives upon
which we look askance sufficient to impel us to find a
clear and compelling public policy where, as here, there is
none.
59 1
Payne later cites a fragment of this language:
In Vermont, under an "at will" employment contract, an
employee may be discharged at any time with or without
cause, "unless there is a clear and compelling public policy
589. 520 A.2d 586 (Vt. 1986).
590. 409 A.2d 581 (Vt. 1979).
591. Id. at 582 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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against the reason advanced for the discharge."5"
Thus Payne's discussion of what "courts generally" have been
unwilling to do was transformed into the definition of Vermont's
public policy exception. Justice Peck's dissent in Payne notes that
Jones is actually a unanimous endorsement of the at-will rule. 93
Despite the Payne court's reference to Jones, it would be difficult
to construe its passing reference to "courts generally" as forecasting
a change in a Vermont rule it had just endorsed.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Sherman v. Rutland Hospital, Inc. (8/9/85). 94 Krueger
also cites this case. Dertouzos and Karoly cite Benoir v. Ethan
Allen, Inc. (7/18/86).95 Benoir is simply later than Sherman and
therefore the wrong benchmark.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Virginia
1. Public Policy
I use Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville (6/14/85).'96 Both
Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly cite this case.
2. Implied Contract
I date this exception from Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg
Foundation (9/9/83). 9 7 Krueger and Dertouzos and Karoly do not
cite a case.
592. Payne, 520 A.2d at 588 (citing Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 564, 409 A.2d 581,
582 (1979) (emphasis in original)).
593. Id. at 591.
594. 500 A.2d 230 (Vt. 1985).
595. 514 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1986).
596. 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985).
597. 574 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Va. 1983).
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3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Washington
1. Public Policy
I cite Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co. (7/5/84)."' Krueger
also cites this case. Dertouzos and Karoly cite dicta in Roberts v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (8/18/77)."'
Although the court does discuss several public policy cases
from other states in Roberts, it concludes:
On the record before us we can neither reach the question
of whether we should totally abrogate the common law
terminable-at-will doctrine nor the question of whether we
should follow the Monge court and make an exception
thereto based on bad faith and malice. While the future of
this doctrine is a compelling issue, it is one which must be
left for another day and different facts.'
This is not the sort of suggestion as to the future course of the law
that implies a change is coming soon (and the change took almost
seven years to arrive).
2. Implied Contract
I cite Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (8/18/77)."° Dertouzos
and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger cites Saruf v. Miller
(11/9/78).6
Although the employee lost in Roberts, the court clearly recog-
598. 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984).
599. 568 P.2d 764 (Wash. 1977).
600. Id. at 770.
601. 568 P.2d 764 (Wash. 1977).
602. 586 P.2d 466 (Wash. 1978).
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nized the existence of an implied contract exception.: 3 In Saruff
the court acknowledged Roberts' creation of the exception, saying
that in Roberts "we recognized that allegations similar to those
made by Saruff may give rise to an implied contract of employ-
ment."60
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
West Virginia
1. Public Policy
I use Harless v. First National Bank (7 /14 /7 8).'S Krueger al-
so cites this case; Dertouzos and Karoly cite it for a narrow public
policy exception and cite Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp.
(7/13/84)6 for a broad exception.
2. Implied Contract
I cite Cook v. Heck's Inc. (4/4186).' Krueger and Dertouzos
and Karoly both cite this case.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Wisconsin
1. Public Policy
I use Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc. (1/28/80). 08 Krueger also cites
this case. Dertouzos and Karoly cite Brockmeyer v. Dun &
603. Roberts, 568 P.2d at 770.
604. Saruff, 586 P.2d at 469.
605. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
606. 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984).
607. 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986).
608. 290 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
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Bradstreet (7/1/83).6
Broclneyer is the first state supreme court ruling, but Ward is
widely recognized as the first appellate opinion in Wisconsin to
create a public policy exception."'
2. Implied Contract
I cite Ferraro v. Koelsch (6/5/85)."' Both Krueger and
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
Wyoming
1. Public Policy
I use Griess v. Consolidated Freightways (7/5/89)."' Krueger
cites no case. Dertouzos and Karoly cite dicta in Allen v. Safeway
Stores, Inc. (5/2/85).I3
Griess involved a claim of retaliation for filing a workers'
compensation case. 4 Allen rejected several public policy claims
made by two discharged employees.1 The rationale for doing so
was that statutory remedies existed to protect the public policies
which the court found to have been valid." 6 In doing so, it de-
fined the requirements for a "tort action premised on public policy"
in general terms.17 Presumably, that is the dicta on which the
Dertouzos and Karoly study relied. That language is too general to
609. 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
610. See, e.g., BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS MAN-
UAL 505:891 (December, 1988).
611. 368 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 1985).
612. 776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 1989).
613. 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985).
614. Griess, 776 P.2d at 752.
615. Allen, 699 P.2d at 282-84.
616. Id. at 284.
617. Id. (stating the requirements to be the absence of a remedy and a discharge in
violation of well-established public policy).
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suggest a public policy exception exists. Griess cited Allen for both
this language and for the proposition that Wyoming has been "cau-
tious" in modifying the at-will rule.6"'
2. Implied Contract
I cite Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks (8/13/85).619
Dertouzos and Karoly also cite this case. Krueger does not cite a
case for this exception.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This exception was not adopted in the period under study.
618. Griess, 776 P.2d at 753-54 (citing Allen, 699 P.2d at 284 and 277).
619. 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985).
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Appendix C: Econometric Details
In this appendix I provide those details of the data analysis
used in Part II which do not relate to dating the common law
changes. The data on individuals and their jobs comes from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), one of two panel data
sets which include information on job tenure.6' The PSID offers
the advantage of providing panel data covering the period of inter-
est. The disadvantage is the presence of some inconsistency in the
PSID's tenure data.62" ' Despite this problem, the PSID has two
advantages for the analysis of the impact of the common law ero-
sion of the at-will rule. First, it contains a large nationally repre-
sentative sample. Second, unlike the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY), it includes prime age men, who are most likely
to be affected by the changes in the at-will rule.
Since the PSID does not explicitly identify employers,6" I
identify when an individual changes employers through other vari-
ables. Brown and Light found that the method of deriving job
620. The other is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). A year's delay in
obtaining approval from a university official for obtaining the restricted NLSY data set
containing geographic information prevents inclusion of NLSY data here. A future paper
will present those results.
621. See James Brown & Audrey Light, Interpreting Panel Data on Job Tenure, 10 J.
LAB. ECON. 219, 220 (1992). Briefly, the sources of the inconsistency are the lack of
information about employers, reporting errors, the ambiguous wording of the questions
about job tenure, and the coding of the answers. Id. at 220-22. The inconsistency makes
evaluating the effect of tenure on job duration difficult and requires relatively strong as-
sumptions to make the data useable.
622. Interview years 1979 and 1980 present additional problems. The PSID questionnaire
for 1979 and 1980 did not contain a job tenure question. The question took the general
form: "How long have you worked for your present employer?" INSTruTE FOR SOCIAL
RESEARCH, A PANEL STUDY OF INCOME DYNAMICS; PROCEDURES AND TAPE CODES 16
(WAVE XIV, 1981) [hereinafter ISR]. The answers could be recorded in either years or
months, see id., leading to a potential rounding error where a job which began in January
of year t is reported in a March interview for interview year t as having 2 months' ten-
tre and in a March interview for interview year t 4 as having 4 years' tenure, rather
than 50 months. Rather than simply discard all observations for these two years, which
would lose information on some changes in the law, I adopted the following procedure:
If the subject was in the sample for 1978 and the job-ending question and time-in-
position question did not indicate a job change, I incremented the tenure reported in 1978
by elapsed calendar time. If the subject was not in the 1978 sample, then I used the
tenure reported in interview year 1981 for those present in the sample for that year, sub-
tracting elapsed calendar time. For those not present in either 1978 or 1981, but present
in either 1979 or 1980 or both, and whose job-ending question indicated the job had not
ended, I relied on the time-in-position data to assign the tenure values.
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changes can significantly affect the results.6' Because of this sen-
sitivity, I use two different methods to determine when jobs end
and present results for both. In Method T, I record the end of a
job wherever reported tenure drops in consecutive months or where
an individual reports not working in a month following a month in
which employment is reported. 4 In Method P, I use the position
questions to identify the end of a job.6'
623. Brown & Light, supra note 621, at 221. One method is to use discontinuities in
reported tenure to identify changes of employers. As Brown and Light found, however,
reported tenure is not correlated well with elapsed calendar time, suggesting that job
changes cannot be identified simply by assuming that whenever reported tenure is less
than elapsed time since the previous interview a new job has begun. Id. A second method
of partitioning the data into jobs uses the PSID's data on current position. Beginning in
interview year 1976, the PSID contained a question which asked about tenure in the
current position. ISR, supra note 622, at 15 (WAVE IX, 1976). If the answer was less
than 12 months in interview years 1976-1983, then the interviewer also asked about why
the previous job ended. See id. In interview years after 1983, the individual was asked
when the present position began, and the questions about why the last position ended
were asked if the date reported was January of the preceding year or later. See, e.g., id.
at 13 (WAVE XVIII, 1985). By using the existence of an answer to these questions, the
data can be partitioned into jobs. The question asked was a variant on the following
example from interview year 1980: "What happened to the job you had before-did the
company go out of business, were you laid off, promoted, were you not working, or
what?" Id. at 14 (WAVE XIII, 1980). The answers which were coded individually were:
(1) Company folded, etc.; (2) Strike, lockout; (3) Laid off, fired; (4) Quit, resigned, re-
tired, pregnant, etc.; (7) Other; (8) Job done; (9) Not applicable, don't know; and (0)
Inappropriate (which includes those still working for the employer). Id. The 1988 respons-
es were: (1) Company folded, etc. - 1%; (2) Strike, lockout - 0%; (3) Laid off, fired -
1.7%; (4) Quit, resigned, retired, pregnant, etc. - 9.4%; (7) Other - 0.3%; (8) Job done -
0.5%; (9) Not applicable, don't know - 0.4%; and (0) Inappropriate (which includes
those still working for the employer) - 86.7%. Id. at 184 (WAVE XXI, 1988). Even aside
from any measurement error in self-reports of firings, the PSID questionnaire does not
separate firings from layoffs. As Brown and Light show, this results in quite different job
assignments than produced by the change in tenure method. Brown & Light, supra note
621, tbl. 3, at 231.
624. Roughly consistent with Brown and Light's Partition T, this method finds more
ends to jobs than their method since it does not require that the following month be
reported to be on a new job. See Brown & Light, supra note 621, at 223-26.
625. This method is similar to Brown and Light's Partition P. Id. at 226-28. As dis-
cussed earlier, the PSIID data on jobs are less than perfect. See supra note 621. Two
approaches are possible in handling inconsistencies in job-related data. One would be to
force consistency by choosing the first or last observation of a job as the source of infor-
mation on the job. An alternative rule for forcing consistency would be to choose the
values consistent with the majority of observations of the job. See Brown & Light, supra
note 621, at 232 (describing ways to implement these varying methodologies). This would
be necessary if the unit of analysis were the job. Since the unit of analysis in this case
is not the job, but rather a month on a job, I used an alternative method. For each ob-
servation, I calculated which job-months were covered by that observation. This was nec-
essary as individuals are not always interviewed during the same month of the year. For
example, a person could have been interviewed in March 1977, in April 1978, and in
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Since this Article seeks to exploit the cross-state, cross-time
variation in the employment-at-will rule, the location of a person at
a particular time is crucial since it controls assignment of the legal-
environment variables. Although, as with other parts of the PSID,
the data are less than ideal in this regard, a few reasonable as-
sumptions are sufficient to locate most individuals.6" Finally, I
March 1979. The job information from the 1978 interview would apply to the period
April 1977-April 1978, while the job information from the 1979 interview would apply to
the period May 1978-March 1979. The information from that observation was then attrib-
uted to the applicable months.
A similar method of division of data was applied to personal data with two impor-
tant differences. First, some data on individuals are not collected each year. Education, for
example, is collected only when a individual becomes head of a family unit and in cer-
tain other years. All heads of households were asked about education in 1968 and 1975
or in the initial year a head is present. ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR PROGRAM, INSTrrUTE FOR
SOCIAL RESEARCH, USER GUIDE TO THE PANEL STUDY OF INCoME DYNAMICS D-8-9
(1984). Second, some information is collected on a calendar-year basis, rather than on an
interview-year basis. For example, individuals are asked whether they have moved since
the last interview, but are asked what their family income was for the last calendar year.
Compare, for example, interview year 1988 questions A18 ("Have you (HEAD) moved
any time since the spring of 1987?") and G13 ("How much did you (HEAD) earn alto-
gether from wages or salaries in 1987, that is, before anything was deducted for taxes or
other things?"). ISR, supra note 622, at 9, 35 (WAVE XXI, 1988) Calendar-year data are
distributed among job-months on a calendar-year basis. A job-month observation may
contain data from interview year t on a job, but from interview year t-1 or t I on per-
sonal characteristics. Data collected less than annually were distributed beginning at the
time of collection.
626. Ideally, the PSID questionnaire would ask individuals where they lived in each
month of the past year. Next best would be questions about the number of moves com-
bined with some information about when the individual moved. What the PSID actually
contains is a set of two questions:
1. Have you (HEAD) moved since the spring of 19xx? ISR, supra note 622, at 14
(WAVE XXI, 1988); Id. at 10 (WAVE XX, 1987); Id. at 10 (WAVE XIX, 1986); Id. at
10 (WAVE XVIII, 1985); Id. at 8 (WAVE XVII, 1984); Id. at 16 (WAVE XVI, 1983);
Id. at 14 (WAVE XV, 1982); Id. at 14 (WAVE XIV, 1981); Id. at 12 (WAVE XIII,
1980); Id. at 12 (WAVE XII, 1979); Id. at 25 (WAVE XI, 1978); Id. at 11 (WAVE X,
1977); Id. at 12 (WAVE IX, 1976).
If the answer is yes, the individual is asked:
2. What month was that? Id. at 14 (WAVE XXI, 1988); Id. at 10 (WAVE XX,
1987); Id. at 10 (WAVE XIX, 1986); Id. at 10 (WAVE XVIII, 1985); Id. at 8 (WAVE
XVII, 1984); Id. at 16 (WAVE XVI, 1983); Id. at 14 (WAVE XV, 1982); Id. at 14
(WAVE XIV, 1981); Id. at 12 (WAVE XII, 1980); Id. at 12 (WAVE XII, 1979); Id. at
25 (WAVE XI, 1978); Id. at 11 (WAVE X, 1977); Id. at 12 (WAVE IX, 1976). The
month moved has been asked only since 1975, making determining pre-1975 location
impossible for interstate movers.
This can be combined with information on the current state and state from the past
year, if the individual were the head of household and in the sample in the immediately
prior year, and the interview dates for both years, to assign a state to each month of the
period between interviews.
This is less than ideal for several reasons. First, an individual may not appear in the
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used information only from interview years 1976627 through
1988.628 Table C-1 and Table C-2 give the descriptive statistics
prior year sample as a head of household. For those individuals who both moved during
the past interview year and became new heads of household in that year, I discarded
months prior to the move since the prior state was unknown. Second, all we know about
movers is that they moved at least once during the past year. As they may have moved
several times and lived in more than two states, this procedure may incorrectly assign
those individuals to states during months between moves. For example, suppose an indi-
vidual lived in New Jersey at the time of his 1978 interview, in March. He moved to
Pennsylvania in July 1978, and then back to New Jersey in January 1979. The procedure
described above will incorrectly assign this individual to New Jersey for the entire time
between March 1978 and his 1979 interview.
This problem is less serious than it seems, however. It potentially affects only the
movers. (Twenty-two percent of individuals in interview year 1988, for example.) JAMEs
N. MORGAN, PANEL STUDY OF INcoME DYNAMICS 1968-1988 (WAVES I-XXI) [computer
file] (Survey Research Center prod.) (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research dist. 1991). Some multiple movers may be relocating only within the same state,
in which case they have been correctly assigned. In addition, as described above, observa-
tions are based only on months during which an individual is employed. A multiple mov-
er who is motivated by job search, for example, would therefore only be in the sample
while he is employed. Since locating a job would end the search, and presumably the
moves as well, the months during which he is searching and misassigned will not be in
the sample.
Interview year 1982 presents an additional problem. In that year the PSID question-
naire asked only if the individual moved, not in what month the person moved. ISR,
supra note 622, at 14 (WAVE XV, 1982). (The omission appears to have simply been an
oversight.) This presents a problem for those individuals who both moved and changed
states. Since the location is critical to the assignment of the legal variables, the observa-
tions for interview year 1982 for these individuals were dropped from the sample.
A final problem with location comes from the method of bracketing the interview
dates. Until interview year 1980, the interview date is present in the data as a code repre-
senting a range of dates. For brackets which fall entirely within a single month, the
month assigned was the month containing the bracket period. The bracket dates for an
additional set of respondents (55.3% of 1976 respondents, 64.5% of 1977 respondents,
39.5% of 1978 respondents, and 35.7% of 1979 respondents, MORGAN, supra) included
one to three days (most brackets contained 14 days) from a second month. These were
assigned the month in which the majority of days fell. A small number of respondents
had daes given as after July 1st (2.3% of 1976 respondents, 1.2% of 1977 respondents,
0.5% of 1978 respondents, and 1.0% of 1979 respondents, id.) and were assigned to July.
Finally, a very small number were listed as "not applicable" or "don't know" (0.1% of
1976 respondents, 0.4% of 1977 respondents, 0.3% of 1978 respondents, and 0.4% of
1979 respondents, id.); these individuals were dropped.
627. I also used location information from interview year 1975 to locate people during
1975-76.
628. Pre-1976 interviews did not include sufficient detail to locate individuals who
moved during the year. Data from PSID interview years 1968-74 has more serious prob-
lems with job tenure. See Brown & Light, supra note 621, at 239-45 (discussing various
problems associated with this body of data). The consequences of excluding pre-1976 data
are relatively small. As Table C-3 shows, only a small percentage of changes in the law
under all three dating methods used occurred before January 1976, and thus relatively few
states who switch are not potentially present in both pre- and post-change status.
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for the samples. Additional tables which report results not reported
in the body of the Article are available from the author.
Table C-1 Descriptive Statistics, All Observations
Variable Morriss Krueger/RAND
Nonunion Union Nonunion Union
ENDJOBP 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.13) 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.13)
ENDJOBT 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.17) 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.17)
PUBPOL-M 0.42 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50)
PUBPOL-K 0.34 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48) 0.34 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48)
PUBPOL-R 0.43 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 0.43 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50)
CONT-M 0.30 (0.46) 0.29 (0.45) 0.30 (0.46) 0.29 (0.45)
CONT-K 0.21 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40)
CONT-R 0.24 (0.43) 0.23 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43) 0.23 (0.42)
ICOV-M 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.19) 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.19)
ICOV-K 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.21) 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.21)
ICOV-R 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.19) 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.19)
EDUC 13.24 (3.45) 11.90 (3.57) 13.25 (3.45) 11.90 (3.57)
TENURE 87.33 (101.0) 127.3 (115.5) 87.4 (101.1) 127.6 (115.6)
AGE 36.77 (11.68) 38.59 (11.54) 36.76 (11.67) 38.60 (11.54)
KIDS 1.09 (1.20) 1.31 (1.28) 1.09 (1.20) 1.31 (1.28)
PAYBYHR 0.39 (0.49) 0.87 (0.34) 0.39 (0.49) 0.86 (0.34)
MARRIED 0.83 (0.37) 0.89 (0.31) 0.83 (0.38) 0.89 (0.31)
COLLEGE 0.29 (0.45) 0.07 (0.25) 0.29 (0.45) 0.07 (0.25)
I AGFOR 0.03 (0.16) 0.003 (0.06) 0.03 (0.16) 0.004 (0.06)
N MINE 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.14)
D CNSTR 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.26)
U TRANS 0.05 (0.22) 0.12 (0.32) 0.05 (0.22) 0.12 (0.32)
S NDMFG 0.12 (0.33) 0.14 (0.35) 0.12 (0.33) 0.14 (0.35)
T UTIL 0.04 (0.19) 0.09 (0.29) 0.04 (0.19) 0.09 (0.29)
R TRADE 0.21 (0.41) 0.09 (0.29) 0.21 (0.41) 0.09 (0.29)
Y FIN 0.06 (0.24) 0.006 (0.08) 0.06 (0.24) 0.006 (0.08)
SRC 0.05 (0.21) 0.02 (0.13) 0.04 (0.21) 0.02 (0.13)
O PROF 0.20 (0.40) 0.06 (0.23) 0.20 (0.40) 0.06 (0.233)
C MGT 0.21 (0.40) 0.03 (0.18) 0.21 (0.41) 0.03 (0.18)
C CLERK 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.22)
U OPER 0.09 (0.29) 0.27 (0.44) 0.09 (0.29) 0.27 (0.44)
P TOPER 0.05 (0.22) 0.11 (0.32) 0.05 (0.22) 0.11 (0.32)
N 153,015 54,349 152,689 54,204
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Table C-2 Descriptive Statistics, Under Forty
Variable Morriss Krueger/RAND
Nonunion Union Nonunion Union
ENDJOBP 0.03 (0.18) 0.02 (0.14) 0.03 (0.18) 0.02 (0.14)
ENDJOBT 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.18)
PUBPOL-M 0.43 (0.49) 0.44 (0.50) 0.43 (0.49) 0.44 (0.50)
PUBPOL-K 0.35 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48)
PUBPOL-R 0.43 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50)
CONT-M 0.31 (0.46) 0.28 (0.45) 0.31 (0.46) 0.28 (0.45)
CONT-K 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41)
CONT-R 0.24 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43)
ICOV-M 0.06 (0.24) 0.03 (0.18) 0.06 (0.24) 0.03 (0.18)
ICOV-K 0.06 (0.24) 0.04 (0.19) 0.06 (0.24) 0.04 (0.19)
ICOV-R 0.05 (0.22) 0.03 (0.17) 0.05 (0.22) 0.03 (0.17)
EDUC 13.51 (2.68) 12.44 (2.51) 13.51 (2.68) 12.44 (2.51)
TENURE 54.44 (61.93) 75.47 (63.24) 54.45 (61.90) 75.58 (63.26)
AGE 29.76 (5.03) 30.1 (4.9) 29.76 (5.03) 30.11 (4.91)
KIDS 1.20 (1.18) 1.53 (1.24) 1.20 (1.18) 1.53 (1.24)
PAYBYHR 0.42 (0.49) 0.89 (0.32) 0.42 (0.49) 0.89 (0.32)
MARRIED 0.81 (0.39) 0.89 (0.34) 0.81 (0.39) 0.87 (0.34)
COLLEGE 0.30 (0.46) 0.08 (0.27) 0.30 (0.46) 0.08 (0.27)
I AGFOR 0.03 (0.16) 0.08 (0.27) 0.03 (0.16) 0.005 (0.07)
N MINE 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13)
D CONSTR 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.27) 0.09 (0.29) 0.11 (0.31)
U TRANS 0.05 (0.21) 0.11 (0.31) 0.05 (0.22) 0.11 (0.31)
S NDURMFG 0.12 (0.33) 0.13 (0.33) 0.13 (0.33) 0.13 (0.33)
T UTIL 0.04 (0.19) 0.12 (0.32) 0.04 (0.19) 0.12 (0.32)
R TRADE 0.22 (0.42) 0.10 (0.29) 0.22 (0.42) 0.10 (0.29)
Y FINANCE 0.05 (0.23) 0.004 (0.06) 0.05 (0.23) 0.003 (0.06)
SRC 0.04 (0.20) 0.02 (0.13) 0.04 (0.20) 0.01 (0.13)
0 PROF 0.21 (0.40) 0.06 (0.24) 0.21 (0.40) 0.06 (0.24)
C MGT 0.19 (0.39) 0.02 (0.15) 0.19 (0.39) 0.02 (0.15)
C CLERK 0.08 (0.27) 0.04 (0.10) 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.21)
U OPER 0.11 (0.30) 0.29 (0.45) 0.10 (0.30) 0.29 (0.45)
P TOPER 0.06 (0.23) 0.10 (0.31) 0.06 (0.23) 0.10 (0.30)
N 102,143 31,800 101,948 31,680
